This paper critically examines Alvin W. Gouldner’s theory of the New Class, focusing on his discussing on the rise of the technical intelligentsia in the capitalist industrial societies. Specifically, it attempts to explicate this claim in *The Future Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (1979):

The New Class’s intelligentsia are controlled by two echelons above them: one, the bureaucratic officialdom, the “line officials” directly above them; two, the political appointees managing the bureaucracy at its pinnacle, who are not appointed on the basis of their technical competence, but because they represent money capital or politically reliable “commissars.” The fundamental structure within which most technical intelligentsia work, then, systematically generates tensions between them, on the one side, and the bureaucratic officials and managers, on the other. *It is within the bureaucratic structure that much of the technical intelligentsia of the New Class begins its struggle to rise. It has its first muffled confrontations with the old class within the precincts of a specific organizational structure, the bureaucracy.*

There are at least two good reasons why this claim is worth a detailed examination. First, some of the ideas underlying it date far back in Gouldner’s early works on industrial bureaucracy, and because of this, it provides a legitimate opportunity to integrate the early Gouldner and the later Gouldner, as well as to identify aspects of the development of his sociology. While some discussions of his studies on bureaucracy and organization analysis have appeared in the *Theory and Society* special issue (1982) on Gouldner, they do not deal with profound continuities between the two clusters of his works. We stress, in this paper, that elements of his works on industrial bureaucracy clearly foreshadow some central tenets in his New Class Project. In the studies on bureaucracy, we find not only the seeds of his later view of bureaucracy as an arena of class contestation (i.e., between the new and the old classes) but also of his view of the New Class intellectuals as the monopolist of the culture of critical discourse (CCD), and as the (flawed) universal class.

Second, Gouldner’s view of the rise of the New Class technical intelligentsia in bureaucratic organizations points to the need for its empirical investigation. Here, Gouldner comes closest to the specification of a rather concrete “model” of the position of the New Class intelligentsia, opening a way for a partial empirical examination of the New Class theory. This, however, is not coincidental, since the early Gouldner was, to a considerable extent, an empirical researcher. In integrating the early and the later Gouldner, this paper explicates the more empirically relevant models of the New Class intelligentsia within the capitalist industrial bureaucracy. Before prematurely judging that Gouldner’s New Class theory “cannot explain the immediate situation or future of any specific group of intellectuals,” we suggest that it is necessary to explore possible ways of relating the theory with empirical investigation. The aspect of the theory which deals with the technical intelligentsia is particularly suitable for such a purpose. After all, Gouldner himself was throughout his life critical of the “pure theorizing.” Moreover, in the process of explicating the models, we find inconsistencies and contradictions in his theory, notably, around his treatment of the professionals as

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*Key Word: bureaucracy, intellectuals, Gouldner

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the New Class force. We propose a major revision and sophistication of the Gouldner model of the technical intelligentsia, using, among others, his The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology (1976). The whole essay, thus, is also a partial exploration of a question: What Gouldner would have done if he had had time to pursue his New Class Project?

In order to facilitate the discussion, four models of the position of the technical intelligentsia are depicted. Model I is derived from Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (1954) and other works on organizations. Model II is abstracted largely from The Future of Intellectuals book. Model III and IV represent modification and enlargement of Model II. It should be noted, at this point, that the models apply only to the technical intelligentsia in the advanced capitalist societies, and their scope is limited when compared with Gouldner’s effort to advance the view of the New Class of both technical intelligentsia and humanistic intellectuals struggling to rise to power both in capitalism and socialism. There also exists a danger of drawing Gouldner’s theses unnecessarily close to the managerialist/Technocratic version of the New Class theory. Yet, on the other hand, the models represent a major crossing point where Gouldner’s theoretical interests and their empirical supports possibly merge, both being rooted in his whole works as a sociologist. The discussion below follows these models in order.

1 STUDIES ON INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY

In an article “Organizational Analysis” (1959), which summarizes most of his works on bureaucracy, Gouldner distinguishes two major images of organizations in sociology. One is the “natural system model” which is in the tradition of Comte and is exemplified by the functionalists such as Parsons and Selznick. The other is the “rational model,” which ultimately derives from Saint-Simon and is exemplified by Max Weber. Gouldner, on the whole, follows the latter model in stressing the crucial role of rationality in bureaucratic organizations. In rejecting the “metaphysical pathos” of the inevitability of bureaucracy, he seeks the explanation of bureaucratization which does not rely on the technological requirement (Parsons) nor the sheer size of the organizations (Blau), but on the self-interested action of the members of different strata, which are rational from their point of view.

Drift toward a “Class Analysis at the Point of Production”

The key concept here seems to be that of “organizational tension” which occurs between various sub-parts (i.e., strata) within bureaucracy. The natural system model is inadequate because it tends to see the system as a whole as sharing a common goal, and to overstate the degree of integration among its sub-parts. To say that an organization as a whole has a definite goal means no more than to say that the top administrators have such a goal. For the Gouldner under heavy Mertonian influence, the natural system perspective amounts to the dismissal of the “functional autonomy” of the system sub-parts, which practically refer to the strata within an organization. Thus, a better approach to bureaucracy, Gouldner writes, “would require specifications of the typical ends of various strata within the organization.”

The major strata described in Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy and Wildcat Strike (1954) are plant management, middle management (supervisors and foremen) and the workers. The two volumes contain rich and vivid observations of the interactions among these “strata,” particularly around the tensions and conflicts generated by the industrial hierarchy. Wildcat Strike, in particular, illustrates how the struggle between the management (which tries to raise productivity by introducing new machines and by imposing “close supervision”) and workers (who resist the management by sticking to the traditional “indulgency patterns”) results in the strike.

As Burawoy points out, Gouldner ultimately generalizes his study results into a general theory
of bureaucratization (in Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy) or of group conflict (in Wildcat Strike). In each book, the highly theoretical and analytical summaries lead us away from the illumination of the specific nature of the events he describes: “the industrial conflict in a capitalist society.” Nonetheless, these early works elsewhere exhibit the “influence of Marxian metatheory, the focus on internal contradictions as a source of change,” and are in that sense forerunner of the recent Marxist studies of the labor process exemplified by Richard Edwards and others. Part of Gouldner’s originality as a sociologist of organizations in the fifties, then, lies in his tendency to view organizations as an arena of class (or “strata” in these works) struggle. It is this theme of class struggle-within-bureaucracy that reappears in The Future of Intellectuals.

2) Experts and Representative Bureaucracy

Yet, the strata identified in the two reports, i.e., management, supervisors and workers, do not exhaust the (possibly) active players within bureaucracy. There is still another stratum identified in Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. This is the “experts.” The finding of this stratum actually goes back to his interest in the continuity between Saint-Simon and Weber on their view of rationality in bureaucracy. In closely examining the two, Gouldner finds differences in them. For Saint-Simon, authority in modern organizations rest on science and technology alone. For Weber, however, while being based upon knowledge and expertise, the authority is also dependent on nonrational elements (discipline). This leads Gouldner to point out that Weber’s theory of bureaucracy contains two rather heterogeneous sources of authority which are left unclarified:

Weber thought of bureaucracy as a Janus-faced organization. On the one side, it was administration based on expertise; while on the other, it was administration based on discipline. In the first emphasis, obedience is invoked as a means to an end; an individual obeys because the rule or order is felt to be the best known method of realizing some goal. In his second conception, Weber held that bureaucracy was a mode of administration in which obedience was an end in itself. The individual obeys the order, setting aside judgements either of its rationality or morality, primarily because of the position occupied by the person commanding. The content of the order is not examinable.

Based on the two sources of authority, Gouldner now posits two types or patterns of bureaucracy: “punishment-centered” bureaucracy which enforces rules through disciplinary sanction and coercion, on the one hand, and “representative” bureaucracy which enforces rules using education and persuasion. Gouldner then shifts his attention from the types of bureaucracy to the dominant agent within each type, and to the power relationship between these agents or strata:

In fact, it may be wise to adopt the working hypothesis that representative bureaucracy in industrial setting operates in a “social space” whose contours, opportunities, and barriers are defined and shaped by punishment-centered bureaucracy. Grounds for favoring this hypothesis ... may be seen, if instead of discussing the “representative” and “punishment-centered” patterns, the typical authority roles within each is examined. To facilitate this, the authority role in the punishment-centered bureaucracy shall be called the “true bureaucrats,” while the authority role in the representative bureaucracy will be called the “experts.”

For Gouldner, then, the dominant stratum in the punishment-centered bureaucracy is the “true bureaucrat” who justifies the rules and orders by recourse to his/her formal position of authority; its counterpart in the representative bureaucracy is the “expert” who justifies them by recourse to his/her technical knowledge and its use on the behalf of the subordinates, i.e., the workers. Clearly, the
distinctive character of the mode of justification attributed to the “expert” is one of the sources of Gouldner's later concept of the culture of critical discourse (CCD) which, he emphasizes, “requires that the validity of claims be justified without reference to the speaker’s societal position or authority.”17 The idea of CCD, then, does not suddenly come up in his study of sociolinguistics in the seventies, but has a deeper root in his critical interpretation of Weber and its application to research in the fifties.

More importantly, in Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, Gouldner pays considerable attention to the power-asymmetry between the two types of bureaucracy, or the two dominant strata within each. As apparent from the above quotation, the representative bureaucracy is seen as subordinated to the punishment-centered bureaucracy, and vice versa. This means, of course, that the “experts” are subordinated to the “true bureaucrats” and not vice versa. In fact, Gouldner writes that “it is the true bureaucrat who comes to man the bastions of the power system, establishing himself as a gatekeeper through whom the expert is obliged to operate.”18 Here Gouldner sees the “true bureaucrat” as an independent power, rather than as the agent of the capitalist owner of industry, and as subordinated to the latter. Rather than examining the structural positions of the two, Gouldner suspects that the power asymmetry has to do with the relative strength of particularistic loyalty to the company among the two “social roles,” i.e., the “true bureaucrats” and the “experts,” and for the time being shifts his attention to the problem of "cosmopolitans" (experts) and “locals” (bureaucrats) within organizations.19 Despite this digression into social psychology, it should be evident by now that a New Class theme of the power relationship between a stratum which uses CCD-like, rational mode of speech and another stratum which does not is firmly rooted in Gouldner’s earlier writings.

3) The Clinical Sociology and the Problem of the “Better” Bureaucracy

While practicing a fairly “normal” academic sociology, the early Gouldner already exhibited an uneasy distance from the notion of “value-free” social science. The key concept in this context is that of “clinical sociology.”20 The social clinician, going beyond the social engineer, does not take the clients’ definition of problems (“disease”) at their face value, but tries to identify the underlying latent problems independently. In the case of social problems which usually involve contending parties, the social clinician—sociologist—is expected to diagnose the problems on his/her own and help those in trouble out of malaise. The clinician, unlike the social engineer, takes more of a universalistic standpoint, and does not leave the value-judgement entirely to the client.21

Specifically, in the context of industrial bureaucracy, Gouldner emphasizes that:

... the distinction between “representative” and “punishment-centered” bureaucracy has certain fairly obvious policy implications. Clearly, on a policy level, unlike that of sheer sociological analysis, it is often necessary to choose between one or the other of the operative forms of bureaucracy. Which shall be chosen, “representative” or “punishment-centered” bureaucracy?22

This is obviously a question leading to the choice of the representative bureaucracy, which is characterized by more cooperative and collaborative relationship between management and workers: for example, more frequent use of education and socialization rather than punishment to cope with rule-violations. Moreover, Gouldner argues that “representative bureaucracy, or Weber’s administration by the expert, entails a proto-democratic process of legitimation,” provided that the expert’s authority and knowledge is used to further the workers’ ends.23 It should be clear, then, that Gouldner is inclined to see some emancipatory potential in the staff-experts who further workers’ welfare. Gouldner’s “clinical sociology” logically implies that he would have to work for the replacement of the “punishment-centered” bureaucracy by the “representative” bureaucracy, i.e., the re-
placement of the “true bureaucrats” by the “experts.” While the two “patterns” of bureaucracy appear to be “functional alternatives” for the industrial administration in *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, they are not so in the sense that each pattern reflects, among others, different balance of class powers. The choice between the two, then, cannot be a mere “policy choice,” but entails a major reorganization of industry. Gouldner’s “clinical sociology,” as applied to the industrial administration, designates the “experts” as a sort of emancipatory class and is intended to help its rise to power. This, again, foreshadows his later characterization of intellectuals (in its generic usage, i.e., including both technical intelligentsia and humanistic intellectuals) as the “universal class,” though its “flawed” nature had not yet been noticed in the early works.

2. THE NEW CLASS PROJECT AND THE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA IN BUREAUCRACY

Nearly two decades after *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, Gouldner came forward with an ambitious theory which deals with the rise of New Class as a world-historical phenomenon. In *The Future of Intellectuals*, he advances a view that a New Class is rising both in the capitalist and in the socialist societies and that the substance of the New Class is the monopoly of culture or knowledge. The knowledge class, which is defined by a shared culture of critical discourse (CCD), includes both the “technical intelligentsia” and the “humanistic intellectuals.” The intelligentsia and the intellectuals are now replacing the money-capitalists in the West; the party bureaucrats in the East. The New Class, according to Gouldner, is also a “flawed universal class,” which has greater rationality and emancipatory potential than any other class but pursues its own self-interest and initiates a new type of class domination rather than abolishing it.

These theses undoubtedly grew out of Gouldner’s works on social theory and on Marxism, particularly after *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (1970).24 Also, there are some other sources such as his interest in the sociolinguistics (Bernstein) and the earlier New Class theories (Machajsky, Veblen, Burnham etc.). The evolution of Gouldner’s thought from *The Coming Crisis* to *The Future of Intellectuals* is itself a significant topic which has been discussed elsewhere.25 Nevertheless, his earlier writings on bureaucracy also exhibit some vital, but less obvious, connection with the New Class Project. More importantly, in discussing the technical intelligentsia as a major section of the New Class, Gouldner attempts to regrasp his studies of bureaucracy, and comes close to a specification of an explicit model of a “class struggle” in bureaucracy. (Model II). In fact, it is not difficult to identify the ways in which the three earlier problematics (in the previous section) are regrasped and reformulated in the overall framework of the New Class theory.

1) The Class Struggle Within Bureaucracy: A Civil War Within the Upper Classes

The early Gouldner, as noted above, stressed the need to find the dynamics of industrial bureaucracy in the interplay of the actions of various strata within it. Yet, due to the exclusion of the owner-capitalist from the analysis, he tended to treat the “true bureaucrats” as a distinctive stratum with its own logic and interests and to miss the structural subordination of the latter to the former group. In analyzing the tension between the “experts” and the “bureaucrats,” he employed a rather inconsequential social psychology of organizational “role players.”

In *The Future of Intellectuals*, however, Gouldner redefines the “true bureaucrats” as the uncritical agents (“transmission belt”) of the interests of the owner-capitalists. Simultaneously, he regrasps the “experts” as the nascent knowledge class (technical intelligentsia) that represents and pursues its own interests.

(The bureaucratic official) serves as a transmission belt. He is passing orders or policies that
he is expected to obey whatever his personal feeling and whether or not he agrees with them. There orders or policies are, then, placed beyond the domain of the culture of critical discourse. The old bureaucratic official was defined to be an “agent,” uncritically obedient to the organization’s top managers who, in turn, transmit the ideological and economic interests of social groups outside of the bureaucracy.\(^{26}\)

Here we can think of the “top managers” above as the “executives” and the “outside social group” as the capital-owners of the organizations. As represented in Model\(\text{II}\), then, the tacit tension between the two upper strata in *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* is here transfigured into the explicit struggle, and confrontation between the lieutenants of the moneyed class, on the one side, and the rising knowledge class, on the other. Moreover, while the worker-management confrontation in *Wildcat Strike* recedes into the background (though not forgotten), the “civil war within the upper classes” comes to the front.\(^{27}\) Gouldner calls the conflict as “the first muffled confrontation” between the old and the new classes, as quoted in the beginning of this essay. The mapping of these relations is presented in Model\(\text{II}\).

2) From the “Expert” to the “Technical Intelligentsia”

In the organizational analysis, the “experts” were defined essentially in functional terms, i.e., in terms of their supply of necessary expertise and technical skills. By contrast, in Model\(\text{II}\), the technical intelligentsia (and other New Class members) are essentially defined in terms of their *monopoly* of knowledge and not simply of their functional utility for production. In other words, the intelligentsia as knowledge class appears as cultural capitalists or bourgeoisie who accumulate and live off their “cultural capital.”

Strictly speaking, the New Class of the intelligentsia (and the intellectuals) is defined by the monopolistic possession of CCD. The essential characteristic of CCD is the use of the “elaborated linguistic variant” as against the “restricted” variant of the non-intellectuals. The earlier distinction between the modes of justification of command in the “bureaucrats” and the “experts” (which was extrapolated from Weber’s theory of bureaucracy) is now regrasped as a special case of a wider distinction between the linguistic culture of the old class (non-knowledge class) and that of the New Class (knowledge class). The implication of the above analysis is that both the “bureaucrats” and their capitalist master act according to the logic of money capital, while the New Class intelligentsia pursue the logic of cultural capital:

The New Class may oppose ... systems that allocate privileges and incomes on the basis of controlling stock of money. ... under certain conditions it is prepared to remove or restrict the special incomes of the old class: profit, rents, interest.\(^{28}\)

3) From the “Benign” Experts to the Flawed Universal Class

It should be recalled that in organizational analysis, the “experts” were seen as a possible agent of emancipation of those who suffer from the malaise of industrial hierarchy. It was the moral obligation for a clinical sociologist to help the expert-centered “representative” bureaucracy to grow. The early Gouldner, thus, stressed the positive side of the expert-technical intelligentsia, but did not recognize its negative or “dark” side. The earlier position is essentially close to Galbraith and others’ view of the New Class as “benign technocrats,” which Gouldner later rejected on the grounds that it “obscures the manner in which the New Class egoistically pursues its own special vested interests.”\(^{29}\) The later view stated in *The Future of Intellectuals* is considerably more sophisticated than the earlier one, which had seen them as purely benign. The New Class intelligentsia, according to
Gouldner,

will benignly increase the funds available for welfare, may even accept worker participation in setting incentives, increase consumerism, even increasing job security. Yet, they remain an elite. They have no intention of instituting a social order in which all are equal regardless of their cultural capital.30

This, of course, is linked with the idea of the “flawed universal class.” The concept directly comes from his study of Marxism, but its origin also goes back to his concern with the problem of the self-interest of academic sociologists, which starts from his “Anti-Minotaur” (1962) essay onward, i.e., only after his departure from the earlier organizational analysis.31 In this sense, there is a dramatic break between the two assessments of the role of the “men of knowledge.” And yet, it should be emphasized that the emancipatory and progressive elements of the technical intelligentsia do not disappear in the New Class theory. At least, it is fair to say that Gouldner’s concept of “flawed universal class” is partially rooted in his earlier studies of industrial bureaucracy.

3 TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA IN BUREAUCRACY: TOWARD A REFINED MODEL

Up to now, we have examined the development of Gouldner’s views on the position and role of the technical intelligentsia in capitalism, from Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy to The Future of Intellectuals. In so doing, we have emphasized the eminently empirical character of what may be called the “models” of technical intelligentsia. Model II, in particular, represents an explication of his relevant writings largely in The Future of Intellectuals book. However, it is by no means a final one, for Gouldner’s other works imply further revision of the model. The revision brings us Model III, which is theoretically more adequate, and empirically more realistic, than Model II. Model IV, in addition, represents a preliminary specification of the power configuration of the New Class intelligentsia in the wider society.

There are at least two serious problems in Model II, as it stands. The first, and crucial, problem is concerned with the rather misleading identification of the “professionals” with the New Class intelligentsia. The second is the neglect of the role of the agents outside the industrial bureaucracy, notably, the state and the academy, in the rise of the intelligentsia. In the following, we mostly deal with the first problematic, generating Model III. The second problematic is only briefly considered in relation to Model IV.

1) Professionals and the New Class Intelligentsia

It is important to note that Gouldner elsewhere implies that his New Class intelligentsia are actually identical with the professional experts. His article, “Prologue to a Theory of Revolutionary Intellectuals” (1976) suggests that the intelligentsia are “professionals” who are inherently more conservative than the other major sector of the New Class, i.e., the humanistic intellectuals:

The intelligentsia ... are very “sane” or, at least, modest persons. It is this sanity and modesty that is expressed in the sobriety and prudence of the “professionalism” claimed by a technical intelligentsia. To claim one is a “professional” is to make a modest claim. It is to acknowledge one’s deb to a body of technology, knowledge, skill, and to the “community” in which this resides. Professionalism is the communism of the modest.

Similarly, in The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology, Gouldner makes it quite clear that the technical intelligentsia “repress” goal rationality, confining the themselves to the realm of instru-
mental rationality. The intelligentsia thus becomes “the main source of a general utility, all-purpose instrumental purposive action” in the hands of the hegemonic class (capitalist-owners) and its trusted agent (executives), which define the “non-negotiable” goals of the bureaucratic machine according to the logic of the “money capital,” i.e., profit maximization and capital accumulation. In stressing their “exclusive devotion to the development of means and instruments,” notes Gouldner, the intelligentsia tacitly supports the political formulation of goals on the basis of the “money capital” rather than their scientific determination on the basis of the CCD. It should be clear, then, that in Gouldner’s view of the actual (as opposed to “conceivable”) position of the intelligentsia, they are exactly like other professionals who sell knowledge and skill in the market and obtain higher income because of the artificial scarcity of such qualities. They are merely “positively privileged” in the labor market transaction, and thus do not have any distinctively anti-capitalist interests. Obviously, it is not reasonable to refer to those professionalized technical intelligentsia as a section of the New Class, since they are well integrated into the existing order of advanced capitalist societies. After all, how can such a professionalized intelligentsia who stick to instrumental rationality challenge and replace the “moneyed class”? Some of the discussion in The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology bears upon this question.

Here, Gouldner suggests a possible “radicalization” of the technical intelligentsia, who liberate themselves from the narrow proclivity towards instrumental rationality and aspires to assume increasing role in the setting of goal. The radicalization is likely to come about, according to Gouldner, partly in the process of the intelligentsia’s pursuit of their own status interests:

If we divest ourselves of any notion of instrumental rationality as a Geist-like, disembodied wraith, and see it instead as part of the occupational culture of experts and technicians who constitute a specific group with status interests they wish to protect and advance, and for which they require political allies, and which, in turn, requires an ideology acceptable to their allies, it then becomes clear: technicians and experts are forced to go beyond instrumental rationality, and to generate a larger morality.35

The intelligentsia need political allies and larger social legitimacy, if they seriously pursue their self interests. To do so, Gouldner suggests, they have to push goals which have appeal to other social groups, particularly, the working class. He also expects a future deterioration of the labor market for the intelligentsia to contribute to the radicalization. The underlining cause of these processes is a deep-seated frustration or resentment of the intelligentsia at being “controlled by those incompetent to judge their performances and whose control, therefore, is experienced as irrational.”

Szelenyi’s discussion of the concept of CCD further clarifies the division within the intelligentsia. He suggests that CCD is better understood as a generic concept which captures the distinctive characteristics of modern (as opposed to pre-modern) discourse: it is self-grounded (i.e., has no reference to the sacred) and theoretic (i.e., trans-contextual). CCD as such, then, defines modern intellectuals in general. What is consequential for the New Class theory, Szelenyi suggests, is not the CCD per se but types of discourse within CCD: one with emphasis on techne or reasoning about techniques and the other with emphasis on telos or reasoning about goals. Using this scheme, we can reconceptualize the discussion above in the following way. The professionalized intelligentsia espouse the first type of CCD, and are “techno-crats” in the proper sense of the word. They are in general comfortably accommodated into the advanced capitalism as a privileged, relatively autonomous stratum with particularistic interests, and better to be grasped as a “knowledge stratum” rather than as a “knowledge class,” since there is no antagonism between such intelligentsia and the capitalist. The knowledge stratum may still have certain tension with the “moneyed class.” Yet, the very professionalization can be seen as a successful mechanism of coping with such strain utilized
by the “money capital.” On the other hand, if the intelligentsia have any potential of unseating the capitalists and the bureaucrats alike, they must go beyond the instrumental rationality and generate alternative goals which confront the latter. At the same time, such goals must have appeal to the working class below them so that the intelligentsia can establish the social legitimacy which leads to their social hegemony. If such “radicalized” intelligentsia (or “teleo-crats”) is conceivable, then they may be properly called the “knowledge class” in embryo (Model III). An obvious critique of Gouldner in this reformulation is that CCD per se is not specific enough to define the New Class intelligentsia. Empirically, then, the formation of the New Class intelligentsia is confirmed only if one identifies the radicalized intelligentsia who conform to the “teleo-crat” type of CCD in the actual social structure.

2) Toward an Expanded Model: the State and the Academy

At this point, it is stimulating to speculate about the rise of the technical intelligentsia in the overall social structure of advanced capitalist societies. One way to approach this task is to conceive of the rise of the intelligentsia as assisted by the scientized portion of the state bureaucracy and by the scientific institutions which include universities and research organizations.

Particularly relevant to this project is John K. Galbraith’s The New Industrial State.39 In this work, Galbraith identifies two strata which are in the ascendancy in the advanced industrial societies. The “technostructure,” on the one hand, represents scientists, engineers, technicians and planners within the private business enterprise. While different conceptualizations are used, the “technostructure” and Gouldner’s “technical intelligentsia within industrial bureaucracy” have much in common in their empirical referents.40 The “educational and scientific estate,” on the other hand, refers to scientists in universities and in research organizations. Galbraith emphasizes the dependence of the “technostructure” on the “educational and scientific estate” for the supply of trained personnel and for scientific and social innovation. The “technostructure” and the “educational and scientific estate” alike depends on the state bureaucracy for the risk-taking in investments and aggregate demand regulation in the case of the former, or for adequate research funding in the case of the latter. He also notes the possible “mutual identification” between the “techno-structure” and the state bureaucracy.

Model IV incorporates Galbraith’s framework, while simultaneously differentiating the state bureaucracy in a manner parallel to the internal differentiation of industrial bureaucracy in Model III. The “old line bureaucrats” corresponds to the “executives” and the “bureaucrats”; the “scientized bureaucrats” to the “professionalized technical intelligentsia”; and the “evangelistic bureaucrats” to the “radicalized technical intelligentsia,” respectively, in the industrial organization.41 In Model IV, then, the “radicalized intelligentsia,” the “evangelistic bureaucrats,” and the “educational and scientific estate” constitute the new “knowledge class” in embryo, to use Gouldner’s phrase.

An important implication of Model IV lies in the alliance lines which connect the three constituents of the nascent knowledge class, and which also extends to the working class. This broad coalition of the possibly anti-capitalist groups, then, can be seen as a conceivable “united front” for the New Class intelligentsia’s ascendancy in the advanced capitalist societies. At the least, this expanded model sensitizes us to look at a possibly new power configuration which has been neglected in the Marxian class analysis, although there is no doubt about the need for the further elaboration of the model, particularly concerning the treatment of the state bureaucracy.

CONCLUSION

Focusing on the continuities between the early Gouldner and the later Gouldner, this paper has explicated the development of the “models” of the intelligentsia in bureaucracy in the advanced
capitalist societies. It has further pushed the line of investigation initiated by Gouldner and proposed revised models which can be fruitfully examined on the empirical plane.

One of the major messages in Gouldner’s work is that we should take the possibility of the new “knowledge class” domination seriously and analyze various social phenomena from this vantage point. In this context, Gouldner’s position is further clarified when compared with that of Habermas on this matter. Habermas, in his Toward a Rational Society, proposes four models of the relation between expertise (science) and politics.42 In the classical bureaucratic model (or “simple decisionistic model”), administration is differentiated from political decision-making. Bureaucrats specialize in the execution of the decisions made by politicians. In the “expanded decisionistic model,” science intrudes into the choice of appropriate means to achieve given ends. Thus scientific intelligentsia perform the function of choosing the best means for a given end, while the politicians become the bearers of pure existential will. The next is the “technocratic model,” in which the intelligentsia take over the function of politicians and make decisions of their own. Finally, he posits the “pragmatistic model,” which represents the critical interaction between the technical and the practical on the basis of the enlightened popular will.

Notice a striking parallel between Habermas’s and Gouldner’s models. The bureaucrats in the “classical bureaucratic model,” of course, correspond to the (old line) bureaucrats. And the scientific intelligentsia in the “expanded decisionistic model” and in the “technocratic model” in Habermas, respectively, correspond to the professionalized and the radicalized intelligentsia in the Gouldner model. (Note that the term “technocratic model” is misleading as a description of the situation where the intelligentsia take over the political function as well. In light of our discussion, it is rather “teleocratic” than “technocratic.”) This parallelism between the two thinkers makes it easy to identify major disagreements between them. Both regard the “(expanded) decisionistic model” or the professionalized intelligentsia as most descriptive of the intelligentsia’s contemporary situation. Yet, on the one hand, Habermas dismisses the “technocratic model” as inconceivable, whereas Gouldner looks at the radicalized intelligentsia and the possibility of the New Class domination seriously. In fact, Gouldner’s major critique of Habermas centers around the latter’s inattention to the real possibility of the new “knowledge class” domination. As late as in 1980, Gouldner wrote that he “is sharply at variance with” Habermas’s position which “views the intelligentsia as if it had only technical, scientific interests but no class interests or ideological morality of its own.”43 On the other

MODELS OF THE POSITION OF THE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA

MODEL I

Note: ———— means a collaborative relationship.
←→ means a conflictual relationship.
………… means an accommodative relationship.
hand, Habermas takes pains to work out the methods or strategies aimed at the realization of the “pragmatistic model” which, he thinks, is the only model necessarily related to democracy. Much of Habermas’ recent works such as his theory of communicative competence is devoted to the question of how to develop the objective conditions upon which domination-free, self-governance of the people at large come into being. Gouldner, by contrast, has little to say about the path to a genuinely democratic society. Rather he does not seem to believe in its possibility. For better or worse, the reflexive sociologist does not seem to know the limit of his Socratic inquiry.

NOTES
3. Gouldner’s writings in The Future of Intellectuals book were first published in Theory and Society, 6 (1978), original article.
22. *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, 243–244.
23. Ibid., 221.
25. See, for example, the papers in *Theory and Society*, 11 (1982); a special issue on Gouldner.
27. Ibid., 18.
28. Ibid., 20.
29. Ibid., 6.
30. Ibid., 52–53.
34. Ibid., 270.
35. Ibid., 269.
40. Galbraith sees the “technostructure” as already dominating stockholders and managers alike in the corporate decision-making. He also assumes the rise of the “techno-structure” as inevitable because of the ever increasing technological requirement of industry. Gouldner, of course, disagrees with these assessments.
42. J. Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society* (Beacon Press, 1972), chap. 5.
ABSTRACT

This paper examines A.W. Gouldner's theory of the New Class, focusing on his discussions of rise of technical intelligentsia in advanced industrial societies. In so doing, it tries to integrate Gouldner's early, well-known works on bureaucracy and organizational analysis with his later, less well-known works on the sociology of intellectuals and the new class. The paper is organized around the four "models" of the sociological position of the technical intelligentsia within the business corporations, state bureaucracy and the society at large. These "models" are derived from the careful readings of Gouldner's major works such as Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (1954), The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology (1976) and The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (1979). It is hoped that the paper shows a promising line of empirical investigation into the transformation of the social position of the intellectuals and intelligenstia in the contemporary advanced industrial-information societies.