

Research Note

Prolegomena to the Transcendental Philosophy and the Foundation of Theoretical Thought

—Seeking for the Point of Contact with Non-Christian Philosophy—

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Where is the point of contact for the philosophical dialogue between the Christian philosophies and the non-Christian philosophies? This is a crucial problem for us who want eagerly to present our reformational philosophy to students and scholars in such an apostate country as Japan. As Dooyeweerd pointed out, theoretical thinking must necessarily be based on the would-be principle of the pretended autonomy of reason, when the heart as a religious center of human existence is dominated and determined by an apostate religious ground motive. They are not aware of their own religious presuppositions and they think they are grounded on the religiously neutral sound basis of autonomous human reason.

Chapter I.

In order to pursue this theme, I would like to start with the problem of the point of contact (Anknüpfungspunkt) between the regenerate and the unregenerate in evangelizing activities or mission work.

[1] There is no point of contact, no common ground between the regenerate and the unregenerate in an epistemological and ethical sense.

(a) We have to reject any kind of natural theology or synthetic principle whether it be Thomistic or neo-Thomistic or neo-protestant.

a-1 Thomistic Synthesis: *gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit.*

According to Thomistic doctrine it was only the *donum superadditum* which was lost by the fall into sin. The *donum superadditum* was the supra-natural additional gift to restrain the disharmony between the rational part of the soul and other sensuous parts. After the loss of this gift there appeared again a disharmony in the soul of the human being. Therefore, according to Thomism and

Neo-Thomism as well, the human rational nature was not radically corrupted by sin and it was only wounded. The supernatural light of grace comes to heal this wound and mend this disharmony. It means that the supra-natural sphere of grace presupposes the natural sphere of human nature. *Theologia naturalis*, *psychologia naturalis* and *cosmologia naturalis* are the half-true, though wounded, system of truth on which *theologia revelata*, *psychologia revelata* and *cosmologia revelata* should be founded. The super-natural truth of divine revelation mends the natural truth of human intellect and leads it to a perfection. The problem of the point of contact between the regenerate and the un-regenerate cannot appear in this Thomistic thought of accommodation and synthesis. It approves the point of contact in the epistemological and ethical senses in the first place. The natural man has the sound, but wounded, knowledge of God which should be repaired into perfection and this is typical natural theology. This is the reason why Roman Catholicism is always generous to other apostate religions. Religiosity in general is accepted affirmatively as the pre-supposition to the acceptance of the Gospel. Therefore it is easily understood that this thought of accommodation and synthesis in the epistemological sense necessarily turns into a semi-pelagian doctrine of salvation. By the pouring out of the sacred grace of Jesus Christ sufficient observance of the Law in natural men could lead to salvation. There is also accommodation and synthesis in that the act of the will needed on the part of natural man to observe the Law is the necessary precedent to the acceptance of the pouring out of sacred grace. From the beginning of this thought process there is a point of contact in an ethical sense. This is the negation of the biblical doctrine of total depravity in its epistemological and ethical meaning. We cannot agree with this natural theol-

ogy and its synthetic principle.

a - 2 The neo-protestant natural theology of E. Brunner

We must be cautious in our approach to another type of natural theology which is deep-rooted in protestant circles. But something that we can appreciate in Brunner's attitude is that he sincerely thought through the problem of the point of contact in missions. Brunner emphasized apologetics as another task of theology on a line with dogmatics in his article: *Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie* (1929). According to him there are two aspects to this apologetics, attack and fulfilment. With respect to the former it attacks the illusionary axiom of self-sufficiency as the final screen or final reference-point of natural reason for the men to whom we preach the Gospel. At the same time with respect to the latter aspect it fulfils the longing that natural reason has conceived by nature from the beginning. Brunner named this kind of apologetics *Eristik*. In its fulfilment aspect this *Eristik* contains a seed of danger to natural theology. After all he admitted four aspects of the mind in natural men: *Wortmächtigkeit, das Weltbewusstsein, die Gotteserkenntnis, das Schuld-, -Sünde- und Verlorenbewusstsein* as the points of contact in evangelization in his article: *Die Frage nach dem „Anknüpfungspunkt“ als Problem der Theologie* (1932). A danger to natural theology being pointed out by Barth, he proposed the idea of the remnant of the image of God as the possibility of response on the part of natural men to the Gospel (*die Verantwortlichkeit*). He asserted that the image of God remains in a formal sense, though it was lost in a material sense by the fall into sin. He said at the conclusion of his book: *Natur und Gnade*, (1934), "It was the task of our theological generation to find the way of return to *die rechte theologia naturalis*." (Theologische Bücherei 34, Chr. Kaiser, S. 207) He proposed a new natural theology. Therefore he actually admits a common ground in an epistemological sense. We must say he necessarily fell prey to a new natural theology. I think Brunner's distinction between the loss of the image in a material sense and the remnant of the image of God in a formal sense has no validity. This is because we cannot think of the form without the matter. A lot of matter is contained in his formal remnants of the image of God. He often called the consciousness in

natural men *die halbe Wahrheit*.

(b) We have to establish the principle of **Antithesis** in an epistemological and ethical sense.

The assertion of the principle of Antithesis found in the writings of A. Kuyper and C. Van Til is very important in this context. There is no room at this moment for the discussion of this problem. (cf. Sumito Haruna, *Religion, Science and Philosophy*, III The Principle of Antithesis and the Principle of Relation between the Regenerate and the Unregenerate in Theoretical Thinking, A. The Principle of Antithesis, Speech for the Second International Symposium sponsored by the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy held at Zeist, The Netherlands, August 23 - 27, 1982)

[2] There is a point of contact between the regenerate and the unregenerate in an ontological (metaphysical) and psychological sense. We can admit the vast common ground and the point of contact in this meaning. For there are the sense of deity or the sense of God-consciousness and the sense of law (moral law, civil law and cosmic law) in the unregenerate. How can we explain these facts on the basis of the Scriptures? We would like to introduce the threefold reformed theological concept into this discussion.

a. Revelatio Generalis

a-1 General revelation in nature, Romans 1:18-23

a-2 General revelation in moral consciousness, Romans 2:12-16

General revelation is the God's revelation in nature, in human conscience and in history. The Scripture teaches that God reveals the truth about His existence and His qualities through the created world, human moral consciousness and history to the whole world, all peoples throughout all ages. God reveals Himself as the Creator through the created world. "The heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands." (Psalm 19:1) And God inscribes His laws on the human heart and reveals Himself as the Lawgiver through human conscience and moral consciousness and shows that there will be punishment for the transgression of what his righteous nature requires of men.(cf. Romans 2:14-15)

a-1 *Through Nature*:

God reveals His divine nature and all good qualities through nature, the created world. "Since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities -

— his eternal power and divine nature — have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse.” (Romans 1: 20) Paul says that God’s invisible qualities have been able to be clearly seen through the visible creation, the handiwork of God since the creation of the world. God’s invisible qualities, His eternal power and divine nature point to the whole of His good and perfect nature with its wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. The glory derived from the existence and nature of God as the Creator is abundantly revealed in the visible world. It could be clearly recognized and understood, if the heart of human beings were normal. In the huge skies and in the tiny crystals of stones the glory of God as the Creator, namely, the revelation of His existence and qualities is richly inscribed and clearly seen. Thus “what may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them.” (Romans 1:19) In spite of this, human beings suppress this truth of God by their wickedness. Against all the godlessness and wickedness of men the wrath of God is being revealed from heaven. (1: 18) “Godlessness” is religious wickedness against God and “wickedness” is moral wickedness against God. Both are terrible sins against God. By this truth-suppressing response to general revelation (natural revelation) human beings are “without excuse” (1:20) in the presense of God (*coram Deo*). “For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened.” (1:21) If the hearts of men were normal and single-eyed, they could surely know God, worship Him, thank Him and ascribe glory to Him through this general revelation. Although God as the Creator reveals His existence and qualities so overwhelmingly and clearly in what has been made, men became blind in their hearts, the religious center of their existence, by their sinning on their own responsibility. As a result their intellect and thinking became futile and darkened and they neither glorified Him as God nor gave thanks to Him and were the more without excuse before God. They piled up sufficient reason for eternal punishment through their response to the general revelation of God. Therefore general revelation functions in the role of judge to condemn men to sin and guilt. Therefore general revelation is fully perspicuous

and nevertheless it is insufficient to lead men to salvation. It condemns men to sin and guilt. On the contrary it shows the need for the special revelation of God in Jesus Christ for the salvation of men. The first chapter of Romans declares that the Gospel is the only power of God for the salvation of everyone who believes: first for the Jew, then for the Gentile (v. 16) and then in sharp contrast to this it declares that the wrath of God is revealed against all the godlessness and wickedness of men who suppress the truth of general revelation. (v.18ff.) The main theme of the discussion which follows from v.18 is the wrath of God. Therefore one cannot read the verses beginning with 18 as the discussion which supports the natural theology as Thomas and Gilson did. They interpret the words; “they knew God” (v. 21) as the half-true fore-knowledge which can become the necessary step leading to the reception of the Gospel. We must bear in mind that the assertion of general revelation and natural revelation does not mean the acceptance of natural theology. The unregenerate cannot know God rightly and cannot obey the demands of God. The knowledge of God in the unregenerate is the object of God’s wrath. They lost the image of God in its epistemological and ethical meaning. “Their foolish hearts are darkened” (1:21) and “because of the hardening or blindness (*phōrōsis*) of their hearts are separated from the life of God.” (Eph. 4: 18). This means the spiritual death of men. Besides “They are darkened in their understanding.” (ibid.) In the Scriptures the heart (*kardia* or *nous*) means the religious center of human existence and it is thought of as the seat of the faculties like the intellect and the will and the primary seat of the image of God. (*primaria sedes Divinae imaginis*, cf. Calvin, *Institutio*, 1, 15, 3). Because of the hardening and blindness of heart, they were captured by spiritual death, separation from the life of God and right and true knowledge was taken away from their hearts. Their hearts are ignorant and their intellect and understanding, whose seat is in the heart, always produces futile thinking. Therefore, even if these ignorant and futile hearts are overwhelmingly surrounded by the revelation of the good qualities of God through His handiwork and creation, they will necessarily suppress the knowledge of God in themselves. Finally the spiritually dead “exchanged the glory of the God for images made to look like

mortal men, birds, animals and reptiles.” (Romans 1: 23) The knowledge of God in this case: “although they knew God” (v.21), is that which was distorted by the ignorant heart and the knowledge of God in the unregenerate leads necessarily to the godlessness of idolatry. “They exchanged the truth of God for a lie and worshiped and served created things rather than the Creator.” (v. 25) In other words, God gave them over to the godlessness of idolatry and to the wickedness of the sinful desires in their hearts. “Since they did not think it worthwhile to retain the knowledge of God, he gave them over to a depraved mind, to do what ought not to be done.” (v. 28)

a-2 *Through Moral Consciousness and Conscience*

In the moral consciousness which is another main form of general revelation there is also a truth-suppressing response on the part of men. All men, the Jew and the Gentile as well, are guilty of the transgression of the moral law of God. The Jews are guilty of the written Law and the Gentiles are guilty of the transgression of the law written on their hearts. God reveals His will in the moral consciousness in the unregenerate. “The requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciousness also bearing witness and their thoughts now accusing, now even defending them.” (2: 15) “Although they know God’s righteous decree that those who do such things deserve death, they not only continue to do these very things but also approve of those who practice them.” (1: 32)

Through general revelation, namely, the revelation of His good qualities in nature and the inscription of moral law on the hearts of men, God challenges men to acknowledge Him as the Creator, to worship Him, to glorify Him as God, to give thanks to Him and to live a life worthy of His will. Therefore the suppression of this truth of general revelation by wickedness, all the godlessness and wickedness of men are sufficient reason for eternal punishment and they have no excuse. General revelation has a twofold function. In the one aspect it continues to challenge men to repent of their sin and come back to their original task of subduing the earth and serving the establishment of His Kingdom. In the other aspect it condemns men to sin and excludes all excuses of men. It does not bring men salvation, but fills the role of the condemnation of men to death.

b. Common Grace

b-1 The maintenance of creational orders. The covenant with Noah. Gen. 8:21-9:17

b-2 Rain and Sunshine. Acts 14:16f.

b-3 The restraint of sin.

b-4 The development of the relatively good in history.

No kind of people can be religiously neutral. The Scripture, history and human experience clearly show this fact. Even the non-regenerate have God-consciousness. This consciousness is often mentioned as *sensus divinitatis* or *sensus deitatis* in the works of Calvin. Paul appealed to the religiosity of the Athenian people in his Areopagus sermon and this fact is very important as the point of contact in evangelization. “Men of Athens! I see that in every way you are very religious.” (Acts 17: 22) There are some books in which the God-consciousness itself is explained as general revelation. But this explanation has no validity, I am convinced. In order to explain the God-consciousness or sense of deity which the Gentiles have in common, we must think of such theologically important concepts as common grace and the image of God in men in a close necessary connection with general revelation. God reveals His existence and qualities as the Creator and the Lawgiver through nature and through the moral consciousness of men. This general revelation is deeply connected with common grace.

b-1 “Common Grace” is the non-saving grace which is given to the regenerate and the unregenerate in common and can be divided into three points. First of all, it is the grace of conservation, by which God conserves and maintains the created world with its construction-orders as shown in the covenant with Noah. (Gen. 8:22) The created world was created in the order of time, which is in itself a creature, and the several temporal orders form various aspects of cosmonomic law and these laws are the forms of existence of all creatures, the visible and the invisible. In Jeremiah 33: 19, 20, 25, God’s covenant with day and night, the fixed law of heaven and earth are mentioned.

b-2 Secondly, God gives us in common rain and sunshine and the grace of nature in these structural orders. This grace is commonly called that of “Rain and Sunshine”. “In the past, he let all nations go their own way. Yet he has not left himself without

testimony: He has shown kindness by giving you rain from heaven and crops in their seasons; he provides you with plenty of food and fills your hearts with joy.” (Acts 14: 16f.) God has given the grace of nature through rain and sunshine and has challenged men to repent and come back to Him and love Him as the Creator. As far as common grace is also the grace of God, it would be a wicked sin against God to withhold from him the right response of thanks and praise.

b-3 Thirdly, there is the grace of the restraint of sin by which God restrains the power of sin lest sin should fully display its power. Thereby the unregenerate can have knowledge of civil righteousness and establish the relatively good.

b-4 Besides this we can mention the common grace of development by which God gives the relatively good development in the history.

In this way the created world and the whole creation are preserved and maintained in the cosmomic laws and all phenomena of nature and moral consciousness in the created world can be providentially controlled in common grace. The general revelation of God's eternal power and of all His good qualities as the Creator are revealed in this threefold common grace.

c. *Imago Dei* (cf. Sumito Haruna, *Religion, Science and Philosophy*, The Principle of Antithesis and the Principle of Relation between the Regenerate and the Unregenerate in Theoretical Thinking, B. The Principle of Relation)

Furthermore the existence of the response to general revelation in the unregenerate, the response of godlessness and wickedness on the part of men who suppress the truth by wickedness, religiosity in general cannot be explained without taking the remnant of the image of God (*imago Dei*) in men into consideration. The existence of a religiosity in men is deeply connected with the fundamental fact that men were created after the image of God.

c-1 The remnant of the *Imago Dei* in the natural man in an ontological (metaphysical) sense

c-1-1 The mental constitution of men, heart, *kardia*, *cor*, *mens* remains after the fall of men. Gen. 8: 21, Rom. 1:21, Eph. 4: 17-18, 22-24, Col. 3: 10

c-1-2 The functions of reason and will also remain. These functions of reason and will are called *facultates cordis* by Calvin.

The continued existence of the heart and its functions such as reason (*intellectus*) and will (*voluntas*) after the fall of men are the marks by which human beings can be distinguished from animals without the image of God. I would like to call these mental constitutions after the fall the remnant of the image of God in the ontological (metaphysical) sense.

c-2 The remnant of the *Imago Dei* in the natural man in a psychological sense

The sense of Divinity and the sense of law.

c-2-1 *Sensus Divinitatis, Semen Religionis*, Romans 1: 21

These mental constitutions which remain even after the fall have their corrupt functions. The heart became futile (Eph. 4: 17), hardened and blind. (v. 18. I would like to translate *pōrōsis* as blindness.) It means that men after the fall were captured by spiritual death. “They are separated from the life of God.” (v.18). And “they are also darkened in their understanding”, because reason or intellect is based on the root (heart). The function of intellect is darkened and ignorant. How can we explain this situation in relation to general revelation? While general revelation or natural revelation is shining brightly and clearly in all aspects of the created world and even in human moral consciousness, men's hearts which are responsible to this clear revelation are covered with a veil of dark thick clouds. Their responses are the godlessness and wickedness of men who suppress this truth. This is the reason why, “although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him” and “they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images made to look like mortal man and birds and animals and reptiles”. They lost any excuse in the presense of God and they were given over to religious impiety and moral impurity. This situation explains eloquently the religiosity in natural men in general and its character. When Calvin says that a seed of religion (*semen religionis*) is implanted in the heart (*cor*) and mind (*mens*) of men and all men have a sense of deity (*sensus deitatis*) or sense of divinity (*sensus divinitatis*), he means this religiosity or God-consciousness in natural men. The content of this consciousness or religiosity is very negative in both the epistemological and the ethical sense. But the fact that every man has the *sensus divinitatis* and the religiosity is

very positively important to evangelization. This guarantees the common ground or the point of contact between the regenerate person and the unregenerate person. The religiosity of humankind or the con-sensus of the sense of divinity is the presupposition apriori which alone makes genuinely human personal contact possible. It is in this meaning that I say there is a common ground or point of contact between the regenerate and the unregenerate in a psychological sense.

c-2-2 *Sensus legis, sensum legum. semen legis, semina legum*

c-2-2-1 The sense of moral laws. Romans 2: 14-15

"The requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciousness also bearing witness and their thoughts now accusing, now even defending them."

c-2-2-2 The sense of civil law or civil righteousness. (Calvin: *universales impressiones of civilis honestas et ordo, semen ordinis politici*)

c-2-2-3 The sense of cosmic law. *Artes liberales, politia, oeconomia, antiqui iureconsulti, medicina, mathematica omnia*, these sciences are derived from this sense that there are cosmic laws. The natural man still holds some sense of cosmic law. This sense is implanted in his heart by the Holy Spirit.

Along with the sense of deity there is also implanted in the hearts of men the seed of laws (*semina legum*): moral laws, civil laws and cosmic laws, because the consciousness of a god is at the same time the consciousness of a law-giver. Therefore all men have the sense of law (*sensum legum*). The sense of law is divided into that of moral laws, that of civil laws and that of cosmic laws. All men are conscious of the fact that nature, morality and society are penetrated and dominated by laws and norms. They are also derived from a kind of response of the remnant of the image of God to general revelation. This is the remnant of the image of God in the psychological sense. The innate ideas, the concepts apriori and natural laws, which secular philosophers usually assert, can be fully explained by the combination of the reformed theological concepts of general revelation, common grace and the remnant of the image of God.

All men have the sense or consciousness of God as the Creator and as the law-giver. All men have

the sense or consciousness of moral laws, of civil laws and of cosmic laws. However this is the result of the response of the remnant of the image of God to general revelation. Therefore this is the religious and moral response of the godlessness and wickedness of men who suppress the truth of general revelation. Such a response is no excuse in the presense of God and is the object of God's wrath. The unregenerate person cannot recognize and know God rightly and therefore his knowledge of God is not the half-true fore-knowledge which should be supplemented and mended by the Gospel into completion. The unregenerate person lost the image of God in the epistemological sense. He cannot act and work rightly according to the will of God and therefore his volitional ethical action is not the semi-pelagian half-true act which should be supplemented and mended by the grace of Jesus Christ into salvation. The unregenerate has lost the image of God in the ethical sense as well. The recovery of the image of God in knowledge, righteousness and holiness or in the epistemological and ethical senses is only possible by the palingenesis through special revelation and special grace in Jesus Christ. (Eph. 4: 21-24, Col. 3:10) The regenerate person has been re-created in the image of God. "For God, who said, 'Let light shine out of darkness,' made his light shine in our hearts to give us the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ." (II Cor. 4: 6) "Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation." (5: 17) Again I must say that the assertion of natural revelation is totally different from the acceptance of natural theology.

Nevertheless it is a very important thing that the unregenerate have the sense of deity, the sense of moral laws, of civic laws and cosmic laws. These con-sensus' are the presupposition apriori which alone make genuine contact possible in evangelization. In evangelizing, the regenerate Christian can appeal to these senses which the unregenerate have in the sense of Deity, in guilt-consciousness and in the consciousness of cosmic laws. In this ontological and psychological sense there is a huge extent of common ground and a vast point of contact.

d. The point of contact between the regenerate person and the unregenerate person.

Above all the *sensus divinitatis* in the unregenerate person is very important as the point of

contact in evangelization. In their preaching at Lystra Barnabas and Paul appealed to the God-consciousness of the listeners or their response to general revelation and common grace.(Acts 14 :15 – 18) On the Areopagus Paul could appeal to the God-consciousness of the Athenian citizens and find a point of contact for evangelization. Only human beings created in the image of God can response to the general revelation of God. I think a suitable name which would make one more aware of the distinction between men and animals is not *homo sapiens*, not *homo faber*, not *homo ludens*, but *homo pius*. “Men of Athens! I see that in every way you are very religious.” (Acts 17: 22) Paul finds a point of contact for evangelization in the religiosity of the people as the response of men to general revelation. The ontological or metaphysical fact that men are religious beings who have their point of integration and unity of personality in their hearts as the seats of the image of God (*sedes imaginis*) and the psychological fact that men have a sense of deity and a consciousness of Law, — — — these two facts show the common ground and point of contact between the regenerate person and the un-regenerate one. An understanding of this concept is very important for the mission of the Gospel.

But on the other hand we must not forget another fact. Paul pointed out that the men of Athens had fallen prey to ignorant idolatry. He said that they worshiped “an unknown God” as “something unknown”. In the epistemological and ethical meanings there is no point of contact between Paul’s religion and the Athenian religion. There is no room for natural theology. Paul did not evaluate this religiosity of the men of Athens as one which could be developed to a genuine religiosity if the knowledge of the Gospel were added. “Paul was greatly distressed to see that the city was full of idols.” (17:16) He had to “proclaim to them what they worshiped as something unknown.” (cf.17 :23) “God commands all people everywhere to repent.” (17:30) God commands men to repent of this ignorance. Paul demands repentance for religious ignorance. Evangelization is the imperative of God towards repentance. Repentance is necessary. There is no continuous line between religiosity in general and the religiosity of the regenerate. Paul proclaimed that the world would be judged with justice by the man whom God has appointed and

that the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the proof of this. (see v. 31) “When they heard about the resurrection of the dead, some of them sneered, but other said, ‘We want to hear you again on this subject.’” (v. 32) The sense of Deity or God-consciousness in the natural man should not be esteemed as the basis for the completion of the true knowledge of God.

Chapter II.

Where is the point of contact between the Christian philosophy and non-Christian philosophy?

I would like to try to elevate the above discussion to the principle of the discussion and dialogue between Christian philosophy and non-Christian philosophy. If we want to find the common ground for philosophical discussions between Christian philosophy and non-Christian philosophy, we must necessarily search for the conditions apriori which alone make each way of theoretical thinking possible. In the discussion of the problem of the point of contact in evangelization we pointed out the senses of religiosity or deity and of law-consciousness as presupposition apriori implanted in the hearts of men as the religious central seat of human existence and the seat of the image of God. If we elevate the discussion mentioned above to the principle of the dialogue between Christian philosophy and non-Christian philosophy and we advance to the problem of the pre-theoretical presupposition apriori or consensus apriori of theoretical thinking, this research will be the discussion of the task of the transcendental critique of theoretic thinking. Through performing this task we can in the first place open the way for a fruitful dialogue with non-Christian philosophy and secondly we can point out an apostate presupposition which necessarily produces the pretended principle of the autonomy of human reason or the thinking human ego in non-Christian philosophy and thirdly and finally we can proceed to a discussion of our own transcendental problems on a scriptural basis. To sum up, the intention of the rest of this paper is to set out the prolegomena to our own transcendental philosophy and to the foundation of theoretical thought, and once this has been explained, to offer the transcendental philosophy and critique of theoretical

thought of Herman Dooyeweerd to Japanese philosophers who as yet have no evaluation of Christian philosophy. A fuller explanation of Dooyeweerd's philosophical thinking will be discussed at some time in the future.

Kant calls it "transcendental," not knowledge directly oriented to objects, but knowledge concerning our way of knowing (*Erkenntnisart*) — — as far as it is a priori possible. (Vgl. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B. 25) Kant was engaged in the task of the transcendental critique of theoretical thought in order to provide a foundation (*begründen*) for scientific thought by researching the universally valid condition which alone makes a scientific thinking possible. However, as Dooyeweerd says, Kant's criticism did not make the theoretical attitude of thought into a critical problem. He "started from the autonomy of theoretical thinking as an axiom which needs no further justification." (Dooyeweerd, Herman, *In the Twilight of Western Thought*, Philadelphia, 1960. cf. p. 5) Kant's transcendental critique held to the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought and therefore it did not see "the concentric direction of theoretical thought upon the human selfhood [which] cannot originate from theoretical reason itself." (*Ibid.* pp. 22–23, et. al.) Nevertheless this self-reflexion is necessary in a transcendental critique to reveal the real starting point of philosophical thinking. (cf. *Ibid.*, p. 22f) If we want to see the universally valid condition which alone makes theoretical thinking possible, we must not stay within the horizon of theoretical thinking but must descend to the level of the root of human existence and find the pretheoretical presupposition a priori. If we use the words of zen-buddhistic philosophy, we must perform transcendence towards the bottom.

In the process of philosophy after Kant this task of transcendental critique was revived in Neo-Kantian philosophy. Behind the revival of transcendental philosophy there is always a moment of critique and antagonism against positivism and materialism. At the background of Neo-Kantian philosophy there was the great power of positivism which began with Comte and Mill and also that of Marxist materialism. The development of the natural sciences and of materialistic tendencies led to the strong trend of thinking that only the empirically proved and the causally explainable

could be true and that human mental activity could be accessed using the methods of the natural sciences as well. These tendencies gave rise to a contempt for philosophy. Neo-Kantianism arose in opposition to these tendencies. The transcendental philosophy of Herman Cohen tried to supply a foundation for (*begründen*) the natural sciences, finding elements a priori in their theoretical thinking. The transcendental philosophy of Heinrich Rickert tried to defend the fields of value and of spiritual culture against the natural sciences' pretence to a monopoly on reality and to supply a foundation for the theoretical thought of the cultural spiritual sciences. However, this Neo-Kantian philosophy again stuck to the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thinking and therefore did not make theoretical thinking itself into a critical problem. It means again that this philosophy did not see the concentric direction of theoretical thinking upon the human selfhood. In the situation that philosophy itself gradually lost interest in the transcendental critical problem of finding a foundation for theoretical thinking itself. Philosophy was reduced to the discussion of empirical verifiability and the evidence of propositions.

But recently transcendental philosophy has evoked new interest in opposition to logical positivism, to materialism and to the scienticism of the natural sciences. On the one hand we can find a critique to logical positivism in the transcendental philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel. He tries to supply a foundation for (*begründen*) theoretical thinking by investigating the transcendental condition which makes theoretical thinking possible. He opposes logical positivism which estimates the sensibly empirically unverified proposition as meaningless. He treats language a priori as a transcendental condition of an inter-subjective validity in the interpretation of a cognitive subject. On the other hand we mention the transcendental philosophy of the later Husserl. His transcendental phenomenology in *opus postumum* is filled with the critique to the naturalistic attitude of modern positive philosophy. This positivism limited beings and realities to the measurable, the empirically verifiable and that which can be explained by physical causality. He opposed the positivistic reduction of reality to the mechanical world and tried to regain the more abundantly diverse law-aspects of the *Lebenswelt*

by introducing the concept of the intentionality of human consciousness. He called his phenomenological philosophy the most radical critique of knowledge. If we admit these aprioris on the subjective and the objective sides, it means that the twofold modern Cartesian axioms which will not admit any presupposition apriori have become doubtful in recent transcendental philosophy.

[1] Subjective apriori.

A certain consciousness that a pre-theoretical presupposition is necessarily presupposed in every theoretical thinking prevails in the recent philosophies. As it is the presupposition that a cognitive subject presupposes it may well be called a subjective apriori. The first Cartesian axiom that a philosopher stands on the basis of sound reason and therefore has no presuppositions has become doubtful.

In general, modern philosophers hold a pretended conviction that they stand on a religiously neutral and would-be sound basis of natural reason and esteem what is clear and distinct to their thinking ego as truth, whereas religious believers hold some religious presuppositions or dogmas. *Le bon sens*, reason is the thing that is most impartially delivered in the world. This was the starting-point of Descartes' philosophical thinking. Philosophy is a science without presuppositions, they think.

Die transzendente Sprachpragmatik of Karl-Otto Apel we refer to from the viewpoint of opposition to positivism.

Logical positivism was the leader of the critique of metaphysics and esteemed every proposition that could not be verified by sensory experience as meaningless. Apel criticizes this principle of the verifiability of objective propositions. His transcendental philosophy investigates the transcendental condition of the subject who uses languages, when he pursues a radically critical inquiry into the universally valid conditions which alone make theoretical thinking possible. Kant thought that *Sinnlichkeit* and *Verstand* as *Erkenntnisvermögen apriori*, *Zeit* and *Raum* as *reine Anschauungsformen apriori*, *Kategorien* as *reine Verstandesformen apriori*, *reine transzendente Apperzeption* as *logisches denkendes Ich* were conditions apriori. But Kant did not see the apriori of

languages. Kant did not take into consideration whether the propositions formulated using language could be inter-subjectively valid or not. And logical positivism and analytical philosophy took only objective verifiability and the evidence of empirically verifiable propositions into consideration. On the contrary Apel thinks of the apriori of languages which support the evidence of the communication experience itself in the community of researchers. He estimates language apriori in the community of researchers as the conditions apriori of theoretic thinking. In the case of the foundation of theoretical knowledge one cannot neglect the mediating function of language as a transcendental condition of intersubjective validity among researchers. Consensus in the *Argumentationsgemeinschaft* or *Interpretationsgemeinschaft* is necessary for the intersubjective validity of theoretic knowledge. The foundation (Begründung) of philosophical knowledge is made possible by this consensus. Apel has re-grasped and transformed the task of the transcendental critique of theoretical thought into the problematization of the intersubjective consensus-formation of researchers. Unless we gain the consensus that we have the evidence of experience in common, that everyone must presuppose, we cannot understand anything intersubjectively. When children learn language, they do not learn words in isolation, but they do learn the rules of language-use which relates the knowledge of languages to the praxis of life. Likewise the philosophers must also recognize the aprioris of languages which are intersubjectively valid as the paradigmatic evidence for the arguments in a definite language game. It was Apel's contribution to philosophy that he tried to revive and reconstruct the transcendental philosophy which seeks for the condition apriori for theoretical knowledge on the subject-side, though analytical philosophy and logical positivism, which stick only to the evidence of empirically verifiable propositions, gave up the epistemological foundation of philosophy and the radical foundation of theoretic thinking. He pointed out that even in Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* a hidden paradigmatic consensus based on the intersubjective evidence in the hidden dialogue with himself was presupposed. When Apel sought for the universal valid conditions which alone make theoretical thought possible, he discovered the

transcendental presupposition apriori of theoretical thinking which positivistic philosophy based only on the evidence of proposition and of empirical verifiability in the line of Cartesian rationalistic tradition had continued to neglect.

But Apel never recognizes that the presupposition of theoretical thinking is religious in character. It is very doubtful whether the transcendental structure of theoretical thinking can be absorbed into that of language. Is it a kind of absolutization of the aspect of language?

It is important that one feels the existence of a pre-theoretical presupposition or of consensus apriori in the theoretical thinking. This may guarantee that there is a common ground for the philosophical discussion between Christian philosophy and non-Christian philosophy in the ontological (metaphysical) and the psychological senses.

[2] Objective apriori.

A certain consciousness that the world in which we live is more abundant than the modern mechanical world prevails also in the recent philosophies. There are many other laws in the temporal world than physical and mathematical laws. This consciousness of the richly abundant cosmic laws may well be called that of objective apriori.

The second Cartesian axiom that only the world which can be determined by mathematical and physical laws has *eine Wirklichkeit* has become doubtful. The Cartesian cognitive principle of "clear and distinct" evoked the modern idea of nature as the counter idol of the freedom of the human personality which is the autonomous modern spirit. What is "clear and distinct" to human theoretical thinking in its essential meaning, then? What man can think of most clearly and distinctly is the things which can be grasped in the cause and effect nexus. Wherever this causal grasp of nature extends, the mechanical view of nature which excludes any influence of spirituality arises, and this view of nature is sharply opposed to that of the Reformers, for whom natural facts are created by God and controlled by His Providence. This new view of nature was born as the result of the mental attitude whereby men did not want to admit the given structural orders in nature, in other words, men did not want to accept any world-orders which did not

originate in the thinking activity of the autonomous human personality. The philosophy of Descartes started by methodically destroying the given structural orders in order to reconstruct the world through clear and distinct thinking. This Cartesian way of thinking was followed by that of the continental rationalists and they took upon themselves the task that the thinking ego, which seeks the standard of truth in itself, should reconstruct the world in a mathematical way, **more geometrico**. In this way the deterministic mechanical picture of the world, according to which nature was interpreted as a necessary chain of cause and effect, was established. This concept of nature is the counter-idol, evoked by freedom as the ground motive of human personality. Along with the development of modern science, this mechanical way of thinking which lies at the bottom of the new idea of nature was gradually beginning to threaten freedom as such. Many sciences concerning human beings tried to understand them by the same method as that of the natural sciences. The realm of human freedom was gradually narrowed, reduced and curtailed and many philosophers tried to regain this lost freedom. Thus, the antinomy of freedom and nature became the most important problem of modern philosophy. (See, Haruna, *Ibid.*)

At this point in our discussion we would like to bring in that aspect of *die transzendente Phänomenologie* of the later Husserl which opposes positivism. In particular we are thinking of his critique to the *Idealisierung* of nature in his *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*.

Antagonism to the reduction of the world in modern science and technology to a merely mathematical and physical world is being discussed in this work.

Phenomenology is the philosophy which was born during the time of the antagonism against positivism and one of the elements in the rise of the phenomenology is the critique of positivism. Positivism tried to transform all beings into things that could be measurably and causally determined by observation and experiment. According to positivism all the psychological, and socio-cultural phenomena were absorbed into thing-phenomena. Husserl called it "naturalism" and saw in it the distortion of modern ontology since Bacon

and Descartes. Beings in the world are not necessarily things that can only be explained by a mathematically and physically measurable causality. Beings in the world are more abundant and have aspects that are more diverse and multiple than the mere mathematical and physical categories. Phenomenology tries to thematize all beings in their proper existence different from mere things and to multiply the monism of modern ontology which brought all beings down to the level of mere things. Phenomenology is the material ontology which tries to materialize all beings according to their own proper formality. When Husserl was engaged with his transcendental critique seeking for the universally valid condition which alone makes theoretical thinking possible, he did not take up the aprioris of a cognitive subject like Kant (also like Apel), but laid emphasis on the material and objective apriori of beings. It is the method of phenomenology to know the essence of beings from the multiple modes of abundant beings. It was the starting-point of phenomenology to discover the diverse meanings of beings. It was the characteristic of phenomenology to know the mode of existence of diverse beings, the mode of appearance of beings to us, namely, to explain the beings from *Erscheinungsart*. (cf. Tsunetoshi, S. ed., *Tetsugaku towa nanika*, Tokyo, 1988.)

In his *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, Husserl described the process through which western science has gradually lost sight of the *Lebenswelt*, where we really live, by the idealising of the world since Bacon and Descartes. The statement that something exists has become totally different in its meaning. The world has come to be considered as if it were originally printed by ideas, concepts, causality, mathematical laws, physical laws.

Husserl recognized the more multiple objective aprioris which are contained in the *Lebenswelt* in which we live. As the result of the fact that modern science and technology has gradually idealised this nature, an idealised nature has made its appearance. The discovery of the scientific and technological world amounts to the concealment of the richness of the *Lebenswelt*. To ask for the *Bedeutsamkeit des Lebens* is to disappear from the sight of the sciences. Husserl's criticism is that modern positivism has forgotten this *Lebenswelt* as the basis of life and

curtailed and reduced it to the idealised world which is only suitable for mathematico-physical measurable causality. And another of his criticisms was that the transcendental critique which seeks for the universally valid condition which alone makes theoretical thought possible as a task of transcendental philosophy was curtailed and reduced to the search for those apriori conditions which are exclusively on the side of *Erkenntnisvermögen*.

But in the last analysis his transcendental philosophy was also captured by the idolatrous principle of the autonomy of theoretical thinking and it did not make the inner character of theoretical thinking itself its critical problem. According to Husserl consciousness is always the consciousness of something. This "*Sich-richten-auf*" character of consciousness is its intentionality. This intentionality is diversely oriented to perception, volition, evaluation and so on. He criticizes the naturalistic attitude of modern positivism which neglected this diversity and reduced it to mathematical measurability and physical causality. But even for Husserl there are no beings that exist before hand apart from the intentionality of human consciousness. He criticized Brentano because Brentano reduced intentionality to the mere psychological concept through which existing beings reach human consciousness. Husserl wanted to establish the material ontology in which beings appear materially and objectively to our consciousness through the diversity of intentionality. But apart from intentionality man cannot speak of the diversity of the existence of beings. His transcendental philosophy searched for the pre-conditions apriori (*vorläufige Bedingungen apriori*) in which beings become beings-for-us in relation to our intentionality. The *vorläufige Bedingungen* are the *Vorverständnis* of our consciousness and it is our function of transcendental *Sinngebung* that makes our intentionality possible. Therefore the recognition and discovery of the divers objective aprioris is nothing but the result of the *Konstruktion* of our consciousness. In this process the autonomy of theoretical thinking is presupposed as an axiom.

About this autonomy of theoretical thinking Dooyeweerd says the following. "Philosophy is in need of this (transcendental) criticism since it is the only way to conquer a theoretical dogmatism which

lacks a radical self-critique. Under the influence of the dogmatical acceptance of the autonomy of philosophical thought such a radical critique was excluded up to now. Neither Kant, the founder of the so-called critical transcendental philosophy, nor Edmund Husserl, the founder of modern phenomenology, who called his phenomenological philosophy the most radical critique of knowledge, have made the theoretical attitude of thought into a critical problem. Both of them started from the autonomy of theoretical thinking as an axiom which needs no further justification. This is the dogmatical presupposition of their theoretical inquiry which makes the critical character of the latter problematic and masks their real starting-point, which, as a matter of fact, rules their manner of positing the philosophical problems." (Dooyeweerd, H., *In the Twilight of Western Thought*, p. 5f.)

However it is important that one feels the diversity and abundance of laws, objective aprioris of this created world against the reduction of realities into the mathematical and physical causality in modern rationalistic and positivistic philosophies. We can explain this consensus or consciousness of cosmic laws from the three-fold theological concepts, namely, the existence of general revelation (natural revelation), the remnant of the image of God in natural man and common grace. This may also guarantee that there is a common ground for the philosophical discussion between Christian philosophy and non-Christian philosophy in the ontological and the psychological senses.

Chapter III

In recent trends in philosophical situations where positivism including logical positivism and the philosophy of materialism have rapidly declined, the Cartesian axioms of modern rationalistic philosophy have become the more doubtful. The axioms that philosophy has no presuppositions and that only that world which can be determined by mathematical and physical laws has any genuine reality have started trembling in their foundations. Both the consciousness of the necessity of a pre-theoretical presupposition in every theoretical system of thinking and the consciousness of the richly abundant cosmic laws are present in the

tendency towards the reconstruction and revival of the so-called transcendental philosophy. When we think of the universally valid conditions which alone make theoretical thought possible, we must take the subjective apriori on the side of the cognitive subject and the cosmonomic apriori on the side of objective world into consideration. In front of us a vast common ground is extended for the discussion between the Christian philosophy and non-Christian philosophy in their ontological and psychological meanings. Just as Paul appealed to the religiosity, *sensus divinitatis* of the Athenian people in his evangelizing activity and found there the common ground for discussion, we can appeal to the fact of the "sensus" of pre-theoretic presuppositions and of cosmonomic laws. Non-Christian philosophers come to open their ears and listen to our discussion.

We have to lay emphasis on the fact that this presupposition of every theoretical thinking is religious in character. From the reformational theological threefold concept of general revelation, the image of God and common grace, we must reject the religiously neutral position in every philosophical system of thinking. The assumption of an axiom of religious neutrality depends on the assumption of the axiom of the autonomy of theoretical thinking. The philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd is acquiring more advantage in the recent tendency to oppose positivism and to feel a need for both subjective and objective presupposition apriori.

Concerning the relation of the existence of a religious presupposition undergirding every system of theoretical thinking to the existence of a common ground among the different philosophical schools and trends which makes possible a real point of contact between them Dooyeweerd says the following.

"Every philosophy which claims a Christian starting-point is confronted with the traditional dogma concerning the autonomy of philosophical thought, implying its independence of all religious presuppositions. It may be posited that this dogma is the only one that has survived the general decay of the earlier certitudes in philosophy. This decay was caused by the fundamental spiritual uprooting of Western thought since the two world wars. Nevertheless, it is the very crisis in the earlier fundamentals of philosophical thought, which has

paved the way for a radical criticism of the dogma of autonomy. Such a criticism is not only necessary from a Christian point of view, much rather it must be considered the primary condition of a truly critical attitude of thought in every kind of philosophical reflection, irrespective of the difference in starting-point. For the acceptance of the autonomy of theoretical thought has been elevated to an intrinsic condition of true philosophy without its having been justified by a critical inquiry into the inner structure of the theoretical attitude of thought itself. So long as the belief in human theoretical reason as the ultimate judge in matters of truth and falsehood was unchallenged, this belief could be accepted as a theoretical axiom. — — — But apart from the present crisis of all former certitude, there are other reasons for making the dogma, concerning the autonomy of philosophical thought, into a critical problem. In the first place, this pretended autonomy, which is considered the common basis of ancient Greek, Thomistic scholastic and modern secularized philosophy, lacks that unity of meaning necessary for such a common foundation. In Greek philosophy it had a meaning quite different from that in Thomistic scholasticism. In both of them it was conceived in a sense quite different from that which it assumed in modern secularized thought. As soon as we seek to penetrate to the root of these fundamentally different conceptions, we are confronted with a fundamental difference in presuppositions which surpasses the boundaries of theoretical thought. In the last analysis these very presuppositions determine the meaning ascribed to this autonomy. This does not agree with the traditional dogmatic view of philosophical thought. For this view implies that ultimate starting-point of philosophy should be found in this thought itself. But due to the lack of a univocal sense, the pretended autonomy cannot guarantee a common basis to the different philosophical trends. On the contrary, it appears again and again that this dogma impeded a real contact between philosophical schools and trends that prove to differ in their deepest, supra-theoretical presuppositions. This is the second reason why we can no longer accept it as an axiom which is not problematic but simply gives expression to an intrinsic condition of true philosophy. For if all philosophical currents that pretend to

choose their starting-point in theoretical reason alone, had, indeed, no deeper presuppositions, it should be possible to settle every philosophical argument between them in a purely theoretical way. But the factual situation is quite different. A debate between philosophical trends, which are fundamentally opposed to each other, usually results in a reasoning at cross-purposes, because they are not able to find a way to penetrate to each other's true starting-points. The latter seem to be masked by the dogma concerning the autonomy of philosophical thought. And as long as there exists a fundamental difference in the philosophical views of meaning and experience, it does not help if, in line with contemporary logical positivism we seek to establish criteria for meaningful and meaningless philosophical propositions and require their verifiability. — — — This question can only be answered by a transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude of thought as such. By this we understand a radically critical inquiry into the universally valid conditions which alone make theoretical thought possible, and which are required by the inner structure and nature of this thought itself." (Dooyeweerd, *ibid.*, p. 1–4)

In a sense K.-O. Apel and Thomas Kuhn recognize this fact. But they do not recognize that this presupposition is religious in its character.

[1] The first transcendental condition *apriori* which alone makes theoretical thought possible is the religious presupposition which determines and motivates all theoretical thinking. If the apostate religious presupposition dominates and determines one's heart, it will easily absolutize a logical-analytical function and establish the pretended principle of the autonomy of reason or theoretical thinking.

In chapter I I described the origin of human religiosity in detail from the standpoint of the threefold concepts of reformed theology. Dooyeweerd also describes it in connection with general revelation and the image of God.

"In an indissoluble contact with this self-revelation as Creator, God has revealed man to himself. Man was created in the image of God. Just as God is the absolute Origin of all that exists outside of Himself, so He created man as a being, in whom the entire diversity of aspects and faculties of the temporal world is concentrated within the religious

center of his existence, which we call our I, and which the Holy Scripture calls our heart, in a pregnant, religious sense. As the central seat of the image of God, the human selfhood was endowed with the innate religious impulse to concentrate his whole temporal life and the whole temporal world upon the service of love to God.— Since the image of God in man concerned the radix, that is, the religious center and root of our entire temporal existence, it follows that the fall into sin can only be understood in the same radical, biblical sense. The entire fall into sin can be summed up as a false illusion, which arose in the human heart, namely, that the human I has the same absolute existence as God Himself. This was the false insinuation of Satan, to which man gave ear: “Ye shall be like God.” This apostasy from the living God implied the spiritual death of man, since the human I is nothing in itself and can only live from the Word of God and in the love-communion with its divine Creator. [cf. the loss of the image of God in the epistemological and ethical senses. the loss of *Deum et animam scire* in the heart, *kardia*.] However, this original sin could not destroy the religious center of human existence with its innate religious impulse to seek for its absolute Origin. [cf. the remnant of the image of God in the ontological and psychological senses.] It could only lead this central impulsion in a false, apostate direction by diverting it to the temporal world with its rich diversity of aspects which, however, have only a relative sense.” (Dooyeweerd, *ibid.*, 189f.)

[2] The second transcendental apriori which alone make theoretical thinking possible is the consciousness of the diversity of laws in the world. The natural man still retains some sense of cosmic laws. This sense, too, is implanted in his heart by the Holy Spirit. See Haruna, *Ibid.*

Chapter IV

As to contemporary philosophy it is often said that it is being confronted with an age of dialectic dialogue. The main philosophies which have been influential upon the thought of the world after World War II have lost their influence. The appearances of the hermeneutic philosophies of Gadamer and Ricoeur and of the paradigm-theory of Thomas Kuhn have given a blow to logical Pos-

itivism. And the appearance of *die transzendente Sprachpragmatik* of K.-O. Apel, the new phenomenological philosophy and post-modern thought mean the end of not only logical positivism but also of Marxist materialism and existentialism. Positivism esteems only those things true that can be empirically verified by means of mathematico-physical causality. But the age of positivism has passed away. The emphasis on the greater diversity of aspects in the objective aprioris of the *Lebenswelt* than those contained in a merely mathematically idealized rationality and the emphasis on the existence of the pre-theoretical presupposition as a subjective apriori in the cognitive subject in every system of theoretical thinking have been the more recognized. These have become the common consensus for the philosophical dialogue.

Not only the transcendental philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd but also the presuppositional Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til are more easily opened to the ears of non-Christian philosophers.

On the other hand we must beware of the danger that we can easily be apt to fall into natural theology which admits the common ground in the epistemological sense for the dialogue with non-Christian philosophy.

In our age of religious pluralism and philosophical dialogue there is a great danger of synthesis and accommodation. In this sense the indication of and emphasis on the antithetical character of the religious ground motive as a pre-theoretical presupposition of theoretical thought is very important. Seeking for and admitting the point of contact with this worldly thought is totally different from accepting it as the basis on which the truth of the Scriptures will lead to perfect knowledge. Dooyeweerd deepened and developed the Kuiperian principle of antithesis in the consciousness of the regenerate and the unregenerate into that of the antithesis of the religious pre-theoretical presupposition in the heart, the religious center in the human personality and the central seat of the image of God. Only by performing this task can one find the way of establishing the transcendental critique which seeks for the universal valid condition which alone makes theoretical thinking possible from the standpoint of Christian philosophy. We Christians have the presuppositions which are implanted by the Holy Spirit into our hearts, hearts

in which the image of God is recovered in the epistemological and ethical senses, namely, in knowledge, righteousness and holiness. The secular philosophers would lend their ears to our whole explanations concerning man and the world, if only they could understand these pre-theoretical presuppositions in our theoretical thinking. The responsibility of our Christian philosophers is that much heavier. Dooyeweerd denied the pretended principle of the religious neutrality of all philosophical thinking and pointed out each religious pre-theoretical presupposition in Greek philosophy, Thomistic philosophy and modern philosophy. And he also showed how the principle of the pretended autonomy of theoretical thinking comes out, when an apostate religious presupposition dominates the heart as the religious center of human existence. In opposition to this, we have for the first time in the history of philosophy a Christian philosophy in which the revelation of God in Jesus Christ dominates the entire field of philosophy, occupies the all-embracing central seat and does not require for its completion a foundation consisting of secular philosophies. Dooyeweerd cut away all the temptation to *theologia naturalis*; synthesis and accommodation from the tree of Christian philosophy. It is highly significant that he cut out the germ of *theologia naturalis* on the one hand and that he opened up the common ground and a point of contact for philosophical discussions with non-Christian philosophies on the other.