

Ideology, Politics, and Intellectuals

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1: Action and cognition of the situation

A fundamental assumption of the behavioral sciences holds that the recognition of a situation is the most important condition for all living systems to survive as their existence is completely dependent upon that situation. It is also widely known that if a living system acts upon miscognition of the situation (=maladaptation), its survival can be severely handicapped because the miscognition is reflected back through the feedback loop of the adaptation process and can produce a degenerative self-modifying process. The more evolved living systems are, the more complicated become internal structures they develop to cope with the complexity of a situation, thus enhancing their adaptive capacity. Moreover, they may act upon a situation positively to change it for their own convenience. At any rate, the correct cognition of a situation is essential for a living creature to survive.

The leading argument of this topics has been deployed systematically in the field of (social) systems theory with the concept of 'information.' Information refers to 'order' or structuralization and is conceived as the reverse function to 'uncertainty,' and as the very basis of decision-making of the social actor.

Information theory suggests that there are three types of information ; 1) cognitive, 2) evaluative, and 3) directive. Cognitive information is the factual and existential knowledge of a situation which excludes the knower's value-judgement. In this sense, it is regarded as the least 'ideological' and the most 'universalistic,' i. e. the empirical scientific knowledge, which is widely accepted and recognized. Evaluative information, diametrically opposite to the cognitive, is value-judgement itself, usually in relation to the end of the action. The most extreme of this is often called the 'ultimate value.' The word 'ideology' is sometimes employed to refer to this kind of value-judged propositions, but in the

name of 'true' or 'false' terms as if these propositions could be scientifically verified. Directive information is one which orders how to act, being based upon the above two kinds of information, the cognitive and the evaluative. In the narrower sense of the term it suggests the choice of the means to carry out the action, but in the wider sense it covers all the executive phases of the action process (Nakano, 1971. Nakano & Atarashi, 1981).

Though in no way meaningless, the simple juxtaposition of these three categories of information is not fruitful to our analysis. Therefore, we now turn to Talcott Parsons who proposed four types of human idea systems (=symbolic representation), combining two independent axis, a) scientific verifiability on the one hand and b) value-free vs. value-related on the other (Nakano, 1976. Parsons, 1951).

Parsons' Four Types of Human Idea Systems

	scientifically	
	verifiable	not verifiable
value-free (factual)	science	philosophy
value-related (normative)	ideology	religion

Interesting here is his categorization of ideology, which is scientifically verifiable propositions, but related to value judgement. From this implication, I would like to point out that scientific knowledge is simply vulnerable to value judgement. Once it defines certain social situation it inevitably occurs that the definition may be favorable to some people and at the same time unfavorable to the other. This, it seems to me, is an inherent nature of social scientific knowledge and social scientists cannot escape from this kind of value involvement as far as they say something about the structure and function of human society.

However suggestive it may be, we cannot be satisfied with the Parsonian definition of ideology

since his categorization is useful only when his criteria of classification are meaningful. For example, we know the scientific verifiability itself is moving in parallel to the development of new techniques in science. Moreover, this does not necessarily guarantee that scientific knowledge is always 'true' or 'real.' Reality or truth could be attained through intuition or some other human ability of this sort. Thus we come to agree, for example, with Julius Gould whose relatively neutral formulation of ideology is the following: ideology is a pattern of beliefs and concepts (both factual and normative) which purport to explain complex social phenomena with a view to directing and simplifying socio-political choices facing individuals and groups (Gould, 1984: 315).

Now it becomes clear that Parsons' preoccupation with distinguishing ideology from other forms of idea systems in terms of a) scientific verifiability, and b) value-relatedness is not vital when we deal with this social phenomenon. The Kuhnian paradigm theory also clarified that the modern science itself is a product of the cultural heritage of the Modern Western Thinking with its remarkable characteristics such as empiricism or rationalism or elementalism which reveal themselves not only in modern sciences but also in many other forms of cultural products including various social institutions in economy and polity. It is exactly in this sense that I would argue the development of two 'giant' social sciences in this period, economics and political science, was a reflection of the two big problems facing the men of knowledge of the time, economic development and national integration, therefore social sciences themselves being strongly 'ideological' in their origin, though I do not deny the value-free as a scientific ethics which Weber once emphasized. In addition to this, I would like to point out the following remarks concerning scientific activities, that is to say, scientific endeavors themselves are a social action which could be an important subject-matter of the sociology of knowledge.

On the one hand, scientists are strongly affected by existing social institutions, government or business, in their choice of research objects as well as in their obtaining research resources and on the other, their 'output' (scientific knowledge and technology) is to be incorporated into society, thus influencing the formation of interests structure of

members of the society which often times has nothing to do with their personal intentions or ideals; demographic projection, programmed language instruction, standardized education testing, behavior modification, man-machine system design, political polling, consumer research and market testing, management consulting, economic indicators, national statistical systems, to mention a few.

We know that many social thinkers tried to give a definition of ideology, not in terms of its substance but of its function. One of those is a classical example of Karl Mannheim who regarded Bacon's theory of Idola as a forerunner of the modern conception of ideology. What he saw in Bacon's Idola was a kind of obstacles which hinder us in obtaining the truth (Mannheim, 1960:55). Machiavellian notion of ideology adds to this human intention of deceiving others for the protection and augmentation of egoistic interests.

Recently Edward Shils mentioned about the nature of ideology, saying that it is full of distrust, is aggressive, undermines existing political institutions, is dogmatic, doctrinaire, totalistic and futuristic (Shils, 1958:450). In the similar vein of argument, Stark says that ideology is 'a mode of thinking which is thrown off its proper course...something shady, something that ought to be overcome and banished from our mind', something psychologically 'deformed'; thought related to 'facts of reality' is like a pure stream, crystal-clear, transparent; ideological ideas are like a dirty river, muddied and polluted by the impurities that have flooded into it (Stark, 1958:90-91). A psychological element is emphasized by Erikson, who says that ideology is 'an unconscious tendency underlying religion and scientific as well as political thought: the tendency at a given time to make facts amenable to ideas, and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and individual sense of identity' (Erikson, 1985:22). Even Parsons says that 'ideologies have functions directly homologous with those of rationalization in the personality system' (Parsons, 1951: 357). Thus, most conceptions of ideology are implicitly or explicitly hostile or derogatory.

Arblaster writes: '...ideology is seen as a veil that stands between men and reality, something that obscures and distorts facts rather than revealing them. Whether someone is consciously com-

mitted to a particular ideological position, or whether his/her beliefs unconsciously reflect an established ideology, the implication is the same: an ideological position is a partisan position, non-neutral and non-objective (Arblaster, 1973, in Beneck et al. eds., 1973:115).

After having taken a short excursion to examine some of the predecessors' definitions of 'ideology,' I would like to give my idea of ideology. What I am going to propose here is not so much a definition of ideology as the idea of 'ideologiness.' Whatever form of information it may be (religious, philosophic, aesthetic, scientific, ideological, etc.), every information (whether it may be a piece or a system) has its own ideologiness by the extent to which it serves to form an opportunity structure (=interests situation) of members of society. Some information is created, diffused, and consolidated by a particular social agent with a specific intention of directing the behavior of other people. Still some other information is coming into existence without any conscious motif or intention on the part of any social actor. The former is to be called 'manifest ideological,' while the latter, 'latent ideological.' Needless to say, this distinction is not based upon the criteria measuring the amount of ideologiness of the information concerned. It simply indicates that one is ardently advocated by 'ideologues' who tend to be dogmatic (loyal to their beliefs), doctrinaire (uncompromising), rigid (principled), aggressive (keen, enthusiastic), Messianic (hopeful of a final solution), apocalyptic (fears a coming disaster), totalitarian (beliefs are coherently unified and relatively comprehensive), brainwashed (persuaded), devoted to myth and illusion (believe what they believe), to use the expression of Nigel Harris (1968:26), and that the other lacks them. Therefore, what is truly important about ideology is not whether it is false or true, but how it is created and spread, and how persuasive and effective it is in driving individuals and groups into a desired action in a determined way. In the final analysis, ideology (=ideologiness) has to be evaluated on human action level where the rational, the irrational, and the superrational motifs compete with each other.

To repeat, the point here is that I would like to propose the 'contextual definition of ideology.' Any statement concerning the socially relevant matters could be 'ideological' in relation to the context in

which it finds itself. Thus, Marx's 'neutral and scientific' observation that history of human beings is a history of class struggle could stimulate and encourage the revolutionary movement of working class against capitalists in some of the industrializing countries in Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The continuation of influence of this ideology in this century revealed itself in the form of various 'revolutions' in late-comer nations, including the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the Chinese Revolution in 1948.

2. Politics and political ideology

Now let us turn to political action and political ideology, applying to the political arena the general proposition that human action cannot be separated from the cognition of the situation.

In contemporary highly industrialized societies, the intervention of government (political power) into social life has become pervasive and complicated. The function of 'polity' (a functionally differentiated sub-system of society) in a social system is ranging from the classical functions such as defense and security-maintenance to various accommodation functions among different interests of different sub-groups in society, which requires highly technical skills and professional knowledge. But essential is the fact that the government decision-making and its execution are based upon the monopoly of coercive force on the part of government, which distinguishes this power from any kind of social power in society, though this political power is always conducted within the limit of a legal framework. As it is based upon the ultimate coercive force, political power needs to have a special sort of legitimacy for which ideology serves to give the mandate.

The general definition of the function of politics is 'to achieve the common goals through authority' or 'authoritative distribution of resources' according to the functionalist political scientists, which suggests that the execution of political power is (1) to convert the particularistic (individual, or sub-group) goals into the universalistic (collective, national) ones, and (2) to specify instrumentally universalistic information and resources in order to mobilize them to attain these goals, (3) through the execution of legitimate power, though the sub-

stance of the legitimacy may differ, depending upon the nature of political system in which power exists. In this process of execution of political power it is not rare to see individual members of society who have their own desire to self-realization sacrifice a part (or the whole) of their desire to compensation for the common benefit such as 'social order.'

Generally speaking, in order that human community should avoid disorder and that it should realize the collectively desired common values it must be a moral community which involves such a 'governance' as we described above, sometimes demanding sacrifice on the part of its individual members. Though this functional problem of human community arises in every social system regardless of its size, 'politics' as an institution should be treated on a particular societal level called 'nation-state.' We may add to this other two relevant levels concerning politics, if it is necessary to do so, namely 'international' above nation-state and 'local' below it, though we do not take these two levels into our present consideration except when they come to be relevant in terms of the nation-state politics.

It does not necessarily mean that as the government is an ultimate agent of political power other social groups are totally excluded from the possibility of controlling the political power. Even slaves or employed soldiers may gain political power through revolts against kings or emperors, and aliens may invade an empire to destroy a long-lasting dynasty. In the case of a political system institutionalized according to the principles of democracy, the non-governmental party gains power by the mandate of the electorate through governmental party gains power by the mandate of the electorate through elections. Many social groups whose original purpose is not 'political' at all seek to influence the political decision-making process, resorting to various strategies and tactics so that their interests should be protected and enlarged.

Even the individual members of society organize themselves to participate in the political process in favor of realizing their own interests in the form of various social movements. Thus, many individuals and groups as well as the government compete with each other, take part in the political process of setting and realizing the common goals (real or fictitious) of the national community. In such a case,

then, they should be equipped with some technical competence and provide 'cause' to persuade the public that their goals are identical with those of the community as a whole. The formation of rules and sanctions are also needed to stabilize this whole process of political struggles.

Political ideology, in general, can be defined as a system of ideas concerning a map of political world created and possessed by a specific social collectivity including social class in connection with its interests, consisting of the above mentioned three forms of information. Among its main functions, there is one function which should be mentioned here in relation to our discussion of politics, that is to say, the legitimizing function of the existing (or to exist) specific social order which is inevitably favorable to some individuals and groups and unfavorable to others. Therefore, there are political scientists who define this term narrowly, meaning a common idea concerning social order. The legitimacy belief system is also used to refer to political ideology, which functions to legitimate political power and dominance. We do not deny this aspect of political ideology to be included in our definition, though we prefer a little bit wider definition of it.

It should be clear here that our theoretical stance is based upon the behavior-information scheme and that accordingly our definition of political ideology does not fit exactly, what our predecessors gave to it, 'misleading ideas' 'unrealistic ideals,' 'intentional fallacy,' false social consciousness,' 'social critic,' or whatever. Mannheim's distinction between partial and total ideology, and between ideology and utopia, is not relevant because political ideology may be partial or total, past-oriented or future-oriented, or even conservative or radical. Having revealed our basic viewpoint, let us analyze some aspects of the statics and the dynamics of political ideology.

3. Statics and dynamics of political ideology

Just like the case of ideology in general, political ideology consists of the three elements we have already mentioned, namely, cognitive, evaluative and directive. They are interpreted alternatively transformed from the first, the second, and the third in time sequence not only in the process of human

action but also of non-human behavior such as thermostat, for example. In other words, behavior is regarded as an information transforming process from this point of view. Statically, however, political ideology has a hierarchical structure with the ultimate core value on the top, which becomes concrete when it comes down to interpret everyday social phenomena, true or false, good or bad, beautiful or ugly. For example, our opinion about something is not itself an ideology, but it is definitely a value-ridden proposition based upon some sort of ideological criteria. Methodologically we try to reconstruct the structure of ideology through the analysis of concrete opinions and attitudes concerning some specific issues. Let me explain this briefly.

Once Parsons enumerated four structural elements of a social system, presupposing that social structure is formed along a value system. With value at the top, followed by norms, collectivity, and roles (Parsons, 1966:18-21).

Social value is a type of order of the social system concerned, which is regarded as 'desirable' by the members of society. It is a pattern of the core normative culture and the necessary condition for stabilization of social structure.

Norms are formed based upon this core value system, regulating performance of the roles of individual members and the differentiated goals of collectivities, leading to the realization of a stable order in a social system which has a direction in continuity.

In the same vein of thinking, we come to a tentative conclusion that political ideology has also a hierarchical structure with its core value dimension at the top, then a more or less consistent normative belief system based upon the core value, according to which specific social phenomena are to be interpreted, evaluated, and finally the directive for action is to be provided. At the same time, the core and ultimate value changes itself on the lower level into the intermediate norms in the different areas of human social activities such as polity, economy, education, and moral life. For example, liberalism is an individualistic ethic with hedonistic and utilitarian self-realization of individual human beings as the ultimate value. This leads to the norm which guarantees the individual economic rights including production, consumption, contract, selling and buying, and other rights to dispose pro-

perties and labor, in the economic area. The same core value leads to the norm which guarantees individual members of society the rights to vote, to participate to choose policy alternatives and the like in the political area.

Political ideology also enables us to put the order our responses towards problems in society. To distinguish the important problems concerning social order from those of little importance is a very crucial function of political ideology. It also provides the direction along which these problems should be resolved.

There are some other important aspects of the nature and dynamics of political ideology, namely, 'personal penetration' and 'public penetration.' These two ideas of 'penetration' are not unrelated, one being socio-psychological and the other, sociological. Only for the analytical sake, we deal with them separately.

Political ideology itself can be objectified as a system of ideas represented by symbols. But it is only after this system has been successfully internalized (accepted and consolidated) into political actors, may it be individual or collectivity, that it functions as motivation and the guiding principle for them to act facing some ambiguous situation which needs a decision to choose. The whole process of this penetration can be called 'political socialization,' which, like the case of ideology in general, is divided into two categories, one being on personal level and the other, on societal level.

As for the former, we have to discuss about, among other things, the problem of communication; what political ideology is transmitted, by whom, to whom, how, and under what circumstances. Given the fact that existing communication studies have said much about this problem, we mention two things which seem to be highly relevant to our present discussion, (1) the role of intellectuals and (2) the situation of receivers.

According to our point of view, intellectuals are a group of people who are engaged in (take the role of) producing, refining, spreading, or destroying the system of ideas in an exclusive and monopolistic way in society notwithstanding the fact that their concrete historical figures are remarkably different depending upon age and society, magicians, priests, scientists, journalists, or university professors. It may be appropriate here to add that we

cannot define intellectuals simply in terms of occupation or professional roles, nor are they mere specialists whose achievements are highly appreciated among their colleagues. Rather, intellectuals are those whose outstanding abilities in the particular field are applied into more general areas, the areas of religion and philosophy, and social and political questions (Benewick, R. als. eds., 1973:119). Supporting this conception of intellectual, Shils wrote; there is in every society a minority of persons who, more than the ordinary run of their fellow men, are inquiring, and desirous of being in frequent communion with symbols which are more general than immediate concrete situations of everyday life and remote in their reference in both time and space. In this minority, there is a need to externalize this quest in oral and written discourse, in poetic or plastic expression, in historical reminiscence or writing, in ritual performance and acts of worship. This interior need to penetrate beyond the screen of immediate concrete experience marks the existence of the intellectuals in every society (Shils, 1972:3).

This group (of people) contains the central figures (cultural heroes), their disciples, and many 'rank-and file' intellectuals. Those at the center are usually charismatic (leaders) and this charismatic character are often times delegated to subordinate members of the group, by which they are able to persuade the public with their interpretation and argument. Generally speaking, the charismatic character of intellectuals are not created by social institutions, but it can be amplified through such devices as medal awarding which symbolizes respect and honor people gave to these persons, the past brilliant career or experience of prestigious positions which proves their professional expertise; affiliation of the high-ranking social institutions (university or research institute). Also important are the media which convey the ideas including academic journals, whose prestige serves to increase the persuasive power of the message that carries the charisma of the media with it.

Thus we can assume rather confidently that there is a competitive 'market' of political ideology where, putting its effectiveness aside, many intellectuals are competing with each other in persuading the public. Under these circumstances, we can say that the above mentioned amplifying mechanism of charisma is what Weder once called,

'routinization of charisma.' In such a way, ideology cannot help but possess its specific roots. This suggests the possibility that political ideology may become something like a myth, containing certain ritualistic element in it.

What can we say about the acceptance of ideology? Let us think of this in the case of individual. In general, we can observe that how an individual person accepts certain information differs depending upon the situation in which he or she happens to be exist. The common picture of this is that people are looking for some sort of system of ideas in a more or less uncertain situation as the guiding principle of their action. But more specifically, what they want and how strongly they want it differs according to the degree of seriousness and the nature of the problems they face. If the situation is less critical without any serious problems in it, the sensitivity towards information on the part of the actor tends to be weak. On the contrary, when the situation is highly critical (they are 'hungry' or 'thirsty' for information) they are likely to be very sensitive to information and they sometimes easily accept the information which, in a normal case, they would refuse to accept due to its ambiguity or uncertainty.

This general picture can be applied to the case of political ideology in terms of its acceptance process. The degree of 'penetration' begins from a simple acceptance (ideology as knowledge, existing on the peripheral of one's consciousness without yet playing the role of motivation or guiding principle for action), ending up to a strongly passionate acceptance (empathy). Some interesting observations: when a given political ideology seems to rationalize (legitimize) actor's situation (of which he or she feels some kind of guilty conscience), it is more likely to be accepted. This is a familiar fact to those who are knowledgeable of Festinger's hypothesis of 'cognitive dissonance.' Though it is widely recognized that ideology is a reflection of the infrastructure, in often cases ideology is not so much the product of people who need it as the product of intellectual activities which are borrowed by the needy. To illustrate this eloquently, we may cite the case of early Christianity which was widely accepted by the slave class in the Roman Empire, and Marxism, by the working class in the early industrial societies in mid-nineteenth century Europe.

Another important point is the certainty (= definition) of a situation. People suffer from the lack of the meaning (of their existence, or of the world) when a situation is chaotic and critical. The state of 'anomie,' for example, caused by a radical change of the social surroundings, would make people vulnerable to maladaptation to a situation, thus leading to the feeling of uncertainty and frustration. Under these circumstances, people tend to accept a specific ideology without any conscious examination or criticism as they are 'thirsty,' so to speak, for certainty. It is in a time of crisis when ideology 'talks' loudly! Shils wrote; ideologies arise in conditions of crisis, in sectors of society to whom hitherto prevailing outlook has become unacceptable. An ideology arises because there is a strongly felt need for an explanation of important experiences which the prevailing outlook does not explain, because there is a need for the firm guidance of conduct which, similarly, is not provided by the prevailing outlook, and because there is a need, likewise strongly felt, for a fundamental vindication of legitimation of the value and dignity of the person in question (Shils, 1972:29).

When people accept an ideology as knowledge with reason it may have less influence to motivate them in action, while when they accept it as empathy with passion it may have more power to drive them into a specific action with determination. We know, for example, during a political campaign, that moral issues are much more appealing than economic issues, and that scientific verification is less effective than religious persuasion in mobilizing people.

Another important aspect of 'penetration' of ideology is more sociological which we call 'public penetration.' If we look for the condition under which a certain specific ideological system dominates in a society, we will find it in a society where an ideology system succeeds in unifying various interests of individuals (or of groups). But the very nature of ideology cannot permit this kind of situation to be realized so easily that there should always exist more or less conflict and concurrence among different ideological systems in society. In general, this sort of conflict (or competition) will occur in connection with, 1) the core value, and 2) the peripheral norms. In the former case, it will be difficult to maintain a political system as a moral community

as the only definite commonly-shared value system cannot exist, with the result that the ideological conflict becomes a real power struggle among those who believe in different ideologies. On the contrary, in the latter case, the conflict arises in terms of the different cognition of a situation or of different means in realizing the same goals. In such a case, if there is a rule to regulate the conflict, power transfer from one party to the other will take place smoothly in peace as in the case of the American two party system. Generally speaking, the interests situation which involves people in society corresponds to ideologies: integrative and general on an abstract level, but differentiated and specific on a concrete level.

In this connection, we can talk about the integrative and divisive functions of ideology in terms of people's interests situation, setting the two social contexts separately, one is that political power is one-dimensional and closed, and the other being that political power is multi-dimensional and open.

In the former case where political power is uni-dimensional, covering the whole existence of individual members, ideology tends to be either, 1) uni-dimensional, or 2) a life-or-death struggle between the orthodox and the heresy, in an extreme way. Which pattern will be realized depends upon a variety of conditions, including the legitimacy and effectiveness of ideology, that is to say, to the extent to which that ideology concerned is recognized and accepted by the main political actors in society and to what extent it functions well to solve the main social problems effectively. Also it depends upon whether the society is or is not in a critical situation, economically, militarily, or whatever. It is often that in a society which has been somehow industrialized and is rapidly changing the uni-dimensionality of ideology can not be realized easily (Think that the pluralistic democracy is always dominant in such a society as a political ideology!) In such a society, though the dominance of the orthodox ideology appears on the surface, it is likely to be that the social consciousness has a dual structure, dividing itself into the formal and superficial and the informal and deep.

When political power is pluralistic and does not cover the whole aspect of individual members, it is likely to be that political ideology is also pluralistic,

though the minimum core value system should be maintained in order to attain social integration. In such a society the different peripheral ideologies compete with each other supported by different social categories such as social classes (economic interests), social statuses (prestige interests), or generations and occupations (cultural interests), and so forth. But it is also possible for such a society to attain a strong uni-dimensionality of ideology, appealing to people emotionally in terms of (the crisis of) the core value system. Thus, in the United States in the 1950s, the ideological one-dimensionality was attained (which is generally called 'McCarthyism'), emphasizing the threat of Communism which would deteriorate the American Way of Life, the traditional core value systems of American society.

4. The social characteristics of intellectuals

The conflict or competition of ideology is also that of intellectuals. Having analyzed the former in the previous section, now let us turn to the latter.

According to our idea that intellectuals are a group of role-performers who are responsible to some specific functions in society, it is necessary to examine fully the diverse definitions given to the term 'intellectual' by many authors in the past. One of the most popular idea is that intellectuals are those persons who always criticize society, being progressive and leftist in their ideological orientation. It was Raymond Aron who once said that being leftist is a sort of professional disease of intellectuals. We do not agree with this kind of statement as, we will see later, intellectuals may be progressive and leftist or conservative and rightist. We are completely favorable to the opinion that the typology of intellectuals should be made in terms of social (political) power, thus highly evaluating the attempt of Lewis Coser who categorizes intellectuals ranging from those who occupy the citadel of political power by themselves to those who run away from their own power system itself (Coser, 1970).

According to him, modalities which characterize the relations between men of power and men of ideas are as follows; 1) intellectuals may hold power, 2) they may attempt to direct and advise the men of power, 3) they may serve to legitimize the men of power and provide them with ideological

justifications, 4) they may be critics of power, and they may castigate political men for the errors of their ways, attempting to shame men committed to an ethos of compromise by holding up absolute standards of moral righteousness, and finally 5) they may despair of exercising influence at home and may turn to political systems abroad that seem more nearly to embody the image of their desire (Coser, 1970:136. abbreviated by the author). But why so many authors still insist that intellectuals should be, in their inherent nature, anti-governmental, or critics of social matters, is another question for us to answer. Coser's suggestive answer to this question (though he has in mind the case of modern intellectuals) is as follows; in the tasks they perform, modern intellectuals are descendant of the priestly upholders of sacred tradition, but they are also and at the same time descendants of the biblical prophets, of those inspired madmen who preached in the wilderness far removed from the institutionalized pieties of court and synagogue, castigating the men of power for the wickedness of their ways.

Intellectuals are men who never seem satisfied with things as they are, with appeals to custom and usage. They question the truth of the moment in terms of higher and wider truth; they counter appeals to factuality by invoking the "impractical ought." They consider themselves special custodians of abstract ideas like reason and justice and truth, jealous guardians of moral standards that are too often ignored in the market place and the houses of power (Coser, 1970: viii).

In any human society, there always exist a group of people whose principal function is to treat symbolic idea systems which are represented with signs and symbols. Though they may be artists, social scientists, magicians or medicine men, or whatever, they share some common characteristics in their social existence. First, their living should depend upon others' productive labor, as, on the one hand, it takes a long time for them to master a complicated system of knowledge and techniques which is mystique and alien to the ordinary people, and, on the other hand, after having mastered it they have to be engaged in an occupation through which they refine these knowledge and techniques or apply them to solve problems society or the individual members of society need to solve. An

example of this is the monks of Hinayana Buddhism in Southeast Asia who live, being completely away from productive and secular activities, exclusively depending upon people in the town who donate them foods and other items for their living. Looking back on the historical past of the modern intellectuals, their pattern of living was almost identical with these Buddhist monks, being under the protection (or patronage) of the ruling class of the day, feudal lords or bourgeois class of modern business and industry.

The reason why the men of power (the ruling social class) patronize intellectuals is that these intellectuals have some value for them, giving the legitimacy to their power through ideologies and providing the techniques they need to govern the body-politics or run the business and industrial enterprises. In a word, we can say that power requires intellectuals, as Shils said that an effective collaboration between intellectuals and the authorities which govern society is requirement for order and continuity in public life and for the integration of the wider reaches of the laity into society (Shils, 1972: 21).

Secondly, intellectuals develop a specific sub-culture which is not necessarily favorable to the value of the powerful. For example, in the case of the modern scientific intellectuals their sub-culture is characterized by empirical positivism, logical rationalism and universalism due to their training of scientific disciplines, which sometimes oppose and check the intentions or plans of the ruling class. It may be that a nation-state has a trouble with its intellectuals in terms of a possible war with an other country as they oppose this policy simply because of their humanitarian universalism, the respect of human rights and self-determination of all peoples regardless of race, religion and nationality. Basically, as Shils wrote, the tension between the intellectuals and the powers— their urge to submit to authority as the bearer of the highest good, whether it be order or progress or some other values, and to resist or condemn authority as a betrayer of the highest values— comes ultimately from the constitutive orientation of the intellectuals toward the sacred (Shils, 1972:17).

Mainly due to these facts, the political and ideological orientation of intellectuals becomes subtle in relation to those in power. Whether they are

governmental or anti-governmental, intellectuals have to depend upon the patrons (particularly, the powerful agents of social activities, politics, business, media, education, religion and whatever) for their living and, to some extent, their own professional activities. This fact necessitates them to respond to the demands of their patrons though not one hundred percent commitment in providing what patrons ask them to offer. But at the same time they feel that they are deprived of honor and self-respect, or even suicidal if they have to abandon their own principles which are utmost important in the world of ideas to which they devote themselves, such as ultimate and abstract values, 'truth' or 'beauty,' or rational and universalistic orientations on the part of the modern scientists. This is why sometimes it happens that intellectuals betray the patrons' demands, keeping their own pride and principle. Thus, they are constantly exposed to these two cross-forces which cause them stress and inner-conflict and the way they try to escape from this difficult situation differs in different types of intellectuals (Nakano, 1984).

There are double meanings, in our judgment, in the fact that intellectuals tend to be critical toward power or that some intellectuals insist on the element of anti-power posture in defining 'intellectual.' On the one hand, they should be vigilant to their own vulnerability to patrons as their social existence depends more or less upon these people (including the mass or the public in contemporary mass society) and on the other hand, they cannot help but be critical toward the power holder because of their own sub-culture with which they cannot make compromise with patrons' plans and policies. Accordingly, in this sense, intellectuals are seen as double-sided, presenting two faces to the patrons, one which is an indispensable collaborator and faithful friend to them, and the other which is a critic to their business and even an enemy or a betrayer. As the former they are respected and adored and as the latter, feared and ignored. Under these circumstances, when anti-intellectual movement arises they are put into place of the 'scapegoat' and become a prey to the public. A recent extreme example of this case is the repulsion and killing of intellectuals during the so-called Cultural Revolution in China in the 1960s. The ambivalent nature of intellectuals' social existence invites in

turn the ambivalent nature of the attitudes toward intellectuals on the part of patrons, the powerful and the mass.

Another traditional emphasis in defining the social characteristics of intellectuals is that there should not be the positive relationship between intellectuals and occupations which are regarded as the most typical secular activity in society. Though some intellectuals occupy some professions this correspondence is nothing but a coincidence and we cannot define intellectuals in terms of their occupations. It seems rather that people talk about intellectuals not in terms of their professional activities but in terms of their 'spiritual stance,' especially of their critical attitudes toward human affairs. So it has never happened that high ranked government officers or eminent natural scientists were regarded as intellectuals simply because of their highly specialized knowledge. The role of intellectuals are not conceived to be 'instrumental' to such secular activities. Rather, it should be related with the core value system of society, how to understand it and how to be responsible to this understanding, for example. Intellectual activities, therefore, cannot be separated from ideology.

The modern phase of societal history, however, has changed a lot of social situations in which intellectual activities take place today. Parallel to the changing process of modern society widely called 'secularization' and 'professionalization' many hitherto non-occupational social roles have become occupations. In particular, we have to pay a special attention to the so-called professions which are usually distinguished from other occupations in terms of, 1) systematized knowledge, 2) long period of formal training, 3) severe professional ethics, 4) service-to-fee remuneration system, 5) altruism, and so forth. University professors, media people, social scientists in government think-tanks, to mention a few, are those new 'intellectuals' who are definitely responsible to the ideological situation in society through their occupational activities. They are called 'intellectual par qualification' or 'intellectual par vocation' and the number of these new intellectuals has increased tremendously. As Shils wrote, the trend in the present century, in all countries of the world, liberal and totalitarian, has been toward an increasing incorporation of intellectuals into organized institutions (Shils, 1972:13).

Naturally it follows that their relation with power has become much more complicated, and the inner division of their group itself has also become minutely ramified in terms of roots, specialty, ideological orientation, and supporting bodies. According to an American sociologist Daniel Bell who argued that the post-industrial society is characterized by 'information' and 'knowledge,' there exists today a remarkable extension and development of the so-called 'knowledge class' whose influence penetrates into society through their 'intellectual technology.' For example, in the United States of America in 1975, this group (including technical-professional occupations and managers) made up 25% of a labor force of eight million people (Bell, 1973, 1976 edition, Preface: xvi).

Although it is still debatable what part of this class should be called intellectuals, almost all of them are involved in some kind of activities which are not unrelated to the realization process of the social value with more or less responsibility through their respective institutional and occupational role performance. As Bell is well aware, 'science' as the central motor of society can provide neither the transcendental ethos which gives to society some appropriate idea of goals nor the spiritual anchor which gives to people an stable world of meanings. But seeing that science has been well institutionalized with good reputation and authority, we may guess, with at least some confidence, that some of these people will play 'pseudo-intellectuals' who provide these ethos and meanings under the name of science.

As we witness today that many new intellectuals as occupational class come to the front scene in history, it is no more meaningful to interpret them as a group of 'transcendental saints.' Instead, it is necessary for us to put them in a part of the complicated social institutions. In a social systems theory term, we can say that these intellectual, governmental or anti-governmental, conservative or radical, are to be interpreted as a kind of 'feed-back' mechanism to enhance the adaptive capacity of the social system.

They are, as a whole, a functionally differentiated sub-system of the total social system, who function, as others do, through the institutionalized role performance. Thus, we come to a conclusion that one of the most important fields in


the study of intellectual today is an analysis of concrete institutions such as churches, universities, research institutes, mass media, and others where these new intellectuals work. To put it in Weberian terms, we may call this new aspect of intellectual activities 'routinization of intellectuals.'

Coming back to our original question, the relationship between intellectual and political power, we treat it on a much more institutionalized level than past authors did. Intellectuals as an institution get involved in politics through a variety of channels. we have already mentioned churches, universities, research institutes, and mass media. Adding to these institutions, we can enumerate research institutes and committees established inside the body-politics, various regular and extraordinary boards and teams again in the body-politics, to mention a few.

Generally speaking, there is a reciprocal and complementary relationship between politics and knowledge, which are, seen from a broader perspective, two functionally differentiated sub-systems of the total social system. Of course, knowledge itself is a part of culture and cannot act. Here we use the term intellectual to refer to the social actor who acts in the field of knowledge. But, as in the case of any functionally differentiated sub-systems, politics and knowledge do not share the same basic principle which dominates and guides human behaviors in each respective sub-system. To express this in a plain terms, for example, the basic principle which dominates politics is something particularistic, that is to say, royalty to a nation, or people, or tradition, while that which dominates knowledge is something universalistic, that is to say, royalty to the truth, or beauty, or objectivity.

This suggests that there exists an inherent (potential or activated) conflict between these two sub-systems, politics and knowledge. In terms of their relationship with power, intellectuals may enjoy the honey-moon with it or may struggle against it. But in a pluralistic society as ours, both politics and knowledge are divided. This means that there is a sort of parallel correspondence between these two institutional settings, which we have to make clear so that we may understand the role of intellectuals in contemporary societies. A tentative scheme to illustrate the relationship between politics and knowledge is as follows ;

The Relationship between Politics and Knowledge



Finally, concerning the political allegiance of intellectuals, Brym proposed to examine the following three factors, 1) the class or group from which they originate, 2) the class or group which effectively controls the educational institutions through which they pass, and 3) the class or group to which they become occupationally and politically tied during early adulthood (Brym, 1980: 73). To the extent that this proposition, which stresses the need to examine intellectuals' shifting social roots, has validity, I think that it amounts to a demaging critique of the widespread view that intellectuals are in any sense classless or rootless.

Another suggestion can be found in a systematic analysis of university professors conducted by Lipset and Ladd in which the political orientation of professors— liberal vs. conservative— is shown to differ according to their disciplinary specialty, with those whose specialty is social sciences are the most liberal, while those whose specialty is agriculture, the most conservative (Lipset and Ladd, 1975).

A general treatment of political ideology and intellectuals is the subject-matter of this paper. What sort of intellectuals have what kind of political ideology, and why, these are the questions to be answered in the future being based upon concrete studies of different time and space.

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