Comparative Survey Research and its Infrastructure in Europe*

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The focus of this article is the organization of comparative survey research in Europe. To many readers the term comparative research may sound like a pleonasm. Empirical research, one may object, is always comparative. If we want to examine causal relationships, for example, at least two states have to be compared: the state before and the state after the occurrence of the cause. Every analysis of change and causal change is only a special case of change—requires the comparison of at least two states. Comparison is at the very heart of all research. Why, then, do social scientists speak of comparative research and not just of research? The answer is that comparative research for the social scientist has a special meaning. It does not refer to any comparison but only to the comparison of different societies, larger regional units, or cultures.

Fundamental Objections to Comparative Research

In principle most social scientists will agree that comparative research is useful. Fundamental doubts will only be raised by those who hold relativistic positions. They will insist that objective knowledge about other cultures cannot be gained. A German social scientist, they may argue for instance, will always see Japan with German eyes even if he speaks Japanese fluently because he lacks all the background knowledge which the Japanese have socialized in childhood and youth. Vice versa, a Japanese scientist will always see Germany with Japanese eyes. And if both, the Japanese and the German social scientist compare, say, social inequality in Germany and Japan they will not only describe the same subject in different ways, they will also arrive at different conclusions and ultimately not even be able to understand each other. The German will always remain in the cage of German culture and the Japanese in the one of his culture. Furthermore, no one is able to leave the cage and to gain objective knowledge from outside.

To some extent the relativistic view is persuasive. Even the use of such simple words like “yes” and “no” varies between languages. And is this not even truer for those terms which refer to unobservable inner states or to the spiritual world? Can we really be sure that Japanese and Germans mean the same if they say “I am very happy” in their respective languages? Is “kami” or “hotoke” an adequate translation of the English word “God”? Question after question! There are always hundreds of reasons why cultures are unique and incomparable and why the meaning of an expression cannot be transferred from one language into an expression in another language.

If we try to clarify these differences, however, we often have an interesting experience. First of all, we always learn more about our own culture if we discuss these problems with experts from other cultures. If an expert tells you, for instance, that “God” in the Christian tradition has much more in common with “kami” in the Japanese tradition, the Western sociologist will start to think more deeply about the Christian concept of God. It is true that God is addressed as father in the Lord’s Prayer and often painted as a wise old man with a beard. But is this still the Christian understanding of God? He will look in

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his own language for alternative concepts like supernatural power or life force which are more similar to the notion of “kami”.

Second, he may empirically investigate which images of God prevail among the European public. This has already been done in the European Values Study and one finding is presented in Figure 1. It shows that the image of God varies not only within but also between countries. In Sweden, for example, about 16 percent believe in a personal God, nearly 53 percent in a spirit or life force, about 18 percent do not know what to believe and 13 percent do not believe in God at all in 1999. In Poland by contrast, a huge majority of nearly 82 percent believes in a personal God and only a small minority of about 10 percent in a spirit or life force. 6 percent of the Poles don’t know what to believe and 2 percent do not believe in God at all. Some European sociologists of religion expect a change in the image of God in the process of modernization, a change from a more personal to a more impersonal image as observed in Sweden. If so, a former difference between the monotheistic and other religions would gradually disappear and Sweden would be at the spearhead of this development.

Whether this prediction will become true or not cannot be said at the moment. What we can say, however, is that Europe presently reveals an enormous diversity of religious beliefs. In East Germany, for instance, more than 50 percent of the population believes that there is no God at all. Thus, the majority of the Swedes believe in a spirit or life force, the overwhelming majority of Poles in a personal God, and the majority of the East Germans do not believe in God at all. It would be very interesting to investigate in a similar way the Japanese belief in kami and hotoke.

We can learn a lot from the intercultural dialogue even if we finally may arrive at the conclusion that we cannot fully transfer the meaning of a concept from one culture into another culture. No doubt, religious symbols like “kami” are particularly difficult in this respect because they refer to a reality which we cannot observe and grasp with our senses. They carry a meaning which is probably not fully understood even within the respective culture.

Other concepts are more easily translated. For instance, inventions and technological innovations obviously can be described in such a way that a transfer into other cultures is possible. Japan, more than a century ago, imported the railway from the West. Nowadays Japan builds the best trains in the world. The same holds not only for many other technological products but also for legal and political institutions. If they try hard and if it is to their advantage, the elites obviously can manage the technological and cultural
transfer. Cultural relativism is often a means to protect ourselves against foreign influences: They cannot understand us and we cannot understand them. Therefore, we do not communicate. Fortunately, the youth in many countries do not think any longer along these lines. They have become curious about other cultures. And curiosity is the first step to an intercultural dialogue. It is also a strong incentive for comparative research.

Once we have abandoned cultural relativism, we are able to see the advantages of comparative research quite independently of our methodological position. Most of us will agree that a social theory is tested more rigorously if it is confronted with data from different countries than only with data from different American student populations. And most people also have more trust in generalizations which are based on empirical evidence from a broad scope of cultures than on generalizations which are based on a single experiment or survey in a narrowly defined context. And even those who distrust generalizations and general propositions will admit that we can learn more about an individual case by comparing it with other cases—or, with regard to societies or cultures: by comparing a given society with other societies instead of focusing on a single society.

A Brief Overview of Comparative Surveys in Europe

Even if one is convinced of the usefulness of comparative research, one is not always able to practice it. Comparative survey research is a demanding enterprise. First of all an efficient infrastructure for survey research is needed in the participating countries. In Germany and many other European countries such an infrastructure did not exist before the war. This is the reason why the first surveys which allow at least for some comparisons were carried out by the United States Information Agency (USIA) in the fifties. These surveys were not conceptualized as a comparative study but tried to collect data on foreign policy orientations like the attitudes towards American and Soviet foreign policy, international relations, arms control, etc. in several European countries, in particular in Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France.

The surveys were not integrated into a single file but were stored as separate data sets. Many of the questionnaires of these surveys were kept at the cellars of the Roper center and the U.S. National Archives in Washington and were, as well as other paper documents, gradually marked by the ravages of time. Due to the initiative of Hans Rattinger (Flyn/Rattinger 1985, Rattinger/Munton 1991) a larger number of the old data sets were rescued¹. In cooperation with the ZA, a total of 65 comparative surveys were transformed into machine-readable documents. In addition the ZA built up a data base of the 47 German surveys which cover a period of about 20 years, from 1952 to 1972. Another 44 surveys are currently being processed and will expand the time horizon up to 1992.

In Table 1 the most important comparative surveys² with European participation are reported without mentioning all of them³. Between 1957 and 1963 the Pattern of Human Concerns studies (Cantril 1965) were carried out and tried to investigate the fears and hopes of human beings on several continents. 14 nations participated in the study, among them also Germany and Japan. Unfortunately the data files for Japan and three other countries are not available.

The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba (Almond/Verba 1963) presumably is the best known study of this period. The authors introduced a typology of political cultures which they applied to the five countries under investigation—Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Mexico and the United States. Germany was characterized by relatively high political knowledge, high voting participation, and high satisfaction with the outcome of the system, but by low political efficacy and low trust of in political institutions. It was for this reason that Almond and Verba labeled Germany as a subject culture—a term which provoked many harsh reactions in Germany and abroad. And even though the study of Almond and Verba was much

1) ZA Informationen 50, Mai 2002. pp. 81–93
2) We exclude surveys which are the basis of official statistics. We also ignore special target group surveys like, for example, the European Working Conditions Survey (http://www.eurofound.eu.int/), a comparative project which originated in the Eurobarometer framework.
3) The study of Buchanan, W., Cantril, H. (1953) is lacking because the data are presently not available.
Several surveys were carried out during the sixties. The magazine Reader’s Digest sponsored a survey on the life-style, well-being, and values of the Europeans in 12 West European countries. The most famous study of this decade presumably is the **International Time Budget study of 1965/66** (Szalai 1972, Harvey /Szalai/Elliott/Stone/ Clark 1984) which was conducted in ten European countries, the United States and Peru. The study allows among other things a comparison of the time use in Western democracies and in the communist East, particularly in Russia.

**Political Action** (Barnes/Kaase 1979, Jennings/Deth 1990) is one of the most important comparative

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**Table 1: Large Scale Cross-National Surveys: Single Studies and Data Collections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey/Collection</th>
<th>NC</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>POP</th>
<th>Main Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USIA-International Relations</td>
<td>4E</td>
<td>1952–</td>
<td>P21 +</td>
<td>Attitudes towards foreign and international policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(USIA XX Surveys)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1969*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern of Human Concerns Data</td>
<td>14I</td>
<td>1957–</td>
<td>P18 +</td>
<td>Hopes and fears for self and the nation (subjective ratings and perceptions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIC CULTURE SURVEY (Almond &amp; Verba)</td>
<td>5I</td>
<td>1959–</td>
<td>P18 +</td>
<td>Basic political attitudes, political partisanship and, socialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes towards Europe</td>
<td>5E</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>P20 +</td>
<td>Attitudes towards European unification and institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation. ISSC-Workbook for Comparative Analysis</td>
<td>81 (JP)</td>
<td>1963–</td>
<td>Eligib</td>
<td>Political attitudes and behaviour, political culture, political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Time Budget Study</td>
<td>11I</td>
<td>1965–</td>
<td>P18-65</td>
<td>Time budget (daily activities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation and Equality in Seven Nations</td>
<td>71 (JP)</td>
<td>1966–</td>
<td>Var.</td>
<td>Political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reader’s Digest EURODATA (The Reader’s Digest Survey of Europe Today)</td>
<td>17E</td>
<td>1969, 1990</td>
<td>P18 +</td>
<td>Lifestyles, consumer habits, well-being, socio-cultural attitudes (work ethic, family relationships, social tolerance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Eurobarometer (incl. EC-Studies 1970/71/73)</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>1970ff</td>
<td>C15 +</td>
<td>Monitoring public opinion on European integration, institutions and politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central &amp; Eastern Eurobarometer (CCEB)</td>
<td>&lt;25&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;25&gt;</td>
<td>C15 +</td>
<td>Special topical modules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate (Applicant) Countries Eurobarometer (CC-EB)</td>
<td>13E</td>
<td>2001–</td>
<td>C15 +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flash Eurobarometer</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>1990ff</td>
<td>C15 +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Eurobarometer</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>1999ff</td>
<td>C15 +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian Welfare Survey</td>
<td>4E</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>P15-64</td>
<td>Living situation and quality of life (incl. social and political participation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIA World Survey 5-B (Post-China-VisitStudy)</td>
<td>71 (JP)</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>P18 +</td>
<td>Attitudes towards national and international affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL ACTION I + II (Cross-Section + Panel)</td>
<td>7E +</td>
<td>1973–</td>
<td>P16 +</td>
<td>Political values, attitudes and participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPEAN ELECTION STUDIES (EES)</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>1979ff</td>
<td>C15 +</td>
<td>Electoral mobilization, legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;25&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>C18 +</td>
<td>Representation, and communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
data sets of the seventies. The study investigates political orientations and political attitudes in 7 West European countries and the United States. The data base is unique in so far as it also includes a second wave panel for three countries, West Germany, The Netherlands, and the United States. These panels were conducted between 1979 and 1981 and complemented by a second cross section. The first wave also includes interviews of parents and children and offers a unique opportunity for the investigation of socialization processes (Allerbeck/Jennings/Rosenmyer 1979).

The infrastructure for survey research gradually developed in the decades after the war but not everywhere with the same speed and success. In Germany we had a long controversy about quota and random sampling and even though quota sampling can hardly be defended from a scientific point of view

Table 1  Large Scale Cross-National Surveys: Single Studies and Data Collections
B. Surveys Between 1980 and 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Series</th>
<th>NC</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>POP</th>
<th>Main Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross-National Equivalent File</td>
<td>2E + 2NA</td>
<td>EPH</td>
<td>Var</td>
<td>Household Panels, employment, earnings, health indicators, household composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLD VALUE SURVEY (WVS) and EUROPEAN VALUE SURVEY (EVS)</td>
<td>1 (JP) + 34E</td>
<td>1981–2000</td>
<td>P18 +</td>
<td>Values and morality, attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SURVEY PROGRAM (ISSP)</td>
<td>6 to 401 (JP)</td>
<td>1985ff.</td>
<td>P18 +</td>
<td>Rotating topical modules: work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Political Culture of Southern Europe: A Four Nation Study</td>
<td>4E</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>P18 +</td>
<td>Political participation, political values, attitudes towards political institutions and parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International stratification, mobility and politics file (ISMP)</td>
<td>16I</td>
<td>EPH</td>
<td>Var</td>
<td>Intergenerational occupational mobility, political behaviour (party preferences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW EUROPE BAROMETER (New Democracies Barometer, New Russia Barometer, New Baltic Barometer, Korea Democracy Barometer)</td>
<td>22E + KR</td>
<td>1991ff.</td>
<td>Var</td>
<td>Societies in transformation; democratization, health, parties and elections, poverty and social protection, social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Change in Baltic Countries</td>
<td>3E</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Var</td>
<td>Work and working life, social problems, political and economic transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values and Political Change in Post-Communist Europe</td>
<td>5E</td>
<td>1993–1994</td>
<td>P + PM</td>
<td>Political change and political values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems)</td>
<td>&gt; 30I</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>1996–2005</td>
<td>Electoral behavior, social and political cleavages, evaluation of democratic institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coping with Government in the FSU/ECE (Former SU/ Economic Commission for Europe) People on war</td>
<td>4E</td>
<td>1996–1998</td>
<td>Var</td>
<td>Government and political systems, societies in transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Regions</td>
<td>1998–1999</td>
<td>P18 +/- target groups</td>
<td>War orientations and war experiences, role of international organizations; civil protection, concept of crimes of war</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As a consequence, the national samples of most comparative surveys which were carried out in the last millennium and included European countries were drawn by different methods. Thus, the social research infrastructure, even in the affluent West European societies, was far from optimal for a long time. These sampling problems also affected the Eurobarometer Surveys (Saris/Kaase 1997) which started in 1970 under the name of European Communities Studies. In the beginning, from the six founder members, only Belgium, The Netherlands, France, Italy and West Germany participated in the survey, supplemented in advance by Great Britain, but excluding Luxembourg. In 1973 the survey was extended to all EC members, recently enlarged by Denmark, Great Britain, and Ireland. Due to the influence of Rabier and Inglehart (Reif/Inglehart 1991) the Eurobarometer Surveys soon also became an instrument for the analysis of change. They are often described and criticized as surveys from and for the European politicians (O’Shea/Bryson/Jowell n.d.). It is true that the social sciences have only limited influence on the conceptualization of the surveys. The latter are used by the politicians for testing their popularity or the support of the European citizens for a particular political measure. Nevertheless the Eurobarometer Surveys contain some very interesting information about opinion change in the European Union. According to common sense, for example, affluent societies will have no advantage from joining the EU while less advanced societies will benefit a lot. This reasoning could explain why the EU presently hesitates to accept new members like Turkey, Russia, or the Ukraine. Is this also the view of the population of the new EU countries? The Eurobarometer can help to answer this question. In the 90s Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Norway negotiated over admission into the EU. East Germany was more or less automatically integrated after the German unification and participates in the Eurobarometer with a separate sample since 1990.
Finland, Sweden and Austria joined the EU in 1995 while Norway remained independent. During and after the negotiations, several Eurobarometer surveys were carried out in the candidate countries and people were asked whether their country would benefit from becoming an EU member. The results are reported in Figure 2 of the handout.

On the horizontal axis of Figure 2 the year of the survey is depicted. The first survey was carried out in 1990 and the last in 1999. The vertical axis displays the proportion of citizens who expect from EU integration a benefit for their country. Apart from Austria, most countries start with an optimistic majority, first and foremost East Germany where a proportion of 9, i.e. 90 percent of the population, believed in the benefits of EU-membership. In Norway the optimists increased from slightly above fifty to more than 60, and in Finland from slightly below 70 to about 75 percent in the first phase of the negotiations. Even in Sweden a tiny majority was optimistic in 1994.

This is not what common sense would predict. Neither are the populations of rich countries constantly against joining nor poor populations constantly in favor of it. Norway, for instance, is a rich oil-producing country and would therefore most likely become a net payer in the EU, i.e. a country which has to pay more to the EU than it gets back from the EU. If Norwegians were initially in favor of joining the EU, they were either not aware of this consequence or they were altruistic. However, when the other countries finally joined the EU in 1995, the optimists had become a minority almost everywhere, most markedly in Sweden where less than 30 percent expect from EU-membership a benefit for their country. The opinion change was most dramatic in East Germany where the percentage of optimists shrank from 90 to 40 percent. Apparently, the citizens in these countries had too high expectations which were later not met. The only exception is Austria which started with fairly low expectations and later on was positively surprised about the EU-Support for investments in the infrastructure and environment.

This change in beliefs and opinions is well documented in the Eurobarometer Surveys. Largely lacking, however, are explanatory models for the observed change. Did the populations in the candidate countries have un-realistically high expectations in the beginning which were disappointed during the negotiations or afterwards? Do we observe a kind of post decision dissonance?

The Eurobarometer Surveys include only a limited number of explanatory variables and measurement
instruments for long-term attitudes and values. The most important exception is an instrument for measuring value change towards postmaterialism which was included in many Eurobarometer Surveys for several decades. In this way a sequence of measurement points has been built up which allows the calculation of the percentages of materialists and postmaterialists in prewar, and postwar generations at more than 40 time points from 1970 onwards.

Many theories of value change maintain that younger and older generations hold different values. By means of a data set like the Eurobarometer we can investigate whether this is not only true for a certain moment in time but for a longer period. We can examine whether the older generations are permanently more materialistic than the younger ones or whether the differences disappear over time.

Many social theories also assume that people do not change their values in adulthood. Once a materialist, always a materialist! It seems to follow that the percentage of materialists and postmaterialists does not change in adult generations. This also can be investigated by means of the Eurobarometer. No other comparative data set permits the analysis of generational stability over a period of more than 30 years with so many measurement points as the Eurobarometer (Böltken/Jagodzinski 1985, Inglehart 1990, Jagodzinski 1996). To be sure, a rigorous test of value change requires observing the same persons repeatedly over time which is not possible with the Eurobarometer. As long as these panel data do not exist, however, hypotheses of generational change can at least partially be tested with sequences of cross-sections.

On balance, the Eurobarometer leaves ambivalent feelings. On the one hand, a huge amount of information has been collected over the years. The Eurobarometer surveys are not only conducted twice a year, they have also been supplemented by additional topical surveys and modules, by the Flash Eurobarometer, the Central and Eastern and later the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer. Though Switzerland is not a member of the EU it has nevertheless conducted parallel surveys once a year since 1999. The Eurobarometer has become a rich data source and it has been a source of interesting empirical findings (Bréchon/Cautrès 1998). On the other hand, more could be done to test and improve the reliability and validity of the measurement instruments. Politicians are more interested in simple questions and questionnaires than in scientifically demanding ones, so that the full potential of such a unique data base is not used from a scientific point of view.

It is impossible to mention all important studies of the last 30 years. Election research has made great efforts in building up a comparative data base by different strategies. The national election studies can be used for comparative secondary analyses. This often requires an—as we call it—ex post harmonization of the national data which is sometimes possible but often fails. The recently published European Voter (Thomassen 2005) is an example of this research strategy. In addition, comparative data sets such as the European Election Studies and—as a worldwide enterprise—the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems have been created (Franklin/Wlezien 2002, Dalton 2004). The latter is particularly interesting because it combines macro data about the electoral systems with survey data.

International Survey Programs

Three or four—depending on how they are counted—other comparative data sets are highly relevant for the further development of comparative research; the European Values Study (EVS) in combination with the World Value Study, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), and the European Social Survey (ESS) (Jowell/Roberts/Fitzgerald/Gillow 2006). Like the Eurobarometer, these empirical investigations are not just surveys but survey programs. They do not aim at a single but a whole series of comparative surveys. The EVS started in 1981 with the intention to investigate the values of the European population: Are value differences an obstacle to European integration or is there a common value basis which facilitates the process of European unification? The first survey did not only include European countries but it was Eurocentric in the sense that it focused on European values and beliefs. This perspective changed when Ronald Inglehart joined the project in the late 80s. He tried to transform the European into a worldwide enterprise. The second wave of the EVS which was carried out in 1990 was
therefore called the World Values Survey. Even though a large number of items was changed, many observers still had and have the impression that the whole survey is based on a Christian occidental world view.

The transformation into a worldwide survey has its price because the various cultures cannot be investigated as comprehensively as a single survey which is tailored to a particular culture. This was one of the reasons why the European Values Group decided to conceptualize the third wave of the values survey again as a European study. The EVS-group also did not follow Inglehart’s suggestion to conduct a survey every five years but retained the interval of 9 years between each wave. Thus the third EVS took place in 1999. It was agreed, however, to collapse the data of the EVS 1999 and the WVS 2000 into a single integrated file4).

Cooperation between EVS and WVS will hopefully continue in the future. In our view the optimal WVS would consist of a smaller core questionnaire which is compulsory for all participating countries. In addition, different regions of the world should be allowed to create their own subsurveys. The EVS may constitute a first regional unit, for example, a group of Asian countries a second, and Latin America a third. This model would have two advantages: First of all, quite a few countries would be released from the pressure to translate questions which cannot be meaningfully translated into their languages. Second, we could obtain more detailed information about the different cultural zones.

The EVS is at the border of a survey program because the time interval between two surveys is fairly large. Therefore, the pressure for creating a strong and efficient organization is not too strong. The surveys are planned and organized by a minimum number of scientists. This is different with regard to the other two research programs, the ISSP and the ESS. The ISSP was founded in 1985 as an American-European enterprise. It has gradually changed into a worldwide program with about forty participating countries. The group has decided to carry out a comparative survey every year on varying topics like the role of government, social inequality, national identity, religion etc. The yearly comparative survey is called a module. By replicating modules in later years the ISSP also permits the analysis of change. Modules on religion, for instance, were carried out in 1992 and 1998 and there will be another in 2007.

The big advantage of survey programs is that they offer the chance for gradual improvements. Questions which were badly phrased or translated can be altered in future questionnaires. Sampling procedures can be improved in the next surveys. There are much better means to detect deficiencies in the surveys because comparisons can be made across countries and time. The ISSP was the first international program which established groups which are continuously working on the improvement of the survey. A special study group focuses on translation problems, others investigate the effects of different interview modes, improve the socio-demographic variables, or control sampling procedures. In doing so, ISSP has become a model for many other comparative survey programs.

In order to utilize the full potential for improvements, however, more than loosely organized workgroups are needed; a stable infrastructure is required. Scientists have to continuously process, analyze, archive and distribute the data, they have to survey the sampling procedures, advise the participating countries, and make proposals. This requires resources. It is not sufficient to raise funds for the survey which in most comparative programs is the duty of the participating countries, it is also necessary to fund a secretariat, organize and fund meetings, pay for data processing and archiving, and create incentives for those who do the difficult and cumbersome work. In ISSP these overhead costs are shared by a few countries which take the money from their own budget or from some external funding. Therefore the funding of the overhead in ISSP always remains precarious.

ISSP as well as EVS/WVS urgently need a funding for the overhead costs. To our knowledge, ESS is the first international survey program which receives such funding from a supranational organization, namely the EU. We often criticize the EU for being slow and inefficient. In this case, however, the EU has taken an

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4) The European Value Survey 1999 is archived at the ZA in Cologne. The integrated file of European and World Value Surveys can presently be downloaded at [http://www.jdsurvey.net/web/evs1.htm](http://www.jdsurvey.net/web/evs1.htm)
early and wise decision. This enables the ESS to build up an efficient infrastructure for the whole survey process, beginning with the drafting of the questionnaire, translation, pretesting and sampling, and ending with data distribution and archiving. And the investment pays off. The ESS has become a model for international surveys (Norris 2004). It has recently been awarded with the Descartes price—a highly ranked European award which so far has only been assigned to European hard core scientists. The excellent infrastructure is one of the reasons for its high quality but there are other reasons as well. Clearly, Europe is more homogeneous than the whole world. It is easier to translate an English master questionnaire into French or German than into Chinese or Japanese. Face to face interviews can more easily be prescribed in the relatively small European countries than in larger countries where these interviews can become very costly. Nevertheless, the support from the EU has substantially contributed to the success of the ESS.

The ESS cannot replace the other international studies because of its regional and thematic specialization. Therefore a joint effort of all participants of the large international survey programs is necessary to establish a similar funding system and a similar infrastructure on the international level. We can only hope that these efforts will be successful. They will be decisive, in any case, for the future fate of comparative survey research. The international survey programs have made an important contribution to the development of comparative research. However there is still a long way to go. We are aware of many open questions but we have so far neither the time nor the resources to find the answers.

**Publications**


Appendix

1) Websites

Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES): http://www.umich.edu/~ces/

Eurobarometer:


Archive data services:

http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer

European Social Survey (ESS) website:

http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/

European Values Survey:

http://www.europeanvalues.nl/index2.htm

World Values Survey:

http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/

International Social Survey Programme (ISSP):

http://www.issp.org/homepage.htm
2) Data archives and archive networks

International Federation of Data Organisations for the Social Sciences (IFDO)
http://www.ifdo.org

Council of European Social Science Data Archives (CESSDA)
http://www.cessda.org

Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (GESIS-ZA)
http://www.gesis.org/en/za/

Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas-Archivo de Estudios Sociales (CIS-ARCES)
http://www.cis.es

Danish Data Archives (DDA)
http://www.dda.dk/

Data Archiving & Networked Services (DANS)
(formerly Steinmetz Archive)
http://www.dans.knaw.org

Finish Social Science Data Archives (FSD)
http://www.fsd.uta.fi/

Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu

Murray Research Archive
http://www.murray.harvard.edu/mra/index.jsp

Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD)
http://www.nsd.uib.no/english/

Roper Centre for Public Opinion Research
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/

Social Science Data Archive Slovenia (ADP)
http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/index_an.html

Sociological Data Archive (SDA)

Swiss Information and Data Archivio Service for the Social Sciences (SIDOS)
http://www.sidos.ch/

UK Data Archive (UKDA) / Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS)
http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/
http://www.esds.ac.uk
Comparative Survey Research and its Infrastructure in Europe

ABSTRACT

This paper gives a broad overview over comparative surveys in Europe which are so far available in European archives. In contrast to cultural relativism, it defends comparative research as an essential means for deepening our understanding of other cultures and our own culture as well. The article gives a historical overview of the most important comparative surveys with European participation after World War II and ends with the presentation of three large survey programs: the European and World Value Surveys, the International Social Survey Program, and the European Social Survey. Only the latter has succeeded, however, in building up a sufficiently large infrastructure for the support of questionnaire drafting, translation, sampling, data collection, data processing and archiving, and data analysis. We can only hope that a similar infrastructure can be established for other international survey programs in the future.

Key Words: comparative surveys, infrastructure, European and World Values Surveys, International Social Survey Programme, European Social Survey