ワーキング・ペーパー・シリーズ(No.1~10)

[ 編集者:総合政策学部・総合政策研究科       2019年11月21日   更新  ]

Issue List

No.1
<Title>On Some Integrated Assessment Modeling Debates

No.1 March 1997

<Author>
天野明弘 Akihiro Amano
関西学院大学総合政策学部教授(1997年3月現在)
Professor,School of Policy Studies,Kwansei Gakuin University(as of March,1997)

<Abstract>
This paper examines three questions that often come up in the integrated assessment debates: discounting, technical change, and the speed limit of global warming. The gaps in the debate on the rate of return on capital vs. consumption rate of interest can be narrowed if negative externalities and the effect of environmental degradation on consumption utility are properly taken into account in the dynamic social optimality condition. Endogenization of technical change in the energy sector will also narrow the gap between early and delayed mitigation debates. Finally, the need for limiting the speed of temperature increase in, say, decadal time period is discussed.

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No.2
<Title>いじめの経済分析 ―傍観者達の分析(2)―

No.2 July 1997

<Author>
柴田愛子 Aiko Shibata
関西学院大学総合政策学部教授(1997年7月現在)
Professor, School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University (as of July, 1997)
森徹 Tohru Mori
名古屋市立大学経済学部教授(1997年7月現在)
岡村誠 Makoto Okamura
神戸市立外国語大学助教授(1997年7月現在)
曽山典子 Noriko Soyama(実験ソフト作成)
奈良女子大学理学研究科(情報科学専攻)修了 (1997年7月現在)

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No.3
<Title>Comparison of Marginal Propensity to Consume between Legal and Tax-Evaded Income–The Japanese Case

No.3 August 1997

<Author>
柴田 愛子 Aiko Shibata
関西学院大学総合政策学部 教授(1997年8月現在)
Professor, School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University (as of August, 1997)
林 宏昭 Hiroaki Hayashi
帝塚山大学経済学部 助教授(1997年8月現在)
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Tezukayama University
(as of August, 1997)

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No.4
<Title>networkを使ったgameシステム ―いじめの経済分析(3)―

No.4 September 1997

<Author>
柴田愛子 Aiko Shibata
関西学院大学総合政策学部 教授(1997年9月現在)
Professor, School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University
(as of September, 1997)
森徹 Tohru Mori
名古屋市立大学経済学部 教授(1997年9月現在)
岡村誠 Makoto Okamura
神戸市立外国語大学 助教授(1997年9月現在)
曽山典子 Noriko Soyama(実験ソフト作成)
奈良女子大学理学研究科(情報科学専攻)修了 (1997年9月現在)

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No.5
<Title>WWWを使ったgameシステム ―いじめの経済分析(4)―

No.5 December 1997

<Author>
柴田愛子 Aiko Shibata
関西学院大学総合政策学部 教授(1997年12月現在)
Professor, School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University
(as of December, 1997)
森徹 Tohru Mori
名古屋市立大学経済学部 教授(1997年12月現在)
岡村誠 Makoto Okamura
神戸市立外国語大学 助教授(1997年12月現在)
曽山典子 Noriko Soyama(実験ソフト作成)
奈良女子大学理学研究科(情報科学専攻)修了 (1997年12月現在)

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No.6
<Title>Choosing between the Median – Voter and Niskanen Models : An Empirical Approach

No.6 December 1997

<Author>
長峯純一 Junichi Nagamine
関西学院大学総合政策学部 教授(1997年12月現在)
Professor, School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University
(as of December, 1997)
小澤太郎 Taro Ozawa
慶応義塾大学総合政策学部 助教授(1997年12月現在)
Associate Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University (as of December, 1997)

<Abstract>
There are two classes of models that seek to explain the level of public expenditure: models that depend on the responsiveness to voter preferences (such as the median-voter model) and models that are driven by the objectives of public officials (such as the Niskanen model of bureaucratic behavior). Studies that try to explain empirically levels of public expenditure typically adopt one of these two types of models.
This paper develops an expanded model in which both of these influences are present. Instead of an equilibrium that is either a median-voter outcome or a Niskanen outcome, the model has a continuum of potential outcomes in which the median-voter and Niskanen results are the polar cases. Budgetary equilibrium in the model is the result of a two-person cooperative game between politicians aiming at vote-maximization and public officials with the objective of budget maximization. The outcome is an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution between these two classes of “players.”

The paper sets forth a method by which this model can be estimated from actual budgetary data. This produces (among other things) an estimate of a parameter that describes the relative bargaining power or influence of the two classes of agents. It vote maximization–is the more influential in determining budgetary outcomes.

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No.7
<Title>公共投資の政治-経済分析 ~道路投資の地域間配分の実証分析~

No.7 June 1998

<Author>
長峯純一 Junichi Nagamine
関西学院大学総合政策学部 教授(1998年6月現在)
Professor, School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University (as of June, 1998)

KGUR関西学院大学リポジトリのワーキングペーパー一覧(7,15,16,19,25と35以降の号はコチラで閲覧ができます) 外部のサイトへリンク

No.8
<Title>COP3後の社会経済システム変革のあり方についてCOP3 and After: Reforming Our Socio-economic Systems

No.8 June 1998

<Author>
天野 明弘 Akihiro Amano
関西学院大学総合政策学部 教授(1998年6月現在)
Professor, School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University (as of June, 1998)

<Abstract>
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention established Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objectives for Annex I countries. It also opened the way for international schemes of emissions trading. Since the global society is required ambitious emissions reductions in the medium and long run in various fronts, active applications of economic measures will be necessary and inevitable. However, there has been strong resistance to the introduction of economic measures in the environmental policy in Japan, both among business circles and within ministries and government offices. This article urges to shift the basic tone of environmental and economic policies in Japan toward more use of economic measures so that this country can attain not only the objectives of UNFCCC but also those of sustainable development at large.

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No.9
<Title>Deficits and Budgeters’ Revenue Forecasts

No.9 July 1998

<Author>
柴田 愛子 Aiko Shibata
関西学院大学総合政策学部 教授(1998年7月現在)
Professor, School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University (as of July, 1998)
柴田 弘文 Hirofumi Shibata
立命館大学政策科学部 教授(1998年7月現在)
Professor, College of Policy Science, Ritsumeikan University (as of July, 1998)

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No.10
<Title>Two Modes of Sophisticated Voting and the Formation of a Coalition Government under Japan’s New Electoral Law

No.10 August 1998

<Author>
鈴木 基史 Motoshi Suzuki
関西学院大学総合政策学部 教授(1998年8月現在)
Professor, School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University (as of August, 1998)
品田 裕 Yutaka Shinada
神戸大学法学部 助教授(1998年8月現在)
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Kobe University (as of August, 1998)
建林 正彦 Masahiko Tatebayashi
関西大学法学部 助教授(1998年8月現在)
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Kansai University (as of August, 1998)

<Abstract>
Recently, Japan has undergone a major change in the electoral law for the House of Representatives. The new law enacted in fall 1994 has installed a “parallel system” combining proportional representation (PR) and plurality rule or a small district (SMD) system. This study examines two types of sophisticated voting – strategic voting and strategic balancing – that can be operative in the parallel system. It is shown that the SMD system contains institutional provisions (double candidacies and the loser-winner ratio) that reduce the extent of strategic voting and thus weaken a tendency toward local two-partism. When more than two effective parties compete in a plurality election, parties holding similar policy and political orientations ought to pursue interparty electoral coordination in order to prevent the opposing parties from gaining electoral victory. Under the parallel system, however, the parties have disincentives to coordinate their SMD candidacies. Thus, Downsian centrist policy pressures are not imposed upon the winning parties formulating a new government. In order to pressure it toward centrist policy, moderate voters with two votes under the parallel system perform the acts of balancing so that a coalition government is formed to check policy extremism that is otherwise pursued by a pluralist party constituting the core of a new government.

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