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【日　時】2026年11月18日 水曜日 16:00～17:30

【講　師】中林 純 氏
　　　　　京都大学大学院 経済学研究科 教授

【テーマ】Information Disclosure and Coordination in Auctions: Evidence from Bidding around Focal Points, with Yui Matsumura (JFTC)

【概　要】We examine how information disclosed before bidding affects firms’ behavior. Using Japanese procurement data, we document concentrations of winning bids near round percentages of reserve prices. These concentrations appear when reserve prices become public and disappear when they become secret. Similar patterns are observed in other countries, including Georgia and Indonesia. In the Japanese data, winning bids concentrate immediately below focal ratios, while losing bids concentrate above them. Statistical tests based on profitable bid deviations reject competitive bidding. Our repeated-auction model generates the observed pattern through coordination that reduces the need for communication. These findings highlight how disclosure policies can facilitate coordination. They also suggest a preliminary screen for further investigation of procurement authorities that publicly disclose only winning bids and reserve prices. Tests of competitive bidding can then be conducted using complete bid records.