Empire, Mobilisation and Economics in Wartime Japan:
A Literature Review

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Abstract
Japanese social scientists were mobilised by the wartime government. Reform-minded intellectuals thought that the government should control the national and imperial economy and that social science could contribute to policy-making. Through their commitment to the government’s advisory groups and research projects, they tried to reform Japan’s diplomatic relations as well as domestic systems although most of their plans were politically defeated. I shall indicate the following four points for future discussion on Japan’s wartime and postwar social history of knowledge. This paper is a literature review for discussion on empire, mobilisation and intellectuals in wartime Japan. By combining hitherto fragmented studies of various transwar topics, this study highlights the following themes: 1. Politico-intellectual continuities in the “transwar” period. 2. The significance of “Empire without colonies” in the development of Japanese colonial studies and therefore also of postwar area studies. 3. The interconnection of concepts of Pan-Asianism and Anti-Asianism (De-Asianisation) in the emergence of wartime and postwar Japanese economic and social thought. 4. The complex and interconnected influence of wartime ideology and postwar US Cold War ideology in shaping Asian studies in Japan.

Keywords
Economist, empire, mobilisation, Pan-Asianism, transwar

Politico-intellectual Continuity in the Transwar Period
How should we understand the place of the fifteen-year war (1931–1945) in the twentieth century history of Japan? As Victor Koschmann argues, “the approach to Japan’s modern history that predominated from the early-postwar period down to the early 1960s, and retained considerable influence even in the 1980s and beyond” emphasised the “premodern residue” in modern Japan to explain “the authoritarianism and expansionism that characterized Japan’s history between 1931 and 1945” through “a theory of premodern particularism” rather than “modern universalism”. According to this approach, “inasmuch as the reforms that followed Japan’s defeat were explicitly designed to eliminate premodern irrationality and to complete Japan’s domestic revolution, the postwar era tended to be sharply distinguished from wartime”. This historical perspective influenced by Marxist history formed the mainstream of Japanese historiography in the second half of the
twentieth century, although a revisionist view from the 1960s “sought to rehabilitate major aspects of the wartime order while also implicitly vindicating the postwar establishment as the culmination of a modern Japanese success story”. The dominant view regarded Japan’s wartime years as a “dark valley” which was a deviation from/between the democratic and internationalist interwar years and the normalised postwar years. ¹

Since the 1980s, one “new perspective that interprets ‘wartime’ as intimately connected to– and, indeed, the fundamental condition for–‘postwar’” emerged to analyse Japan’s wartime years as the origin of the total war (mobilisation) system. This approach, set out in Total War and ‘Modernization’ (edited by Yamanouchi Yasushi, Victor Koschmann and Narita Ryūichi), argues that “the ills of the postwar era are, first of all, predominantly modern rather than residually premodern; and second, that they result not primarily from Japanese peculiarities but rather from tendencies that are in greater or lesser degree common to all ‘advanced’ capitalist nations”.² Yamanouchi, Koschmann and Narita develop this point through discussing the rationalistic aspect of the socio-economic system and discourse in wartime Japan. Koschman mentions the continuity of the “wartime/postwar era”, that is, from the 1930s to the 1970s.

In recent decades, other scholars from Japan and the US have also discussed the continuity between wartime and postwar in Japan, especially the economic and social aspects. In the 1990s, “deregulation” became a magic word in Japan, and Japanese economists pointed out that Japan’s economic policies and institutions under strong regulation originated from the wartime years, the so-called “1940s system”.³ Chalmers Johnson’s classic work, MITI and the Japanese miracle (1982), focusing on the fifty-year history of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry from 1925, argued that state industrial policy exerted a powerful influence over the private sector. Johnson found that economic bureaucrats played an important role in Japan’s “development state” from the wartime period onward, and that this was a major cause of the postwar economic growth.⁴ Sheldon Garon also focuses on bureaucrats and ministries, especially “social bureaucrats” in the Ministry of Home Affairs, in his examination of the state-labour relations. Garon argues that the social bureaucrats, who had promoted “the liberal labor programs of the 1920s”, “devised the statist program in response to the perceived failures of liberal labor policies after 1931” and that “several of the same elite bureaucrats again switched gears after World War II to advance” labour policies in the Allied occupation period.⁵ Both Johnson and Garon thus point out the continuity of Japan’s wartime and postwar bureaucracy in terms of the intervention of the state into the national economy and society.

² Ibid., xii–xiii.
³ Noguchi Yukio 野口悠紀夫, 1940 nen Taisei『1940年体制』(東洋経済新報社:東京,1995).
Bai Gao’s *Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy* discusses the continuity of Japan’s economic principles from 1930 to 1965. Gao argues that the ideology of developmentalism (a nationalistic perspective, production orientation, strategic view of the economy, constraints on market competition and rejection of the profit principle), which “served to combat the Great Depression and sustain the total war from 1931 to 1945”, survived to become “the basic framework of Japanese industrial policy, facilitating economic growth and the development of modern economic institutions”.6 In order to establish developmentalist Japan, economists were mobilised by the state in which the Ministry of International Trade and Industry played the key role. Gao focuses on “economic ideology” to examine not only ministries and bureaucrats but also intellectuals, especially economists.

In his recent works, Andrew Gordon uses the term “transwar”, which covers the decades from the 1920s through the 1960s, especially the 1930s, 40s and 50s. According to Gordon, “‘transwar’ gives way to ‘postwar’ Japan” in the decade of the 1960s and “key elements of a ‘high postwar’ order of the 1960s were improvised or crystallized in a series of responses to the rapid succession of depression, war and recovery”.7

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**Empire without Colonies**

Analysing wartime Japan-Asia relations, Peter Duus presents the concepts “informal empire”, “wartime empire” and “imperialism without colonies”. Japan annexed Korea and Taiwan before World War I and attempted to expand its territory thereafter. However, after World War I the Japanese empire, like western empires, tried to take advantage of these new regions in a form other than outright colonisation, because the principle of the right of national self-determination of others made the acquisition of colonies difficult to legitimise. Duus has explained Japan’s policy and order after WWI using two concepts: “informal empire” and “imperialism without colonies”. For instance, he claims that until the 1930s, “Japanese imperialism in China was not ‘formal’ so much as ‘informal’, defined by its participation in the benefit of the unequal treaty system” and “the Japanese presence in China was far more important to the home country in economic terms than its control over the formal empire”.8 Japan as well as Britain, France, America and other western countries enjoyed the unequal treaty system and the doctrine of the Open Door in China.

After WWI, the institutions of informal empire faced nationalist movements: boycotts, demonstrations and strikes against foreign business. The Japanese empire “reacted by attempting a deeper political penetration of China”, although “the other treaty powers seemed willing to opt for a loosening of the system, if not total withdrawal” in the

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face of China’s new nationalism. 9 The system of informal empire was insufficient to maintain Japan’s special interests (tokushu ken’eki), so Japan invaded the Chinese mainland. It was, however, impossible for Japan to control occupied territories as colonies because of the anti-imperialist tone of international society after WWI, which did not allow the expansion of the formal empire. “That no doubt was also the reason that the Chinese territory occupied by the Kwantung Army in 1931–32 was reorganized as an independent state, Manchukuo, rather than a formal colony or territory” under Japan’s direct control.10 The Japanese empire used its military power to create collaborator states such as Manchukuo and the Wang Ching-wei regime.

Japan pursued the military occupation of China in the 1930s and proposed the vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS/Daitōa Kyōeiken) in the 1940s. According to Duus, post-1918 Europe established new systems of domination that were justified by two principle methods: by the concept of the mandate and by the ideology of pan-nationalism.11 Duus suggests that the vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was the “principal Japanese response to the intellectual dilemma of interwar imperialism” and a Japanese version of pan-nationalism.12 Although the GEACPS was vague and “a series of empty rhetorical gestures”, the vision mentioned “independence” for Southeast Asians areas occupied by Japan.13 Besides the GEACPS, Japanese intellectuals also discussed other “new orders” for a “post” imperialist era such as the Greater East Asia Conference and its Joint Declaration.

While Duus analyses the GEACPS within the framework of “imperialism without colonies”, I wish to examine the ideas and activities of scholars of colonial policy in relation to intra-imperial relations/order by using the concept of “empire without colonies”. According to Michael Doyle, while imperialism is “simply the process or policy of establishing or maintaining an empire”, empire itself “is a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence”.14 An empire, therefore, is created both by “annexation (formal sovereignty)” and “control (effective sovereignty)”.15 Louise Young analyses the Japanese empire, by defining imperialism as process and empire as structure. “Imperialism is empire building; it represents the process of constructing a relationship of domination. Empire signifies what is built—the structures that produce and reproduce dominance”.16 Using the vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and other ideas (regional or bloc formation and economic autarky), Japanese leaders and intellectuals discussed intra-imperial relationships

9 Ibid., p. xxv.
12 Ibid., p. 58.
13 Ibid., p. 69.
15 Ibid., p. 32.
16 Young, Louise, Japan’s Total Empire (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London :University of California Press, 1998), p. 11.
and order (structure), that is, “empire” rather than the process of imperial expansion (imperialism). While I refer to Duus’s framework, I adopt the definition presented by Doyle and Young: Imperialism is a process whereas empire is a structure. What did wartime leaders and intellectuals seek to think and do in order to build an “empire without colonies” in transwar Asia?

Prasenjit Duara presents the thought-provoking term “New Imperialism”, which was “exhibited in the foreign affairs of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, rather than in those of the older European colonial powers”, through analysing the character of Manchukuo, while Duus considers the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as an epoch-making idea for a new imperial order. It would be possible to reinterpret his “New Imperialism” as “new empire” through focusing on the structure of an empire. Duara’s idea, in a sense, is similar to Duus’s “imperialism without colonies”. As Duara argues, “while the new imperialists maintained ultimate control of their dependencies or clients through military subordination, they often created or maintained legally sovereign nation-states with political and economic structures that resembled their own” (for example, Manchukuo); “The new imperialists espoused anticolonial ideologies and emphasized cultural and ideological similarities” (for example, Pan-Asianism). In addition to these politico-cultural strategies (puppet states and pan-nationalism), Duara mentions the economic aspect of the “new imperialism” which “made considerable economic investments, even while exploiting these regions, and attended to the modernization of institutions and identities”. In other words, “the new imperialism occasionally entailed a separation of its economic and military-political dimensions. Although subordinate states were militarily dependent upon the metropole, it was not necessarily in the latter’s interest to have them economically or institutionally backward”.

Besides the above developmentalist character, Duara mentions another economic aspect of the new imperialism: its tendency “to form a regional or (geographically dispersed) bloc formation, promoting economic autarky as a means for the imperial power to gain global supremacy or advantage”. Many intellectuals around the Konoe government were interested in the ideas of an autonomous bloc “influenced by models of autarky in Europe” and “[t]he bloc idea grew by the mid-1930s into the East Asian League (Tōa renmei) and the East Asian Community (Tōa kyōdōtai), and still later into the idea of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai-Tōa Kyōeiken)”. Among these scholars were Konoe’s advisors Kada Tetsuji (a professor at Keio University) and Miki Kiyoshi (a Kyoto School philosopher). According to Kada, “the death/collapse of liberalist elements” was a corollary of “the age of wartime political economy”. Kada, who advocated “the solution of the Japan-China problem” from a “world wide” or “global perspective”, argued that “at the moment Japan need not imitate Euro-American imperialism in terms of national security. In fact, learning the way of Euro-American imperialism does not contribute to the

18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p. 49.
development of Japan but discourages the development of East Asia itself”, and he suggested the “scrapping of existing colonial or semi-colonial relationships”. Kada’s Tōa Kyōdōtai (East Asian Genossenschaft) planned an Economic Cooperative Union based on the following points.

1. The Economic Cooperative Union is an economic relationship established in neighbouring areas.
2. The aim of the establishment of the Economic Cooperative Union is not to build a relationship of exploitation through political means such as conquest but to found an associationist economy based on bilateral or mutual preference.
3. Under the Economic Cooperative Union, therefore, individualism in capitalism and egoism in international relations are modified, and profit-oriented agency and national interest-centrism are reformed.
4. This modification and reform are based on the well-organised plans for all members of the economic Genossenschaft. In a Bloc economy, policies on multiple areas are based on providing benefits for the dominant country. In contrast, the Economic Cooperative Union considers not only the request of the central country but also the demands of multiple areas as the central issue for policy-making even though one country has the central role in the Genossenschaft. In this sense, the Economic Cooperative Union is an institution in which each area has its own autonomy and cooperates with the other.
5. In the above relationship the main aspects of trade, finance, investment, and economic development are under the control of the region-wide plan.

Socio-economist Kada’s idea was to construct an associative unity of Japan-China-Manchuria (Nichimanshi) based on the economic cooperative union. Focusing on the triangle of Japan, China and Manchukuo, he supported Japan’s Nanshin (Southern advance or Southern expansion) but paid little attention to Southeast Asia in the 1930s. In his book published in 1940, Kada advocated the Southern advance as a part of his East Asian policy, but his concrete idea was to expand Japan’s economic influence through trade, resource development and emigration to Southeast Asia, while the other intellectuals discussed paid more attention to European colonies in Asia.

Duara extracts the essence of the new imperialism from the case of Japan’s control of Manchukuo, and considers Japan’s projects for autarky and an economic bloc, particularly Manchukuo, China and Japan (together with its colonies Korea and Taiwan).

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21 Kada Tetsuji 加田哲二, Tōa Kyōdōtai no Kōgai 「東亜協同体論の梗概」, Zaisei Keizai Jihō『財政経済時報』, July 1939, p. 15.
22 Regarding the term Tōa Kyōdōtai, scholars translate the word into various English equivalents: Peter Duus, “East Asian Gemeinschaft”; Prasenjit Duara, “East Asian Community”; Tetsuo Najita and H. D. Harootunian, “East Asian Cooperative Union”. The idea of “Kyōdōtai” is based on association or cooperation. So I agree with Najita and Harootunian’s translation. And the German word “Gemeinschaft (society)” is not the equivalent of “Kyōdōtai”, “Genossenschaft” is a good equivalent instead.
23 Kada Tetsuji 加田哲二, Tōa Kyōdōtai no Kōgai 「東亜協同体論の梗概」, Zaisei Keizai Jihō『財政経済時報』, July 1939, pp. 16–17.
Economists, however, especially scholars in commercial colleges, discussed a wider economic sphere including Southeast Asia from the late 1930s. Among them were Kaneda Kinji (professor of colonial policy at the Kobe University of Commerce; now Kobe University) and Asaka Sueki (professor of colonial policy at the Osaka University of Commerce; now Osaka City University), who were leading figures in wartime colonial policy studies and activities such as the Great Japanese Association of Colonisation.

The leading scholar of colonial policy Kaneda started to discuss Nanshin (Southern advance) and Nanyō (the South Seas or Southeast Asia) as an enlargement of Japan-China relations from 1938. His research paralleled the development of current issues such as the so-called “China problem”: wider war and nationalism in China. Kaneda claimed that “we have to think that the discussion on Nanshinron (Southern Expansion Doctrine) and the policy on the South (Nanpō Seisaku) have a close relationship with policy on mainland China and have become a part of a so-called broadly defined Renascent Asia Policy (Kōa Seisaku)” and “it is the overseas Chinese problem in Nanyō that clearly demonstrates this trend”. Kaneda examined how overseas Chinese, who “have physically and materially made significant contributions to the Chinese nationalist revolution” had been influenced by the worsening of Japan-China relations and concluded that “Japan has faced boycott movements against Japanese commodities led by Chinese overseas and not only have their protests become stronger but also their support for Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese nationalist government has grown”. He concluded, “we have to recognise contemporary Japan-China relations are not just bilateral relations but are related on the big stage called Nanyō” (South Sea).24

Asaka Sueki in Osaka was another important scholar in Japanese colonial policy studies, which was expanding its area of research from formal territories such as Korea and Taiwan to the so-called Nanpō, Southeast Asia. His question was what colonial policy could do “when it seems to be impossible to gain and govern new colonies by the imperialist way”.25 According to Asaka, after WWI “cosmopolitanism and internationalism resonated with democracy and liberalism, repudiated exclusive regionalism, and criticised great powers’ monopoly of territories” but “policies based on these doctrines did not go well at all” and a new type of nationalism had emerged “which was significantly different from imperialism-led nationalism”.26 Asaka said, “in the coming era, the typical nationalism will be related to the regime which favours control-oriented domestic policy and organises to form a regional bloc. Therefore colonial policy is liberated from annexation-oriented policy”.27 In the new colonial policy, which was control-oriented and non-market based economic policy, “the element of colony is changing from a new territory to a member of a bloc sphere, from legal control to effective control, from legally absolute control to legally limited control, from conquest to collaboration, and from control to

25 Asaka Sueki 浅香末起, Shokumin Seisaku no Shinkōsei 「植民政策の新構成」, Gaikō Jihō 『外交時報』, 15 August 1940, p. 34.
26 Ibid., p. 35.
27 Ibid., p. 36–38.
leading. This trend is a universal and rational response to recent colonial problems”. Kaneda also had a similar approach, and defined “Kōiki Keizai” (wider economy) as:

a phenomenon in a process of equilibrium recovery derived from the recent collapse of liberal economy; a big economic formation, in which one strong national economy and neighbouring national economies combine to make a totally autonomous regional economy, and where members work together for co-existence and co-prosperity and make plans and controls by the collective will of economic defence in order to ensure political and economic independence from other regional economies.

Scholars who led economic policy studies and colonial policy studies from the late 1930s discussed the possible formation of such a wider economic sphere, including Southeast Asia, under an anti-liberalist administrative body controlling the entire economy. In order to create Japan’s “New Empire” in which “domination and exploitation coexisted with development and modernization”, intellectuals such as Kada, Kaneda and Asaka studied economic blocs and “the Manchukuo model of client-states was partially extended to regimes in occupied China and in Southeast Asia during the Pacific war”. Duara argues that the essence of Manchukuo “could be found after World War II in Eastern Europe, French Africa, the British sterling zone and the US empire”, that is, the Allies. As Kobayashi Hideo argues in his works, Japan’s wartime enterprise in Manchukuo was taken over by postwar Japan re-entering Asia.

**Pan-Asianism and De-Asianisation**

As Duus and Duara argue, the Japanese empire, by appropriating pan-nationalism, federalism or associationism and developmentalism, sought to rationalise and functionalise its structure through compromising with post-WWI norms that recognised national self-determination and promoted state control of the economy. In the transwar years, intellectuals, especially economists, were mobilised for Japan’s imperial project to reorganise Japan-Asia relations. Yonetani Masafumi’s work on Japan-Asia intellectual relations provides a thought-provoking examination of the relationship between modernity and Orientalism in Japanese pro-Asia discourses. Many scholars have pointed out that Japan has historically had two types of discourses on Asia: Pan-Asianism and De-Asianisation. In general, Asianism (Pan-Asianism or Pro-Asianism) was regarded as anti-

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28 Ibid., p. 42.
29 Kaneda Kinji 金田近二, Tōa Kōiki Keizai no Shomondai「東亜広域経済の諸問題」, Tōsei Keizai『統制経済』, June 1941, p. 3.
32 Kobayashi Hideo 小林英夫, Sengo Ajia to Nihon Kigyō『戦後アジアと日本企業』(東京: 岩波書店, 2001) and Manshūkoku to Jimintō『満州国と自民党』(東京: 新潮社, 2005).
33 Yonetani Masafumi 米谷匡史, Ajia/Nihon『アジア／日本』(東京: 岩波書店, 2006).
modern sentiment while De-Asianisation (Anti-Asianism) was seen as pro-Western modernism. The Genyōsha (Dark Ocean Society, founded in 1881) and its offshoot the Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society or Amur River Society, founded in 1901), the most well-known Pan-Asianist organisations in modern Japan, were considered ultranationalistic and fanatical by the SCAP which dissolved them in 1946. The occupation authorities’ understanding was supported by historian E. H. Norman, who criticised these “patriotic societies” or “militarist-gangster organizations” as “a spearhead” for Japanese militarism.34

One important discussant on the politico-intellectual relations between Japan and the rest of Asia was Chinese literature critic Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910–1977) who said “Japan’s modern history was, in terms of ideas, progressing through a spiral of Datsua (脱亜: leaving Asia) and Kōa (興亜: promoting Asia”).35 In other words, “Japan’s course in Asia”, especially in the Meiji period (1868–1912), “is often seen as a conflict between Westernization-cum-imperialism (Japan devours Asia in concert with the Western powers) and a utopian Asianism (Japan unites Asia against the Western powers)”.36 The “Kōa” idea was originally Meiji era ideology, which promoted the solidarity of Asians in order to confront Western powers when all Asian countries but Japan were partly or fully-colonised.37 Some regarded wartime Japan's Asian policy, including the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, as a reversion toward Asianism (a return to Kōa after Datsua). On the other hand, the “Datsua” idea (De-Asianisation) was the opposite of the ideology of “Kōa”, which regarded “Asia” as an anti-Western unity. One of the well-known proponents of De-Asianisation was Fukuzawa Yukichi, who emphasised the dichotomy between “developing” Japan and “stagnant” Asia, and discussed Japan's modernisation without Asia.38 Fukuzawa argued, in his article “Datsu-ron (On Leaving Asia)”, “we are not able to wait for Asians until they are civilised in order to develop Asia... we, in our mind, are getting out of the bad company in Asia”.39

However, Yonetani Masafumi argues that both Kōa and Datsua were conceived on the basis of Orientalist and colonialist ideology.40 Fukuzawa had been an ideologue of Kōa ideas before writing the 1884 article on Datsua. Fukuzawa's major work on Kōa was written in an article of 1882 on Japan's relations with Korea.41 At the beginning of the

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article, Fukuzawa argued, “as compared to each other, Japan is strong and Korea is lesser. Japan has been civilised already and Korea is still primitive”. He believed Japan had to intervene in Korea and he supported Korean modernisers such as Kim Ok-gyun and Pak Yeong-hyo. Fukuzawa invited Korean modernisers to his school Keio Gijuku. Following the failed Gapsin Coup (Gapsinjeongbyeon) of 1884 (in which pro-Japan modernisers lost the political struggle against the pro-Chinese establishment), Korean activists including Kim Ok-gyun and Pak Yeong-Hyo lost power and Fukuzawa abandoned the Kōa idea and shifted to the approach expressed in his “Datsua-ron” of 1884. The Kōa idea was still strong, but Fukuzawa gave up his idea of Kōa due to his great disappointment with the Koreans after the Gapsin Coup. In fact, major Kōa (Pan-Asianist) organisations such as the Kōakai and the Genyōsha were established in the 1880s.

Another important example of Kōa thought put forward after Fukuzawa published his Datsua-ron is Tarui Tokichi's “Daitō Gappō Ron” (大東合邦論) of 1893. Tarui, who was the founder of the banned “Oriental Socialist Party”, advocated that Japan and Korea should establish a federation called “Daitō Koku” (大東国: Great East), which would associate with Qing China to confront the Western powers. In his plan, although Japan would not colonise Korea, “poor” Korea would reach a civilised and developed state through the establishment of the federation, and the federation would eventually civilise Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Fukuzawa and Tarui, influential ideologues of the Kōa idea, argued that civilised Japan should facilitate the development of stagnant Asia. The Kōa idea, a typical form of Pro-Asianism, clearly involved Orientalist views that regarded Japan as a developed country dominating “stagnant Asia” based on the dichotomy between “civilised” and “savage”. Japanese modernisers were interested not only in westernising Japan, but also in civilising Asia. Japan's discourses on modernisation and Asianism were closely interlinked.

Yonetani, while tracing the trend in Japanese thought that aimed to ally with Asian leaders through modernisation and civilisation, also emphasises the interaction between Japanese Pan-Asianists and Asian modernisers in modern Japan. Yonetani points out that Yoshino Sakuzō, a leading ideologue of “Taishō Democracy”, was not only an internationalist (Pro-Anglo Saxon) but also a Pro-Asianist, seeking to work with Korean and Chinese modernisers and to propose a restructuring of the Japanese empire in the interwar years. On the other hand, Japan’s traditional Asianism from the Meiji period was too naïve to collaborate with Asian leaders and intellectuals as an idea of solidarity for Asians after WWI. When anti-imperialist movements or anti-Japan demonstrations (such as the March First Movement in Korea and the May Fourth Movement in China in 1919) appeared, almost none of traditional Asianist societies could find a way to join hands with

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43 Ibid., p. 10.
Asian nationalists. In place of the traditional Pro-Asia activists including the Genyōsha leaders, Taishō modernisers such as Yoshino Sakuzō were emerging in intellectual and political discussions on Japan-Asia relations. They advocated not only the democratisation of politics and the development of social welfare in Japan’s domestic sphere, but also the promotion of political rights and the development of the economic situation in the colonies. As we shall see, Japanese modernisers and reformers who inherited the ideas of Taishō Pro-Asian modernisers were committed to the reconstruction of Japan-Asia relations from the 1930s.

The interaction between Japanese Pan-Asianists and Asian modernisers, and nationalists in colonised societies cannot be ignored. We should notice the interaction between Japanese “orientalists”, and Asian “orientalists” both of who tried to modernise their societies. As I mentioned, Fukuzawa had interacted with modernisers of late nineteenth century Korea. Scholars, however, have generally ignored native “orientalists” in “orientalised” societies, while focusing instead on orientalists and orientalist discourses in the West and the imperial centres. What was happening to Japan's discourse on Datsua and Kōa in the wartime years and how did Japanese modernisers intervene in other parts of Asia during this period? How did these Japanese modernisers interact with other Asians elites who sought to develop and modernise their societies? Colonial policy studies and economic policy studies in the wartime years, as well as Asian studies in the postwar era, were moulded and mobilised on the home front through the process of interaction with intellectuals and nationalist activities in other Asian countries.

**Japan’s Asian Studies and Critique of Area Studies**

Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1975) provoked reflective studies of the ideology of area studies in the West in the Cold War and postcolonial era. Asian studies and Japanese studies in the US have been the subject of debate by critical scholars including Harry Harootunian and Naoki Sakai. Many scholars understand that area studies in the US “originated in the immediate post-World War II era and sought to meet the necessity of gathering and providing information about the enemy. Later, the investigation was extended to any region of the world considered vital to the interests of the United States in the Cold War”. Area studies programs in American universities (such as Soviet studies and Asian studies courses) are often regarded as a product of the Cold War policy in the US, although WWII also promoted studies of “enemies” including Japan. Most critical discussions, which expose the geopolitical character of area studies, have focused on discourse and ideology, while they only briefly mention that area studies programs in the US relied on domestic and external funding including the Rockefeller Foundation and the Social Science Foundation.

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Scholars examining modern Japanese scholarship on Asia have focused primarily on Sinology. Stefan Tanaka in his analysis of Japan’s Tōyōshi (Oriental History) finds a correlation between Japan’s construction of its Orient and Japanese imperialism. Joshua Fogel examines Japan’s Sinology in the works of Naitō Konan (1866–1934) and the intellectual interaction between Japan and China in the works of Nakae Ushikichi (1889–1942). These and other research, including Yamamuro Shin’ichi’s encyclopedic work Shisō Kadai Toshiteno Ajia (Asia as A Intellectual Problem), mainly examine the intellectual relationship between Japan and China and discuss the era around the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. By contrast, there has been little research on Japan’s knowledge of Southeast Asia and on wartime and postwar Asian studies. So far, therefore, little attention has been paid to the way in which Japan’s knowledge on Asia was transformed by imperial projects which combined responses to colonial nationalism and opposition to politico-economic liberalism.

In Japan, wartime knowledge of Asia and postwar Asian studies had a very close connection. Both were not originally “enemy” studies like Japanese studies or Soviet studies in the US, but academic fields covering Japan’s political or economic subordinates and later potential markets or economic partners. In this sense, transwar social science on Asia was similar to early modern Sinology in Japan. On the other hand, both wartime and postwar Asian studies in Japan were close to national policy. In this respect they resembled the Asian studies of the US rather than Japan’s Sinology. Japan thus already possessed intellectually and institutionally indigenous area studies based on the imperial legacy, although Japanese social sciences and humanities including Asian studies was academically influenced and received financial support from the anti-communist US in the Cold War era.

**Relationship to Previous Studies of Japanese Economic Thought**

Japan’s economics and economists have been an important topic in Japanese studies. One recent work is Laura Hein’s *Reasonable Men Powerful Words*, which traces the activities and thought of an economic intellectual group that graduated from the Imperial University of Tokyo. *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan* by Andrew Barsheyn also deals with social scientists, especially “two of the most powerful streams”, Marxism and Modernism, focusing on Marxist economic scholar Uno Közō, Modernist political scholar Maruyama Masao and economic historian Ōtsuka Hisao, all of whom were professors at the (Imperial)

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49 There are a few exceptions including Chomsky, Noam et al., *The Cold War & the University* (New York: New Press, 1997).
University of Tokyo. Susan Townsend’s *Yanaihara Tadao and Japanese Colonial Policy* also focuses on intellectuals of the (Imperial) University of Tokyo.\(^{54}\)

Hein argues that “as in all modern societies, social scientists formed a new technocratic elite that approached problems in a new way and claimed authority through a new kind of expertise” to change “the nature of public debate”. She also points out an academic circle “fully participated in all rituals of meritocratic elite inclusion” such as “the mechanism of personal introduction” and “the etiquette of reciprocal obligations” based on personal connections including “school friendship” and “hometown and regional ties” as in all Japanese social groups (e.g. business, politics, bureaucrats and military).\(^{55}\)

However, the English language works above all focus on intellectuals based at the Imperial University of Tokyo. One reason is simply that the (Imperial) University of Tokyo was/is the most prestigious educational institute with the most influential scholars in Japan. Intellectuals (as well as political leaders such as communists) who did not support wartime governments had ethical authority as non-conformists or non-converts in the postwar society, while supporters or collaborators with wartime governments or government leaders were (whether fairly or otherwise) criticised for their record. The Ōuchi group (studied by Hein), Yanaihara (studied by Townsend) and Uno (studied by Barshey) were all expelled from their universities due to their Marxist tendencies or criticism of the government.

Maruyama and Ōtsuka, early career researchers at that time, did not openly support any wartime government (but managed to retain their academic positions).\(^{56}\) The Imperial University had contained some war regime ideologues or fanatics who left the university after the war. The renamed University of Tokyo in the postwar years reinstated previously ostracised social scientists who had played important roles in Japanese academia and intellectual life before 1945, and retained its intellectual authority and moral responsibility with reunited wartime non-conformists.

Yet the Imperial University of Tokyo and its scholars are only part of the cases of wartime mobilisation and “wartime reform”. The wartime years of the Imperial University, especially the economics faculty, were chaotic due to the professors’ factionalism and government suppression, and for many scholars these years have been thought of as a black hole in research.\(^{57}\) It is difficult to analyse the relationship between interwar and wartime economists and/or between wartime and postwar economists in the (Imperial) University of Tokyo. In the Law Faculty (which contained important advisors to wartime Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro), Rōyama Masamichi resigned from his professorship with his expelled friend Kawai Eijirō in 1939 (to join the Parliament in 1942) and did not return to the university although he continued his academic activities in other institutions in the postwar years. Yabe Teiji, another wartime policy advisor to Konoe, left the Imperial University at

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\(^{54}\) Townsend, Susan C., *Yanaihara Tadao and Japanese Colonial Policy* (Richmond: Cuzon, 2000).


\(^{56}\) Nakano Toshio argues the wartime discourse of Maruyama and Ōtsuka had an affinity with the wartime mobilization system. See Nakano Toshi 中野敏男, *Ōtsuka Hisao to Maruyama Masao 『大塚久雄と丸山真男』* (東京: 青土社, 2001).

\(^{57}\) Takeuchi Yō 竹内洋, *Daigaku to iu Yamai 『大学という病』* (東京: 中央公論新社, 2001).
the end of war although he was still a leading policy intellectual in postwar Japan. On the other hand, economic faculties in other universities such as Keio and Hitotsubashi (Tokyo College of Commerce) were not plagued by such strong factionalism and were much less chaotic. They also, however, played an important role in providing advice to the government both during and after the war. For example, Hitotubashi professors Itagaki Yoichi and Akamatsu Kaname worked for the Army’s wartime research project in Southeast Asia and became external advisors to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the postwar years. In order to analyse how these intellectuals were related to the emergence of Japanese imperial order and postwar Japan-Asia politico-economic relations, it is more appropriate to focus outside the (Imperial) University of Tokyo.

Wartime non-Marxist and non-mathematical economics has attracted little attention from Japanese scholars. In his book published in 1971, Tamanoi Yoshirō traced Japan’s economics in the pre-war era (including wartime years) on the following lines: “the introduction and assimilation of Socialist thought” including the idea of social policy and German social democracy, “the establishment of Marxist economics” and “the growth of Modern economics (Kindai Keizaigaku)”. His understanding, which described the history of Japanese economics in terms of the dichotomy of Marxian and neo-classical economics, has been followed by many scholars. Based on this historical approach, scholars have shown little interest in Itagaki Yoichi, who was neither Marxist nor neo-classical economist, nor in the group of economists around him (so-called wartime Seiji Keizaigaku: political economics), although many wartime social scientists took notice of their works. Many of the above economists, including Itagaki, led postwar “democratic socialism” which was anti-communist socialism.

Hayasaka Tadashi was one of the first people to discuss wartime political economics including Itagaki. He categorised Japan’s wartime economics into three strands: Marxist economics, theory-oriented economics (Junsui Keizaigaku), and political economics (Seiji Keizaigaku). Hayasaka pointed out that not only Marxist and but also political economics had criticised general equilibrium theory, which was studied by theory-oriented economists in the early 1930s. While the first two streams, known as Marxist economics and Modern economics today, became dominant trends in the postwar years, the third stream was treated with scant as regard by the postwar economics. In fact, leading wartime scholars of political economics (such as Naniwada Haruo) who proposed the establishment of “Imperial Way Economics (Kōdō Keizaigaku)” or “Japan Economics (Nippon Keizaigaku)” were branded as fanatic ideologues of the military regime and had to leave universities after WWII. However, Hayasaka argued that discussions of political economics, which was “a product not only of nationalist tendency but also of critics against existing economics”, still had implications for contemporary economic issues.59

58 Tamanoi Yoshirō 玉野井芳郎, Nihon no Keizaigaku 『日本の経済学』 (東京: 中央公論社, 1971).
59 Hayasaka Tadashi 早坂忠, Junsui Keizaigaku ni taisuru Shohihan 「純粋経済学にたいする諸批判」（日本経済学史の諸断面（10）），Keizai Semina『経済セミナー』, no. 204, July 1972, p. 119.
In recent years, wartime economics has attracted Japanese scholars’ interest. Kamikubo Satoshi introduces “non-Marxist economics” of the first half of the twentieth century in his Who’s Who-style book.  

Yanagisawa Osamu examines how the economic ideas and systems of German Nazism were introduced and accepted by Japanese social scientists (such as Kada Tetsuji, Ōtsuka Hisao and Ōkōchi Kazuo) in the 1930s and 1940s. Yanagisawa, who takes a Marxian approach to understanding the transformation of the global economic system and Japanese capitalism between the 1920s and 40s, argues the characteristic of Nazidom as anti-laissez-faire and anti-economic liberalism was appealing to Japanese intellectuals who sought to transform capitalism after the Great Depression.  

Makino Kuniaki examines “the activities and discourses of economists who faced ‘total war’ during WWI and WWII”, and argues that “it was the economy which played the important role in the total war, and economists were inevitably dragged into the total war mobilisation system”.  

In this paper, I indicate periodical and geographical bridges as a perspectives for discussion on colonial orders and imperial academic fields on Asia in wartime and postwar Japan. The Previous works I mentioned are key stones for future researches regarding empire, mobilisation and intellectuals in Japan and Asia.

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