EU Institute in Japan, Kansai

～Academic Symposium～

"Normative Politics in the European Union"

Date: 4 July, 2015 (Saturday)

Venue: Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya Uegahara Campus,

      125th Anniversary Auditorium

Language: English/Japanese (with Simultaneous Interpretation)

Organizer: Institute for Industrial Research (IIR) of KGU

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13：30-13：40　　　Opening Remarks　　Prof. Akira ICHIKAWA

13：40-14：00　　　Keynote lecture　　Prof. Stephen DAY
"Normative Politics in the EU: The Europarties and the Grail of Sustained Recognition"

14：00-14：20　　　Keynote lecture　　Prof. Franz-Lothar ALTMANN
"Normative Politics in the EU External Security Policy"

14：20-14：45　　　Keynote lecture　　Prof. Hartmut MAYER
"Normative Politics in the EU-Japan Relations"

15：00-16：30　　　Q & A Session　　Prof. Yoichiro USUI
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Chair and moderator)
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Dr. Atsuko HIGASHINO
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Dr. Ken TAKEDA

16：30-16：40　　　Closing Remarks　　Prof. Akira ICHIKAWA

EU Institute in Japan, Kansai
～Academic Symposium～

"Normative Politics in the European Union"

1:30 p.m. – 4:40 p.m., Saturday, July 4, 2015

Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya Uegahara Campus, 125th Anniversary Auditorium

Contents

Opening Remarks
Akira ICHIKAWA
(Associate Professor, Institute for Industrial Research, Kwansei Gakuin University)

Thank you so much for waiting.   Let us now start the symposium on normative politics in the European Union under the auspices of EU Institute in Japan, Kansai.   I am acting as the moderator for today.   My name is Akira Ichikawa, of Institute of Industrial Research, Kwansei Gakuin University and also EUIJ Kansai.   Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

At the outset, it is rather presumptuous of me, but allow me to say the opening remarks on my part. Thank you very much for listening.   At this time in this symposium, we are going to discuss normative politics in the EU.   The lectures consist of two parts.   In part one there will be the lectures by the overseas lecturers.   They are going to talk about normative politics and how they are implemented in their respective arenas in the EU.   After that we are going to have short break.   This will be followed by the discussants' comments by three speakers.   Then we are going to have the panel discussion.

The sponsoring organization, EUIJ Kansai, is something I would to present to you at the outset. EUIJ Kansai was created with Kobe University, Kwansei Gakuin University, and Osaka University as a consortium.   As the partner universities, we have Faculty of Economics of Kagawa University, Wakayama University, Kansai University, Nara Women's University, and Kyoto University's Institute of Economic Research.   This organization is funded by the European Commission.   The three universities in the consortium do have a proportionate share of the funds.

The main objectives of EUIJ Kansai are threefold.   One is to disseminate the information to the ordinary people regarding the EU in the open forum.   The second mission is the educational activities in each consortium university.   I believe that many of the students participating today are taking my course related to the EU, and that is also part of the EUIJ activities.   Third, we are also engaged in academic collaboration not only in Japan, not only in Kansai, but throughout Japan.   We invite overseas scholars and have exchanges on the results of the academic accomplishments.   This symposium today satisfies all of those conditions and objectives.   I believe this is an opportune moment that we are having today.

Just like this one, we have been inviting lecturers and speakers from overseas.   To listen to those lectures in English contributes to our university which is designated as a 'Super Global University'. Our school is based on the 'Global Academic Port' and it has opened the way for the students to study overseas and also we invite the overseas students to study in our university.   We believe that those are important opportunities for KGU students.

For example, in recent years in our university, throughout the year approximately 1000 students go overseas to study.   In the coming 10 years, we intend to increase the number to 2500 students a year. As you can see here, with Canada and America, in North American countries we do have strong relationships, but in the future we hope that we will be able to strengthen our ties with Europe.   We would like to create more opportunities for the students to learn in Europe.   I sincerely hope that today's opportunity will trigger the students' interest to be able to study in Europe.

Now, why Europe?   That is the question.   Why do Japanese students need to have opportunities to study in Europe?   As you know, between Japan and the EU, we share common values in many ways; rule of law, basic human rights, democracy, functional market economy, and high education standards.   In many ways, the EU and Japan as partners share these values.   We can contribute to global governance in the future.   At the same time, with EU countries, Japan faces similar common problems such as energy, climate change, aging, and low fertility issues.   I believe that those are some of the common issues that we share.   From those perspectives, if the Japanese students learn in Europe and European students come to Japan to learn, this can present very invaluable opportunities.

Then in part two we have the commentators or the discussants.   Just last month we published a new book under the title of The Normative Politics of the European Union.   To the international community and intra-EU, how the EU is demonstrating its power in different disciplines and in different domains, we set the lights of the direction of the EU.   Today's symposium is also inspired by the topics covered by this book.

Also, MOFA is publishing a diplomatic journal on a regular basis.   Those who are interested in diplomacy and foreign affairs, I believe those are the magazines that can be of great help for you to study from.

Now allow me to give you a quick rundown of the introduction and CV of the speakers and lecturers.   Starting from part one, we have three lecturers.   The first speaker is Professor Stephen Day.   He is a professor in the faculty of economics at Oita University on comparative politics and EU politics.   The second speaker is Professor Franz-Lothar Altmann.   He is an associate professor at Bucharest State University.   Especially in East Europe and Southeast Europe, he has expertise in politics and economics in those fields.

The third lecturer is Professor Hartmut Mayer.   At Oxford University, he is an official fellow and tutor.   His specialties are EU external relations and EU-Japan relations.

In part two there will be the following commentators: with Niigata University of International and Informational Studies, we have Professor Yoichiro Usui.   His specialty is EU politics.

Next is Dr. Atsuko Higashino with Tsukuba University.   Her specialties are international relations and international politics in the EU.

The third speaker is Dr. Ken Takeda, assistant professor at Waseda University.   His specialties are international relations and EU politics.

There was one more person who was scheduled to come today, Ms. Yukari Akeda from MOFA. On EPA/FTA negotiations, she is extremely busy between Japan and the EU, and we were not able to have her as one of the speakers.   Therefore, altogether, six speakers will be joining this symposium, excluding her.

Now then, shall we invite the speaker, Professor Stephen Day from Oita University?   Professor Day is going to talk about the normative scope of European politics and the conflicts related to continuous recognition.

Normative Politics in the EU: The Europarties and the Grail of Sustained Recognition

Stephen DAY

(Professor, Faculty of Economics, Oita University)

It is very inspiring to be here today in such a fantastic auditorium. It is also a rather daunting experience because I do not think that I have ever set foot upon such a large stage before. First of all, I would like to thank the organizers, The EU Institute in Japan-Kansai (EUIJ-Kansai) and Kwansei Gakuin, our hosts for today, for bringing me here and my translator who faces the difficult task of translating my, sometimes not so coherent, *eigo* into coherent Japanese. In addition, I am very grateful to Professor Yoichiro Usui who graciously offered me the chance to contribute a chapter to the book *The Normative Politics of the European Union*, and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) for providing the funds to carry out my research (*Kiban C 26380174* – entitled *Consolidating or Dismantling Representative Democracy at the EU-level*).

As expressed in the title of my presentation, my primary concern, this afternoon, concerns the little-known entities called 'Europarties' (or European political parties) and their path-shaping role, and place, within the normative politics of the European Union. Back in 1942, writing about national-level political parties, E.E. Schattschneider coined his famous line that 'political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties'. Could we reinterpret this quote so that someday we are able to make the claim that 'Europarties created representative democracy at the EU-level and EU-level representative democracy is unthinkable save in terms of Europarties'? With a genealogy, that encompasses four generations, the formation and operationalization of the Europarties is very much tied to bringing about the goal of an EU-level representative-democracy. This means that they are clearly very much a part of the normative politics of the European Union. It is the nature and the extent of the role, though, that remains somewhat blurred.

Presently numbering 15, they are sometimes referred to as 'a party of parties' given that their core constituent part remains national political parties. Not to be confused with the European Parliamentary Groups (EPGs), the Europarties exist as extra-parliamentary forces on the margins of the EU institutional architecture. Here, they continue to play a rather passive, low-key, role. Occasionally, though, as I will highlight, that role has taken on a much more proactive significance as the Europarties have sought, collectively, to develop elements of EU-level representative democracy. Here we can point to, for example, the contribution they made to the process of democracy-building across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) post-1989; the collective pursuit of secondary legislation in the form of a Party Regulation during the early 2000s; and, more recently, the role they played spearheading the *Spitzenkandidaten* process during the 2014 European elections. Despite playing such a path-shaping role, the *Grail* of sustained recognition, where they are viewed as key EU actors on a par with their EPG counterparts, continues to remain elusive.

It will be argued that as a result of the legal context in which they find themselves (which has given them a purpose), the role that they have played (both passive and active), and the significance which they hope to attain, that drawing upon an explanatory framework inspired by the 'norms' debate

seems appropriate. As part of this, a useful starting point is Finnemore and Sikkink's 1998 seminal article for the journal *International Organization* (IO). Here, they introduced the notion of '*norm entrepreneurs*' and the idea of norms having a '*life cycle*'. Let me try to paraphrase their argument. The first step is when norms begin to emerge (what might be deemed the *genesis moment*). Such norms emerge because of the drive of *norm entrepreneurs* (often referred to as '*political crafting*'). The goal of these entrepreneurs is to win the support of a critical mass so that the norms become accepted and, over time, move from being accepted through to being internalized. At the point of internalization, such norms are no longer questioned as they are simply taken for granted. As part of any discussion about '*norm entrepreneurs*', it is also necessary to ask to what extent does the act of acting entrepreneurially incorporate *idealist* (normative, values-based) and *instrumental* (interest-based) tendencies? The extent to which is it possible to identify which of the two tendencies is in the driving seat and passenger seat or whether the two tendencies are so intertwined, in a symbiotic state, making any kind of definitive differentiation practically impossible, remains at the heart of this debate.

Returning to the Europarties, this then begs the question: 'Have the Europarties displayed the sorts of characteristics that would enable us to use the label *norm entrepreneurs*?' Do they have a sense of efficacy, that they can actually transform their contextual surroundings, and in so doing, bring about a strengthening of EU-level representative democracy and a consolidation of their own existence ?' If they, indeed, wish to pursue such a pathway (some, as I will show, do not) it will become clear that they will need to set-aside/overcome a series of intra-party and extra-party obstacles.

Bearing all of the above in mind, it is important to stress that I do not want to give you a false impression, this afternoon, by overstating the systemic significance of the Europarties. It should also be noted that the generic term '*Europarties*' needs some qualification. Prior to 2004, it carried a much greater sense of cohesiveness. At that time, there were five first-generation Europarties. Collectively, they, not only, supported the normative pursuit of political integration, they also sought measures to enhance their legal standing. With the subsequent proliferation of Europarties post-2004, and particularly since 2009, which has seen the arrival of numerous soft and hard-core Eurosceptic parties promoting a set of *counter-norms*, that sense of cohesiveness no longer reflects the reality on the ground.

Before I address the substantive part of my talk, I would like to draw your attention to *the spatial dimension of this story*. The Europarties exist, and operate, at the transnational/supranational level. This can sometimes produce a kind of 'Brussels bubble group-think'. Insulated from the machinations of the national and local level, it can result in a tendency to romanticize their systemic importance. It is important not to get caught-up in such an atmosphere. Equally important, though, is the need to recognize that the local, national and transnational, in an era of globalization, are increasingly, interconnected. From that perspective, an openness to viewing these three levels as co-constitutive rather than as three distinct and impregnable silos would seem legitimate. Let me try to push this point a little further with the following two examples:

1) I imagine that most of you have come across the expression 'all politics is local'. Take a listen to the following story which I heard Frank Dobson (at that time a member of the British

Parliament) recite a few years ago. I hope the metaphor translates well and that I have remembered the story correctly. During an election campaign in the UK in the early 1950s, a candidate knocks on a constituent's door, and presents the potential voter with the statement: "Do you know that the most important issue in this election is the question of German rearmament." The constituent responds "Oh, right, okay. But did you notice anything when you came up in the lift?" to which the candidate replies, "Sorry, no". The constituent then presses the point, "You did not notice the smell of dog piss in the lift?" The candidate says, "Well, now you come to mention it, yes, I did." "Well, what are you going to do about it?" the constituent retorts. The candidate says, "I am not sure there is anything I can do about it," to which the constituent replied, "If you cannot do anything about dog piss in the lift, how the hell are you going to deal with German rearmament?"

The lesson that needs to be borne in mind here is that any future, fully formed and operational, Europarty, would need to have some form of linkage with politics/people at the grass-roots level. Remaining cocooned in Brussels is not a recipe for success. How this might be achieved is a story for another day.

2) Please look at this page from the '*The Irish Times*' (March 6, 2014). During that period, the European People's Party (EPP – one of the first generation of Europarties) was holding its Congress in Dublin. The story at the top of the page is a national story. The Irish Prime Minister (leader of an EPP member party) meets with the German Chancellor (leader of an EPP member party). The story at the bottom of the page is a transnational story – a Q&A about the EPP. The story that occupies part of the middle is very much a local one – 'Who is going to pay for the security as a result of Dublin hosting the Congress? And what disruption will it have upon the city traffic?'

Should we view this newspaper page as a whole, and in so doing, begin to recognize the co-constitutive threads contained within each story? Alternatively, are we more likely to read each story in isolation?

Let us now turn our attention, more explicitly, to the Europarties. These organizations initially emerged in the run-up to the first direct election to the European Parliament in 1979. At that time, there were three such entities. They were built around what is often referred to as the '*political mainstream*': Christian Democratic (the centre-right European People's Party - EPP), Liberal (presently known as the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats-Party – ALDE-P) and Social Democratic (centre-left, presently known as the Party of European Socialists - PES). In the immediate aftermath of the election, a group of progressive nationalist and regionalist parties set about establishing the fourth Europarty - the European Free Alliance (EFA). This was formally established in 1981. The European Greens, would subsequently become the fifth Europarty in 1984. The formation of this first generation of Europarties produced a great deal of optimism/romanticism about the emergence of representative democracy at the EU/supranational level. Such optimism though soon began to fade. By 2015, fifteen Europarties, encompassing a wider expanse of the political spectrum, have appeared.

Their composition is centred around national member parties from across, and beyond, the EU Member States (sometimes more than one member party per country) and close connections (if applicable) with their corresponding European Parliamentary Groups (EPGs). In addition, the first generation Europarties (and some of the second generation such as the Party of the European Left and the European Democratic Party) have a number of auxiliary organizations and, in recent years, varying forms of individual membership. Despite numerous developments (which I will mention shortly), the Europarties continue to remain the weakest link in what might be considered an embryonic 'representative trinity' – i.e. national political parties, European Parliamentary Groups and Europarties.

In this next slide, you can see two figures, Jean-Claude Juncker (who is President of the European Commission) and Donald Tusk (who is President of the European Council). They both come from the centre-right European People's Party (EPP). They are standing under the headline 'EPP, the driving force of Europe'. Maybe such a statement *is wishful thinking* but it also highlights a sense of aspiration on the part of the EPP. A similar desire, on the part of the other first generation (and some of the second generation) Europarties to enhance their role and significance as organizational and ideational forces, can also be witnessed.

In terms of the European Union, a glance at the Lisbon Treaty clearly highlights the importance of norms. I will just mention a couple that resonate explicitly with our story. Article 10(1) sets out one of the normative goals of the EU, "The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy," and, Article 10(4) "Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of the citizens." As both articles reflect a desire about how things 'ought' to be, the charge of *wishful thinking* may, once again, be applied. That was certainly the view of Mair and Thomassen in their 2010 article carried in the *Journal of European Public Policy*. However, if we think in terms of a *developmental trajectory* is it not possible to envisage a scenario where the Europarties are capable of engaging with/undertaking the sort of norm entrepreneurial behaviour envisioned in Article 10(4) – which, in turn, would contribute to ensuring the success of Article 10(1)?

In 2015, as already mentioned, we can point to four generations of Europarties. The diagram, in this slide, shows the 15 officially recognized Europarties - from the far-left through to the far-right. Legally, the basic role of the European political parties is mapped out in the Lisbon Treaty. It is within the secondary legislation i.e. the Party Regulation where we can find more detail. The Party Regulation was first enacted in 2004. This followed a concerted campaign by the five, first-generation, Europarties for its enactment. One of the major contributions of this endeavour would be the introduction of EU-funding and a deepening of the institutionalization of the Europarties. In 2016, the EU's financial support amounted to €31,400,000 for the Europarties and €18,700,000 for their corresponding political foundations (think-tanks that first emerged in 2008). From this budget, 15 percent is distributed equally amongst all 15 Europarties and the rest is distributed proportionately depending on the number of MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) a Europarty has. The Regulation lays out what is required to be registered as a Europarty. This includes the need to uphold a minimum set of EU norms and values. The corresponding slide here highlights the *process of constitutionalization* from the

original recognition of the Europarties in the Maastricht Treaty and the opening provided by the Nice Treaty for the Party Regulation, through to the present situation emanating from the Lisbon Treaty, and the most recent version of the Party Regulation that will come into effect in 2017. As an aside, there has also been an interesting development in terms of semantics. The original regulation labelled them 'political parties at the European level'. The new regulation refers to them as 'European political parties' – something the first generation have been seeking for some considerable time.

This next slide highlights the specific conditions that a Europarty must fulfill to be officially registered. Let me refer to Article 3(c) on the handout. To be eligible to apply for funding, a European political party 'must observe, in particular in its programme and in its activities, the principles on which the European Union is founded, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.' Such funding can be used to develop their organization and for engaging in political campaigning (following a 2007 Amendment). Up until now, it has been very difficult to fall-foul of these normative requirements. It does appear, however, that the 2017 version of the regulation (that was passed in 2014) intends to set a higher standard, and police more extensively, the oversight of registered Europarties. This can be gleamed from the following three points. First, there is a more explicit recognition of Article 2 of the Treaty of European Union in that 'European political parties must respect Article 2'. This also means that for the first time the Europarties will have to 'respect the rights of persons belonging to minorities'. Second, the Regulation provides for the establishment of 'The Authority', which will oversee the registration and subsequent behavior of the Europarties post-2017. Third, a named person from a Europarty has to sign a declaration, as part of the registration process that they adhere to the norms and values laid out in Article 2.

Now, that I have provided a basic introduction to the Europarties and their legal context, I need to ask the question: 'have they displayed the sorts of characteristics that we might associate with a *norm entrepreneur*'? Here, two events (in addition to the already mentioned push for the Party Regulation), two decades apart, can be cited as evidence that they have. One relates to the process of democracy building in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after the collapse of communism post-1989. The second relates to the 2014 European Parliamentary election and the role that the Europarties played as key drivers of the *Spitzenkandidaten* process.

In the early-to-mid 1990s, the Europarties, in conjunction with some of their national member parties (and national parties political foundations particularly from Germany and the Netherlands), headed to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to offer various types of *capacity-building* measures to emerging political parties. The Social Democrats, for example, under the guise of the *European Forum for Solidarity and Democracy*, would go to Romania or Poland to look for social democratic parties that they could support. The EPP, Liberals and Greens, and their corresponding organizations, would do the same. At the time, it was clear that recognition, leading to eventual membership, was of immense significance for applicant parties. It brought with it a 'stamp of approval' for the applicant i.e. that they were legitimately recognized by their western counterparts as a social-democratic party or liberal party etc. This could then be used as part of their domestic electoral appeal. To receive such recognition, an applicant party would have to pass through a number of filters (at the time often referred to as

'political conditionality'). Part of this, not surprisingly, necessitated displaying adherence to the norms and values of the particular ideological party family that it wanted to join. An examination of the underlying motives for these developments, highlights an array of normative and instrumental reasons – *a la* March and Olsen. On the one hand, as part of the symbolic 'return to Europe', inviting likeminded national counterparts to join was the 'right thing to do' (normative) given the situation. On the other hand, the need to ensure a political presence across the region, and in a bid to prevent an ideological competitor from racing ahead, could be interpreted as driving the Europarties to establish linkages for more instrumental reasons. For applicants, genuine ideological affinity (normative) would also share the stage with the temptation to say whatever was necessary to get in (instrumental) as the pay-off was simply too good to ignore.

The second major event is tied to an innovation that accompanied the 2014 European Parliamentary elections – the *Spitzenkandidaten* process. The trigger for this was Article 17(7) of the Lisbon Treaty. This stipulated that the European Council would have to 'take into account' the results of elections to the European parliament when it came to selecting the President of the European Commission. The Europarties and the European Parliamentary Groups interpreted article 17(7) as '*an obligation*'. Many members of the European council believed that article 17(7) was '*just a suggestion*'. Regardless, the first and some of the second generation, Europarties and their corresponding EPGs saw, collectively, the situation as an opportunity to enhance representative democracy at the EU-level by presenting voters with an indirect choice (indirect because the this was not a direct election of the candidates). Thus from their perspective initiating a process where they would field potential candidates for the position was very much the 'right thing to do'. For the third and fourth generation, this was an unnecessary waste of time. In the months leading up to the May 2014 European election, five of the Europarties chose their *Spitzenkandidat* (leading candidate). The slide goes into more detail about the method that each Europarty chose – suffice to say that there was plenty of drama as the comments in the table show. Only two parties, however, actually held an electoral contest. The Greens held an open, on-line, election while the European People's Party held a vote for delegates at its Dublin party congress.

The five candidates (in actual fact there were six, as the Greens had two, but their campaign was primarily fronted by one of them) then began to engage in an unprecedented, but tentative, pan-European campaign with political hustings and live televised debates. Despite being a rather modest, (for many underwhelming) affair, its biggest impact appears to be its legacy. As a result of this 'test-run', so to speak, *Spitzenkandidaten 2.0.* (2018-19) is likely to be a much grander, professional and democratic affair. Following the EPP's electoral success, it was their candidate, Jean-Claude Juncker, who was expected to become the Commission President. At that time, though, not everyone was on-board either with the *Spitzenkandidaten* process, via which Juncker came to be the prospective candidate, or with Juncker himself. Indeed, there was much disquiet within sections of the European Council about this whole process, spearheaded by British Prime Minister David Cameron and elements of the UK media. The British tabloid newspaper, *The Sun*, for example published a picture of Juncker with the headline that read: '6 reasons why this is the most dangerous man in Europe'. Cameron was not, however, the only national leader who objected to, or had reservations about, Juncker. The list also,

initially, included Angela Merkel as well as the Dutch, Swedish and Hungarian prime ministers. Eventually, however, the European Council acquiesced to both the process and result of the European elections. Jean-Claude Juncker emerged triumphant – though the UK and Hungary voted against him in Council.

Both of these aforementioned events, therefore, witnessed the Europarties momentarily taking centre-stage. With an emphasis on the norm of an 'EU-level representative-democracy' they were able to influence aspects of their contextual environment in a manner befitting of a *norm entrepreneur*. It is the sustainability of that position, though, that continues to remain problematic. This can be tied to a number of formidable obstacles at both the intra-party and extra-party level.

1) Please take a look at quote a) which comes from a former secretary general of a Europarty, "We are bound by something that comes back every day. Our existence is bound by domestic/local issues. People are afraid of Europarties. They fear they will undermine national parties." It may be considered ironic that national member parties, which place rhetorical and symbolic value on being a member of a Europarty, are still not prepared to see them develop beyond a certain point. Indeed, many national member parties (and not just those from the third and fourth generation) actively seek to contain developments so that at what some take to be a rather rudimentary stage of development.

2) Please look at quote d) from a serving (2013) Europarty secretary general, "We cannot invent things in our small office but what we know we can make accessible to our member parties…" Some of these organizations, it should be stressed, are extremely small, with just a handful of staff. Even the largest parties - the EPP and the PES and ALDE-P – only employ 15 to 20 full-time staff.

3) Structural obstacles vis-à-vis the European elections can also be witnessed as section b) of the next slide highlights. At present, only nine member states allow for Europarty names or logos to appear on the ballot papers. It means that electorates do not have a sense that when they vote for their national party in the European election, that that national party is also a member of a Europarty. The photograph, in the middle of the slide, is of national party election posters from the Netherlands. As you can see, there is no sign of Europarty logos, once again, preventing a direct and explicit connection between the national party and the Europarty.

4) We can also point to an emerging obstacle that has somewhat of an existential quality to it – i.e. the recent formation of a number of Eurosceptic and far-right Europarties. With EU-funds on offer, they appear to have taken the decision to establish themselves for, primarily, instrumental reasons. But they also offer and promote a set of *'counter-norms'* that clearly differentiates them from their first generation counterparts. That differentiation extends to both their take on the EU and their take on what a Europarty should be/should become. At the forefront of these developments are two prominent and controversial political

figures: Marine Le Pen (leader of the French National Front) and Geert Wilders (leader of the Dutch Freedom Party). Le Pen has been the leading figure in the establishment of the newest Europarty - the *Mouvement pour une Europe des Nations et des Libertes* (MENL). Wilders remains a key figure within the European Alliance for Freedom (EAF). Both figures were influential in the formation of the newest European Parliamentary Group - the Europe of Nations and Freedom in June 2015. Two recent quotes, from Le Pen and Wilders, which equate the European Union with the collapse of the Soviet Union and as an entity that is about to face its own D-Day (i.e. the start of its downfall), highlight the depth of their hostility towards the European project/political integration. All of the third and fourth generation Europarties want to either roll back political aspects of the European Union, making it more of an economic organization (for example, the third generation European Conservatives and Reformists - ECR), or they actively wish to dismantle the European Union altogether (third and fourth generation far-right forces). On a semantic level, these newer Europarties do not make use of the term 'party'/or see themselves as a party seeking to operate under the principle of collective responsibility. They refer to themselves as 'alliances' or 'movements'. Built into their statutory framework is an intergovernmental set-up where each national member party, ultimately, remains free to choose their own path without the threat of sanction.

5) The extent of 'norm internalization' within the first generation of Europarties. Ensuring that all of the national member parties adhere to the overall aims of their Europarty, as both an organization (i.e. the extent to which they want it to develop) and, in terms of, the core norms and values of the organization, faces numberous challenges. As I show in this slide, perhaps the most recognizable contemporary figure here is Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister whose party, *Fidesz*, is a member of the EPP. His conduct, in the past few years, such as citing the virtues of an 'illiberal democracy' can be seen to challenging many of the norms and values of both the EPP and the EU. One national party representative, in 2015, was quoted as saying, 'Orbán's behaviour is beyond the boundaries of what is acceptable.' It remains to be seen if Fidesz will face any sanctions. In the mid-2000s, the PES had similar *values-based* difficulties with its member party from Slovakia, SMER, which had its membership temporarily suspended. Not surprisingly how best to deal with such behaviour is far from settled. Does membership of the Europarty, in such cases, act as an anchor on the worst excesses of behavior which means that suspension ends up being counter-productive as a party is released from such constraints? Or does suspension serve to nurture moderation, within a national party, as it seeks to regain full membership?

Let me now try to draw my presentation to a conclusion. We know, as mentioned at the beginning of my talk that at the heart of the development of representative democracy, at the nation-state level, has been political parties. Whether, or not the pursuit of representative democracy at the EU-level, with the Europarties at its heart, is a bridge too far remains to be seen. Normatively,

though, the Lisbon Treaty, Article 10(1), is committed to such a pursuit with the Europarties playing a key role in its operationalization – Article 10(4). Despite all of their on-going weaknesses and limitations, the Europarties, because of the Party Regulation, are now successfully institutionalized within the EU-architecture. It also appears that they have proven themselves capable of acting as *'norm entrepreneurs'* – albeit in a rather episodic fashion (the general impact on the behavioural norms of applicant member parties; the evolution of the party regulation; and the spearheading of the revolutionary impact of the *Spitzenkandidaten* process) rather than sustainable manner. As to deciding, which tendency – idealist or instrumental – is constantly in the driving seat, when it comes to interpreting entrepreneurial behaviour, might be somewhat of a forlorn exercise as so much of that debate appears to be tied to a question of judgement. On the one hand, many of the developments associated with the Europarty story, to date, have been collective-based endeavours. Ostensibly, these have been orchestrated by the first generation, based on the belief that in light of the situation it is 'the right thing to do'. On the other hand, the fact that such measures would enhance the operational capacities of these parties means that such actions could also be interpreted in instrumental terms.

While such collective endeavours indicate signs of success, we can also point to numerous limitations/shortcomings that continue to weigh heavily on the capacity of the Europarties to enhance their role and significance. In this final slide, I reiterate some of the issues hindering their *developmental trajectory* and make some suggestions as to the way-forward for those parties that wish to pursue such a path:

1) There appears to be a need for a deeper commitment (*norm internalization*) toward the goal of building a representative democracy, facilitated via the actions of the Europarties, at the EU-level. Here the Europarties need to highlight their relevance as *the guardians of specific EU norms and values.*

2) The notion of 'significance' appears to remain tied to national perceptions of what a Europarty is/or is expected to become. Therefore, enhancing their significance will necessitate affecting change within national member parties that continue to show an underlying hesitation/hostility towards their Europarty. Overcoming deeply rooted national party practices though is no mean feat.

3) A continuing compartmentalization of the transnational, national and local spheres of politics. Here, the Europarties will need to promote the idea that, in an era of globalization, so many public goods have a European dimension to them and that the three-levels should be considered co-constitutive.

4) There is no escaping from the continuing rise of the Eurosceptic Europarties and their package of *counter-norms*. This represents a significant challenge for the Europarties of the first generation. Facing up to the challenge, is going to necessitate developing a *more overt projection of their own ideological norms and values* in a bid to attract support for differing future visions of the EU-project.

My final point addresses the general academic literature on the EU/EU institutions. While the European Parliament and the European Parliamentary Groups continue to receive deep and sustained analysis, the Europarties are seldom mentioned or, if they are, it is usually only in passing. Maybe it is time that the Europarties, at least within the literature, are warranted *the Grail of sustained recognition.*

Thank you very much.

Normative Politics in the EU External Security Policy

Franz-Lothar ALTMANN

(Professor, Intercultural and International Relations, Bucharest State University)

Let me start, as long as the colleague here is helping me. Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, first of all I would like to express my gratitude for being invited into this very impressive environment here.

Given the 20 minutes that I will fill, I will not present everything that is on my slides and I will not be able to present such a colorful and picture-full presentation as Stephen did before. Mine will be very simple black and white; first the white part and then at the end a little bit of black.

The first slide is considered the short history of EU common security and defense policy. I will jump over it by just two remarks. The first of which is that it took a long time to build up a kind of common security and defense policy. There has been at the very beginning the attempt of a European defense community, but it failed because too many reservations of the states (sovereignty reservations and interests of the alliance of NATO) blocked any attempts to construct such a European defense policy. At the same time, we had a very high dependence on NATO's strengths and the nuclear protection by the United States.

Also, what in the beginning was an attempt of common security policy, the Western European Union, was just a military assistance pact that was mainly backed by NATO, which took over the military tasks, and it was also an attempt to block the German rearmament after the war. This was the attempt of France to build a kind of umbrella where Germany was packed in and blocked from future rearmament.

This all changed in the years 1990/ 1991 when the end of the Cold War came up and when the USSR was dissolved. It prompted a reduction of the necessary European dependence on the US protection because the Cold War´s threat was over. Therefore, the notion came up: this confrontation no longer exists, so we do not need this very strong protection by the United States. But at the same time, new conflicts came up; conflicts in the Gulf region and conflicts in the near neighborhood of the European Community as it was called at that time.You know, the European Community was renamed European Union only later in 1993. So, in the Balkans, the near neighborhood, these conflicts, this fighting between the different armies, showed that, at that time, the European Union or the European Community at the beginning did not really have its own crisis management. Again, the United States were those who brought up action or tried to interfere. When they say, "Why do the Europeans not take over? This is in their neighborhood," the Europeans had to answer, "We cannot. We do not have the instruments. We do not have the policies."

This was the beginning of the thinking that Europe should have its own instrument, its own framework for defense and security policy. The first meeting that brought up such ideas was the so-called Petersberg meeting. Petersberg is a nice castle near to Bonn which at that time was the capital of Germany. In Petersberg, here they provided for the first time some ideas of what a new common security and defense policy should look like. They defined the spectrum of military actions

that the European Union can take if a crisis comes up.

This is Petersberg, this castle near to Bonn in the Rhine Valley. (Slide 1)

Now, the Petersberg Declaration defined several purposes for which military units could be deployed: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The term 'peacemaking' was adopted as a consensual solution and as a synonym for 'peace-enforcement'. Remember that 1992 was at the height of the Balkan Wars which started in 1991, and then in 1992 it developed in Bosnia Herzegovina. At that time, the United States and also Europe thought about how can we enforce peace? How can we interfere? The declaration of Petersberg tried to make the Europeans consider how they could also act in addition to the United States. These Petersberg tasks were later expanded in the new Treaty of Lisbon.

However, first there was an attempt to formulate a European Security Strategy in 2003. This strategy tried to define the key threats that the European Union is faced. The first is terrorism. The second is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The third one is regional conflicts, and then state failure. At that time already, state failure in the neighborhood, but also in other continents like Africa, became an issue. Then, of course, organized crime, which more and more extended also in Europe, so these were the threats.

I mentioned that these definitions of threats and the Petersberg declaration were extended in the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon, which was set up in 2009, had also provisions related to common security and defense policy, so this is the treaty which now is the basic treaty for the European Union. I told you that the European Union was called so after 1993.

There are two clauses that refer to common security and defense policy (CSDP). The first clause is on mutual assistance, the second on solidarity. For the meaning of mutual assistance, assistance is if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory. Of course, this must still be seen in the environment with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The solidarity clause, on the other hand, states if an EU Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, then the countries, the members of the EU, should provide solidarity to this country.

In addition, in the Treaty of Lisbon, a permanent structural cooperation was constructed, which means a framework in which this common security and defense policy can happen. What was also important was the creation of the European External Action Service under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

I mentioned before that the former Petersberg declaration was extended in the Treaty of Lisbon. What includes the extension of the Petersberg tasks, we had it already, is humanitarian and rescue tasks, but now it contains also conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks; the task of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks to other countries outside of the EU if they ask for it or if the EU thinks it is needed to provide advice and assistance; and also post-conflict stabilization tasks. Remember the Balkans where in 1995 ended the first big wars in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegowina, and then came Kosovo in 1999 and 2000. Also here the EU is requested to provide some support for the stabilization after conflicts.

At that time, the former Western European Union (WEU) that I mentioned in the very beginning, which anyhow had not really some real meaning in defense policy, was terminated and the EU officially took over.

Now, CSDP entails two components. One is the military and the other one is civilian, because CSDP is common security and defense policy. That means that we have three major committees in this concept. The first is the political and security committee. The second is the military committee, and the third, the committee for civilian aspects of crisis management. The first, the political committee, consists of ambassadors of all of the 28 member states. They deal with the principal political issues concerning CSDP. Then we have the military committee where the chiefs of general staff advise the political committee (PC) on all issues that are of military contents. Then we have the third committee for civilian aspects where diplomats and specialists meet and, again, advise the first committee, which is the major committee.

There are some headline goals for these two aspects, the civilian and the military aspect. Civilian crisis management is a priority area for the EU. Here we have from the year 2000 a first set of headline goals. The first one was to provide up to 5000 police officers for crisis management operations. The second is monitoring, advising and training local police, preventing or mitigating internal crises and conflicts, restoring law and order.

Then these headline goals were extended one year later in 2001 in Gothenburg at the Council where, in addition to what was already agreed upon, 200 judges and prosecutors were prepared for crisis management operations in the field of rule of law; and a pool of experts in the area of civilian administration including general administrative, social, and infrastructure functions; plus a civil protection team up to 2000 people, all deployable at very short notice. I must mention here that these were goals. It does not mean that all of these goals were actually implemented. This will come during my last remarks, i.e. some kinds of limitations.

We had another set, a third set of civilian headline goals under this umbrella of common security and defense policy, namely to establish monitoring missions and support for the so-called EU Special Representatives. There exist EU Special Representatives for certain tasks for certain regions. For example, for the Balkan region we have a Special Representative. And then, finally, in 2010, so just five years ago, there was an additional great emphasis on civil-military cooperation, i.e. cooperation between the civil and the military component of CSDP, which makes available 285 military and civilian experts on traditional justice, dialogue and conflict analysis, and the so-called Civilian Response Teams.

Now in short the military headline goals. The military headline goals have the task that the EU can react with an autonomous military capacity if a crisis comes up. The first setting of such military goals happened in Helsinki in 1999. This was to be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces up to the corps level (15 brigades or 50,000 – 60,000 persons) – again, a goal, it is not that it really exists now as such – to be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days.

It was clear that this task was very demanding, so there was kind of reconsidering of this goal which happened in 2010, five years ago, where the central military part of the CSDP became the so-call battle group concept. Now, what is a battle group? These are high readiness forces consisting of 1500 personnel that can be deployed within 10 days after the EU decides to launch an operation. It can

be sustained for up to 30 days, which can be prolonged to 120 days. Altogether, 13 battle groups are considered, of which two should be on standby.

Finally, it should be mentioned that also within the framework of the CSDP the so-called European Defence Agency (EDA) was set up in 2004. You see, this is all rather recent, rather new. I told you at the beginning that it took quite a time until CSDP had been developed, and only after the breakup of the cold war, this consideration of having its own policy on defense and security came up. One of the considerations was also to coordinate the production and the market possibilities of European military production in this new EDA.

These are the EDA´s tasks: first to develop defense capabilities by providing the necessary military equipment; to promote common defense research and technology; to foster armament cooperation; and to create a competitive European defense equipment market. This is, of course, a huge market, the market for military equipment where the Americans, the Russians and the Chinese compete with the Europeans now, and in order to cooperate better between the French, the British, and the German production facilities, this was set up in the framework of the European Defence Agency.

This is a chart where the European Union at present has military and civilian operations. (Slide 2) You see the yellow ones are the military operations and the blue ones are the civilian missions. You will have it on the printout, but it think it is not in color. There are not so many military operations: You see one in the Mediterranean, which is very new now due to the migration flows, and then in Bosnia Herzegovina, in Mali, Central Africa, and Somalia with Atalanta.

Now, finally, some limitations, some retrenchments that must be given here because it all sounds so perfect. The firstis that operational capabilities are restricted to the substrategic level. What does that mean? It means CSDP is active only up to a level where no acute and fundamental issues of world order, of war and peace are on stage. In contrast to the American National Security Strategy, the European Security Strategy accentuates more on diplomatic and political means, not so much on the military means. It attempts to strengthen international institutions like the United Nations Security Council rules or OSCE. The use of military tools is really the last resort of the CSDP to reestablish or maintain international order.

Thank you very much for your attention, and there are more detail is in the printout.

(Slide 1)

(Slide 2)

Normative Politics in the EU-Japan Relations

Hartmut MAYER

(Professor, Official Fellow and Tutor in Politics at St. Peter's College, University of Oxford)

As the previous speakers have said, they are delighted to be here.   I am delighted to be here, so thank you for inviting me to this wonderful conference on normative politics in the European Union. I think normative politics in the EU is an important topic and I congratulate all of the contributors to the book which I understand is only available so far in Japanese, but we are looking forward, needless to say, potentially to an English translation.

I have also worked on normative politics and recently published a book on *The European Union and Japan: A New Chapter in Civilian Power Cooperation*.   This book was launched at the end of April in Brussels and the coeditors are Paul Bacon from Waseda University, myself, and Hidetoshi Nakamura. The gentleman you see in between you have seen before in the slides.   That is Herman Van Rompuy, who wrote the forward and launched the book in Brussels.

The title of today's talk is 'Normative Politics in the EU-Japan Relations'.   The central message is both, to some extent, normative power or civilian powers, and there is a very strong normative claim that they should work together in global governance to promote certain values, certain policies and they are uniquely qualified to do so because of their civilian nature.   I want to send that, and I think that probably resonates with what your book suggests, and that is what our book suggests as well, so we are a meeting of minds.

However, where does it fit into the larger research on the EU as a global actor?   I have listed in this slide (and you will find it in the handout) the essential type of research.   The first one is the nature of the EU as an external relations actor, and some of things that Professor Altmann mentioned are part of that body of research.   How do the institutions work?   Why do they not work as well as they should?   What are the inter-institutional battles, and what is (and that is fundamental) the relationship between the 28 members and the common institutions?   There is a lot of research in that area.

Then there is the body of literature which identifies the EU as a unique actor and is about the uniqueness of the actor and why the EU could be an influential actor because it combines political, economic, and civilian means to promote policy agendas and, to some extent, norms.

The third research area is about the effectiveness.   Does the EU really affect climate change negotiations when we talk about strategic partnerships and so on?   How do you measure effectiveness?   Is it the EU or these other factors that stimulate results or not?

The next body of literature on the EU in global politics is where is the EU in the larger balance of power?   Where are we in a new geostrategic environment?   Do we need to develop new mechanisms in order to respond to challenges that are coming from elsewhere?   That is a body of literature that is interesting.

Then I have listed the three ones which are the most relevant to this conference, and these are the highlighted ones.   The legitimacy of the EU as a global player: what actually qualifies the EU to claim that they can set norms and set human rights standards and so on?   That is an important question:

where does the legitimacy come from?   I do not want to go into details about input process and output legitimacy, but what I can say (and I do not want to talk too much about it) in the current crisis there is a decreasing legitimacy of the Europeans to tell other people what to do because some of the civilian language that the EU promotes does not seem to appear the guiding principle of relations between member states at the moment.   If you go to any panel these days listening to what Germans have to say to Greeks and Greeks to Germans, there is not that normative harmonious civilian engagement anymore, and I would like to stress out that this undermines the legitimacy of the Europeans to speak to other regions.

The next is the creator and agent of global norms (and I am pretty sure that is part of your book) and the old question as to whether the EU remains a model for other regions; a model for trade policies, a model of multilevel, governance and so on.   I will leave it to you to decide.   My position was always that the EU cannot be a model because the circumstances of the creation, the political dynamics are so unique, but it can be an inspiration for other regions to look at what the Europeans have done, how they do it, and see whether some inspiration can follow from that.   The old missionary attitude of the Europeans that 'we know it better and please do as we do' does not resonate, and it is the wrong type of language in engagement with other regions.

Then there is more specific literature on the EU as a trade actor and the EU as a development actor, but these are particular policy fields.   I just wanted to situate where we are.

When it comes to normative politics, there are many labels; normative power Europe, the Ian Manners label.   Civilian power is an older one.   You find transformative power Europe.   You find soft power Europe.   You find many labels.   I prefer to conceptualize normative power through – and that is very German – through the concept of responsibility.   I believe that the European Union is most effective if it promotes responsible contributions to global governance.   I would suggest that this is a guideline for Japanese engagement with European Union initiatives by looking at what our responsibility is towards global governance.   What can we do because we are uniquely qualified and what can we do together because we have a joint responsibility for those kinds of areas? Responsibility is a slightly more difficult concept, and what I tried to do in some of my previous books, and particularly the one in 2006 on responsible Europe, tried to identify principles which guide us to identify what a responsible actor is.

You have a list of the principles that guide us.   The first one is the contribution principle.   I think I should jump a bit.   Here you have the contribution principle, which is the idea of, if you have contributed to a problem in global governance that constitutes harm to others, you have a responsibility to do something to overcome that problem.

The second principle is the beneficiary principle.   If you have benefitted from a situation which creates harm to others but you have not contributed to it, you still have a responsibility to help overcome that particular problem.

The third principle is the community principle.   It is the idea that you have more responsibility towards your own community than to a larger community.   For your own children you have a higher responsibility than to all children.   It is the communitarian versus the cosmopolitan.   When we look at what a unique responsibility Europe is in the world or in Japan and the world, the community

principle is one of the guiding principles that can lead us to certain policy decisions.

Very important, however, is the next one, which is the capacity principle. I have to tell that to the Europeans all the time. The capacity principle is if you have the capacity to do something, i.e. if you can swim and you see a child drowning, you have to jump and save the child. If you cannot swim, there is no obligation to jump because you cannot save the child. When it comes to Europe and their ambitions in the world, they still think that they can swim everywhere and not only swim, but run, jump, dance, tango, everything. My message is, be modest. Ask yourself, "Can you swim?" If you cannot swim, you should try to seek cooperation with other institutions in addressing global problems. That is the capacity principle.

The next principle is the legitimate expectation principle. If you have raised expectations and they are legitimate, then you have an obligation to fulfill these obligations. The rhetoric of the European Union raises a lot of expectations and very often, unfortunately, the European Union cannot deliver.

The next principle is the consent principle. This is the old, if you have signed up to treaty you have to fulfill the treaty. You have agreed. You had better do that.

However, what is important is to remind ourselves when we judge international behavior and international institutions whether we have been through these tests. We did that in the book and identified certain things that Europe should do and certain things that Europe cannot do. I give a list of priorities which I do not want to explain in too much detail, but this is our list from 2005, 2006, and in 2014, 2015 I am glad to say that I would come up with a similar list which is derived from the principles that I have tried to identify.

An internal consolidation of the European project remains the most important responsibility that Europe has vis-à-vis its European citizens, but also if Europe does not work internally it cannot project either norms or others externally. Therefore, the Greece financial crisis, institutional crisis, that is the first priority.

The second priority based on those principles still seems to me to come up with a new Transatlantic understanding because a lot of the things that Europe promotes are jointly shared by Western and – to some extent if we want to think about the role of Japan – a renewal of trilateralism in one form or the other facing challenges from regions, actors that do not share the same norms and values.

It strikes me then also is important to point out that Russia, as the third priority, remains a European priority because whatever we think about Russia, positively or negatively, it is an important factor in European politics and has always been and will always be, and hence, it is for the Europeans an important area of engagement.

The fourth is the Neighborhood Policy. I do not want to go into too much detail, but it used to be one mechanism which applied to the Mediterranean, to Eastern Europe, and to the Middle East. Now we have a more differentiated one, but it is quite important to understand that I consider these as core responsibilities for the Europeans.

The fifth is a break which it says you cannot swim further than that. The rest you have to do by inter-institutional cooperation. What comes in six, seven, and eight is, from a European perspective, a

list of priorities, but five is the important one.   You can only do it jointly.   Here is where Japan comes in.   When we talk about the environment, when we talk about health, when we talk about food security, all the areas – technology, demography – where EU-Japan can work closely together, the message is you have to work together because you have a joint responsibility and you have with joint action greater power and greater ability to affect things.

Then, having sent that message, we have to understand that the EU-Japan relations, it is a bilateral one, and the relative importance of this relationship, unfortunately, does not depend on Europe and Japan alone, but we live in a fluid global order which has been changes and will continue to change since the end of the Cold War.   What I have listed (and I do not want to go into too much detail) are competing visions of global order that emerge in the literature.

The unipolar moment, the unipolar world, this was after the end of the Cold War, the US hegemony, an overriding narrative.

The alternative to that was neo-realist instability, the idea that we will see less order and more chaos because nation states would go back to competing with one another.   The John Mearsheimer prediction was even in Europe this will happen and there will be greater rivalry.   What we have seen in the 1990s was an institutional strengthening that prevented that rivalry.   In fact, it extended the zone of stability.   What we might see in the future (and I do not want to be gloomy) is a bit of a reemergence of new rivalries and new competition even within Europe.

Then you have global order that is either cooperative or antagonistic multi-polarity.   It comes in either three poles or five poles, rising powers, and so on.   In each of these global orders, EU and Japan cooperation to some extent is either non-hegemonic cooperation against the United States, or it is cooperation in order to foster cooperation within a world of instability.

The fourth order says, well, there is not one order.   In different policy areas there are different hierarchies; military, unipolar, trade, multipolar, human rights, transpolar, and so on, the layer cake model.

Then there is the popular return to bipolarity, seeing the United States and China as the opposing poles.   For EU-Japan that would mean choosing between America and China, and I think that there is consensus in this room probably of which pole one would choose, but I will leave it to you whether you think that is a realistic scenario.

The sixth one is cultural friction.   This is Huntington clash of civilizations.   I do not want to go into too much detail, but we know that it has an appeal to some policy makers, but it is a rather conceptualization of world order because the self-fulfilling prophecy argument, i.e. if you call it a clash of civilization, you will get a clash of civilization.   That is something that might happen.

The others are variations, and I want to point out the one that is 11 and 12, the tension between pre-modern, modern, and postmodern, this is what Robert Cooper in particular (one of the foreign policy advisors to Catherine Ashton, to Javier Solana, and so on) pointed out, says world order is the tension between societies such as America, Japan, Europe that have postmodern values, pre-modern, Afghanistan, and then you have emerging rising powers which are modernization and they give priority over economic growth over environment, social issues and so on.

Then there are the rising states, defending states, and declining states.   I would argue, hopefully,

that Europe and Japan, even though they are economically declining as a part of global GDP, they are not declining states, but defending states as states that will remain important as crucial actors is global governance taking on responsibilities individually and jointly and contribute to better global governance.

That is my normative final statement.　Let us work together.　Let us embrace those values and let us defend them against those who challenge them.　I do not want to name names, but we all know which kind of actors might challenge these values.　I am very happy to be here on normative power, on normative politics, and on EU-Japan relations.　I am glad to have contributed to this conference and I thank you for listening.

This is me in my funny gown in Oxford last week where we celebrate Encaenia as they call it (for the translators that is difficult), but it is the party where all members of the university get together and have strawberries and Pimm's once a year.　That is the picture to you.　We have finished the term and we are now on vacation.　You are still working very hard, so thank you.　Thank you very much.

<h1 align="center">Q&A Session</h1>

Moderator:

Prof. Yoichiro USUI (Niigata University of International and Informational Studies)

Participants:

  Prof. Stephen DAY (Oita University)
  Prof. Franz-Lothar ALTMANN (Bucharest State University)
  Prof. Hartmut MAYER (University of Oxford)
  Dr. Atsuko HIGASHINO (Tsukuba University)
  Dr. Ken TAKEDA (Waseda University)

(ICHIKAWA)　We will now begin part two.　The moderator for part two is Professor Yoichiro Usui of Niigata University of International and Informational Studies.　Professor Usui, would you please serve a moderator for part two?

(USUI) Thank you very much for the introduction.　As we begin part two, I would like to take note and express my appreciation to the three speakers for their fine presentations.　Based on these three presentations, we are going to invite two commentators in this session to make their comments. Based on that, we would also like to entertain questions from the floor and to go into panel discussion based on the comments that we receive.

As Professor Ichikawa mentioned, we actually were expecting Ms. Yukari Akeda to this panel, but as of 2:00 a.m., she sent us an email saying that she cannot attend this symposium.　The fact that she is called upon in the middle of the night such that she is not able to attend the symposium that was scheduled for over a month is quite unique perhaps.　However, we did receive a message from her. Please let me show it to you later.

Those young students in the audience, perhaps some of you may wish to pursue research and study on the EU in the future.　You might also become involved in works related to the EU.　I sincerely hope that we will be able to work on this symposium based on that hope.

I would like to first of all invite Dr. Ken Takeda and then Dr. Atsuko Higashino to make comments.　They are also researchers contributing to the book The Normative Politics of the European Union together with Professor Stephen Day.　The question discussed with this book is how the EU is trying to use norms politically.　Norms are the word to indicate what should be done and/or what should not be done. Such norms may have importance in the world of global politics. The topic or the theme throughout this book is how to understand such norms.　I hope that today's discussions will cast light upon some insights on the study carried out with this book.

First of all, I would like to invite Dr. Takeda to speak first.

(TAKEDA)　Thank you very much.　I am Takeda, assistant professor at Waseda University.　Thank you very much for this opportunity.　When I was offered to serve as a commentator for today's symposium, I really was honored indeed to be among such distinguished researchers and speakers.

Professor Day, Professor Altmann, Professor Mayer, all of your presentations were impressive. I have learned a lot of things from the presentations. I enjoyed your presentations. I have questions to each of them.

I would like to start off by asking questions to Professor Day first. I think that you have given two examples of normative politics. One was the spreading of norms among the members of Central and Eastern Europe. The second is that of the *Spitzenkandidaten* process in which Mr. Juncker was chosen as the president. First of all, regarding the active engagement of the Europarties with the members of the European parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe, I think that was an interesting case that you have talked about. Methodologically speaking or technically speaking or in terms of case selection, I think that the case can be considered a most likely case since the Central and Eastern European people have always wished to take conduct with the Western people or with the existing members of the European Parliament. They were willing to learn or take in and accept the European norms. Therefore, I think it is a case where European norms were more readily communicated. Therefore, Europarties or the European Parliament had an easier chance of sending that message to the Central and Eastern European countries. Would there be any other cases where successful socialization could be identified?

Secondly, as for the process in which Mr. Juncker was chosen as president of the European Commission, I think that you are looking at this from the angle of norms of a representative democracy. Do you think that the representative democracy norm actually was influential in this case? Also, to what extent would Europarties be considered as norm entrepreneurs?

I have a different standpoint, actually, from that of Dr. Day. I felt that, in this process, the role of the norms was not that strong, for two reasons. One is that, in selecting Mr. Juncker as the president, I think the credible threat could be imposed upon the national governments from the European Parliament. In other words, the European Parliament had the discretion of not choosing that particular person if their selection is not approved by the national leaders. Therefore, perhaps I thought that they bluffed, so to speak, or used that credible threat.

Secondly, I think that the key was Chancellor Merkel of Germany. As Professor Day mentioned, at the beginning, Chancellor Merkel and the German government were not so keen on selecting Mr. Juncker. However, they changed their stance and attitude in the meanwhile and ultimately chose Mr. Juncker as the president. I think that Mr. Juncker, the German government, and Chancellor Merkel probably had a lot in common in terms of EU policy preferences and the basic pro-EU ideologies. Therefore, I think that the German government selected Mr. Juncker ultimately in order to pursue their own interests as well. This is how many rationalists would interpret the selection of Mr. Juncker. So, the process of choosing Mr. Juncker probably was based not so much on norms, but rather on self-interest of the Parliament as well the German government. That would be my question to Professor Day.

Secondly, to Professor Altmann, I think in the presentation the history was outlined quite in detail. I have learned a lot because I had not been so familiar with the whole history of the development of the security and defense policy. My question is related to the development of the security and defense policy. What do you think were the factors that led to such development of the European security

policy?   In the academic arena, I think that Stanley Hoffmann and other intergovernmentalist people would say that the integration probably would not be seen in the field of security and defense. However, with the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, the Bosnia War, and other conflicts have become triggers for the EU to think about the expansion of security and defense policies in the EU. How could this be explained?   Is it okay to say that this cannot be explained by intergovernmentalism?   Or would you think that this development in the security and defense arena came out as a necessity?   Therefore, in the Gulf and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Professor Altmann mentioned, the EU became aware of their own weaknesses and therefore they tried to build their autonomous military capabilities and that has led to the development of a common security and defense policies.   Was it a functional necessity that led to this development of the policy based on necessity?   Is it okay to take that theoretical approach?   That is my question to Professor Altmann.

Finally, for Professor Mayer, as you mentioned in your presentation, the EU is trying to spread its norms externally and in your presentation it was a very well explained and I enjoyed the presentation. However, to start with, would you say that the EU is able to succeed in convincing others outside of the territory to agree with the EU norms? I think it is relatively easy for the EU to impose these values on new candidates for accession.   However, apart from that, would you say that the EU is able to impose such norms on other actors and to have them be internalized?   Do you think that is possible? If you think it is possible, under what conditions would you say that it would be possible and against what sorts of countries or regions?   Another point with a specific example: would you say that the EU is able impose its own norms on Japan or to China or to Russia?   Countries like China, which probably we can say do not really share norms of the EU to a great extent, do you still think that EU norms could be imposed on a country such as China?

Thank you very much.

(USUI)   Thank you very much.   The next discussant is Dr. Higashino, please.

(HIGASHINO) Thank you very much for your kind introduction. My name is Atsuko Higashino, from the University of Tsukuba. I wish to express my deepest thanks to all those presenting papers here today for their informative presentations. I would now like to comment and ask questions concerning Japan-EU relations and the security policies of the EU, including its response to the Ukraine crisis. Answers from any panellists would be highly appreciated.

My research interests include the enlargement of the EU, currently vis-à-vis Turkey and the Western Balkan countries, and the European Neighbourhood Policies (ENP) towards Ukraine and Georgia in particular—, the countries that will not be member states of the EU in the near future, but are located in the EU's 'backyard' and are currently facing many problems. I am also interested in the current relationship between the EU and Asia. From a theoretical perspective, I am strongly interested in whether and to what extent the EU can be regarded as a 'normative power', including the points that how norms can and cannot explain the external policies of the EU. In Chapter One of The Normative Politics of the European Union, which I co-wrote with some of the panellists and speakers here today, I shed light on this issue. Therefore, as I am largely trying to elucidate the external policies of the EU

as well as the EU's posture on the international stage, I believe I share certain research interests with Professor Mayer and Professor Altmann.

I would like to start my comments and questions to the panellists by addressing Japan-EU relations and the issues involved in prioritising the relevant actors. In his presentation, Professor Mayer explained the prioritisation of the EU's external policies, such as 'internal consolidation', 'a new transatlantic understanding', 'Russia', and the 'EU neighbourhood policy'. Naturally, such diplomatic prioritisations are quite different from those of Japan, whose relations with the US and East Asia are particularly important. I personally feel that one of the potential problems for the Japan-EU relationship is the considerable difference between the EU and Japan concerning their senses of threats, emergency, and urgency, and the failure to deal with these differences effectively.

It is now widely known that there is tension between Japan and China over the East Asia Sea, and between China and some ASEAN countries over islands in the South China Sea. Against this background, it has been strongly expected that the EU, as a normative power, or as an actor which has sought to establish international stability and peace, would become involved in one way or another in these tricky issues— if direct involvement is too difficult, it was considered desirable that the EU would at least clearly express its stance on these problems.' However, the EU's typical response has been to keep its distance from such disputes, emphasising the rule of law as well as peaceful and cooperative solutions in accordance with international law. It has not taken positions on these problems, and has instead tried to be neutral. Some argue that such neutrality is a virtue or wisdom of the EU's foreign policy, maintaining the EU's self-image as impartial and fair.

That said, some of the EU's reasons for remaining neutral in these contentious disputes in East Asia are well-founded such as the Japanese government's alleged shift to the right (nationalisation) and the ever-deepening economic interdependence between China and the EU. All of these elements combined have made the EU extremely cautious in expressing any views on the problems in East Asia. However, from a Japanese viewpoint, we are actually hoping to hear the EU's views concerning what it regards as right or wrong in these issues, particularly as the perception of the EU as a normative and international actor is stronger than ever. My question, therefore, is how will the EU deal with these problems in East Asia from a normative perspective, and what will be the core norm in that case?

From this perspective, I also would like to ask about the 'strategic partnership' between the EU and Japan. This question is related to the presentations made by Professor Altmann and Professor Mayer. The concept of the strategic partnership was introduced in 2003 when the EU published its European Security Strategy, and currently 10 countries, including Japan, China, and Russia, are designated as partners. In East Asia, Japan, China, and South Korea are strategic partners of the EU; however, many in East Asia feel that this partnership is not functioning as expected. Furthermore, it has not necessarily made positive contributions to the Japan-EU relationship.

Traditionally, the EU has had a comparative advantage with regard to 'region-to-region' external policies, such as its policies toward ASEAN and Latin America. This has been regarded as one of its strongest advantages in the realm of foreign policy. However, the strategic partnership is not modelled on the EU's traditional region-to-region approach, and it has not been evaluated positively by many observers. One of the reasons is that this strategic partnership focuses rather too much on bilateral

relationships with non-EU states, and less on the relationships with the EU's partners and neighbouring countries. In East Asia, while all three of the EU's strategic partners in the region (Japan, China, and South Korea) are dealing with diplomatic tensions with each other, the EU has tried very hard to keep its distance from these disputes; it has done nothing visible to contribute to improving horizontal relationships in the region. I would therefore like to ask what the EU's policies toward East Asia could be in order to, on one hand, improve the functioning of the strategic partnership, and, on the other hand, build a more amicable and good-neighbourly atmosphere across East Asia.

The next question is related to the future of the CSDP, as was discussed in Professor Altmann's presentation. To start with, as an overall framework, I would be most grateful if you could elaborate the point concerning whether and to what extent the CSDP can (and cannot) be explained from a normative perspective. If we look specifically at the current Ukraine crisis, the EU's response has been to impose a series of diplomatic and economic sanctions on Russia and to conduct civilian missions to Ukraine. How can we explain these actions normatively?

In terms of sanctions on Russia, the principles that the EU has referred to most frequently are 'Ukrainian sovereignty' and 'territorial integrity'. These principles have been accepted as norms of the EU as they are. The EU has imposed sanctions despite the considerable economic losses they will cause for the EU itself, partly because of the widespread sense within the EU that norms were violated by Russia's annexation of Crimea and its invasion of eastern Ukraine. At the same time, however, it is obvious that completely turning its back to Russia would go against the EU's interests, and would also contradict the EU's identity as a promoter of good-neighbourly relationships across Europe. How can the EU fulfil these different demands—that is, to stick to its own principles and the norms of foreign policy and improve its relationship with Russia as an inescapable neighbour, while simultaneously discouraging Russia from being too aggressive towards its neighbouring countries? If you could kindly comment on this point, I would be very grateful.

Related to this point, I would also like to ask about the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM), the EU's civilian mission to Ukraine. This is what we call a 'rule of law mission', but it is small and its period of operation is currently limited to two years. My question is whether this EUAM is sufficient in light of EU norms. In Ukraine, the so-called Minsk II agreement, which was barely concluded this February, has already become rather meaningless, and it is highly conceivable that the situation could become even worse in the future. I myself have written and commented on this problem quite frequently, my central argument being that, at least in the mid-term, it is almost impossible to solve this crisis completely and fundamentally, and the EU does not have a clear perspective of how this conflict should be resolved. The EU is now calling for the atrocities still being committed in eastern Ukraine to stop: Against this background, how effective it can really be to send the EUAM—a mission that is not directly in charge of conflict-resolution—to Ukraine, and whether and how is the EU planning its next steps? Your comments are highly appreciated.

There are so many more questions that I wish to ask, but the time does not allow me to continue, so those are the questions. Thank you very much.

(USUI) Thank you very much for keeping within the allocated time. So, we have ample time to go

into the details.　I did not introduce these two speakers, so let me do that now shortly. I think they are still quite young relatively speaking, active researchers in Japan regarding EU studies and international relations.　I would consider them to be leading players in that arena.　As I said already, they have contributed chapters to this new book titled *The Normative Politics of the European Union*, together with Professor Day,

Ms. Yukari Akeda, who is with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was planning to be here, could not be here because she is engaging in FTA negotiations with the EU at the moment.　We have received an email from her.　I would like to introduce her email and would like to go into the Q&A and the responses from the speakers.　She is in the midst of negotiating with the EU at the moment. Ms. Yukari Akeda has written two chapters for this new book: one is on EU trade policies; the other on civil societies in the EU.　On the latter chapter, She has considered the various trade agreements as to how the EU is utilizing the norms.　She is now negotiating as a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.　Now, she has three points that she would like to point out.

First of all, Japan and the EU are mostly on par with each other in terms of the strength of power. This is unknown territory for both sides.　In other words, I think that both Japan and the EU have been in negotiation for FTAs with countries of less power, so to speak, but I think that Japan and the EU are on par with each other, almost. This is a first-time experience for both sides.　In the past, both the EU and Japan used to negotiate FTAs with countries where asymmetries of power existed, but that is not the case between the EU and Japan.

Secondly, Japan and the EU both are engaging in this negotiation based on democratic systems and procedures.　However, there is hardly any mutual understanding regarding each other's institutions and procedures.　On the Japanese side, the question is how many of the Japanese negotiators (the bureaucrats) really understand the democratic systems and the procedures of the EU and vice versa.　There seems to be a lack of understanding mutually on this point.　Therefore, even though they share values and norms, still negotiation could be rather difficult because they lack the mutual understanding of each other's democratic procedures and systems.

Third point: EU and Japan are both trying to work on the political, security-based cooperation, and economic cooperation not just through the meeting of political leaders, but by signing political contracts so that they can make the collaboration and cooperation solid.　I think that is important, Ms. Akeda says.　The EU loves laws, and therefore they want to make everything into law and are trying to sell their norms and values to Japan.　However, Japan seems to be rather skeptical of the EU norms and values that they are trying to sell to Japan.　That is what Ms. Akeda is saying.

Let me summerise these three points. First of all, number one, the two parties are negotiating with each other as equal powers.　Secondly, there seems to be a lack of mutual understanding on each other's democratic systems and procedures.　Thirdly, when you try to bring in the binding force in the form of an agreement, the EU side is trying to sell its own norms and values to Japan, but Japan is skeptical.　Those are the three points that Ms. Akeda raises.　I would like to have your responses. Of course, we proceed with the negotiation with the EU.　If there is any hint that you could give to Ms. Akeda, she would appreciate it as well.

We have some time to entertain questions from the floor as well.　Tomorrow the referendum is

going to take place in Greece. What is taking place in Greece of course is significant.   In addition, as Dr. Higashino mentioned, the EU has the Ukraine issue as well.   As much as Greece is important for the EU, however, the EU is not just being run by Greek issues.   Even though there may be the Greek issue, the EU is still solid.   Probably the EU, even with the Greek problem, will continue to negotiate with Japan or with the United States over the FTA.   Therefore, the EU-US/EU-Japan, which negotiation will be completed first of course would be important because the trade agreement sets new norms for global trade.   Therefore, which norm will become more important will be a very important point for us.

Not everything is impacted by the Greek issue at the moment.   Even if there is the Greek issue, EU solidarity is certainly resilient.   You will be free to ask any question including the Greek issue as well, if you wish.   I think that we may be able to entertain three or four questions from the floor if you limit your question to a minute.   Is there anyone who would like to start off with the question first?   We are going to entertain a couple of questions together.

(Question1)   Thank you so much for your presentations.   I really enjoyed listening to the three different aspects of the EU.   I have a question for Professor Mayer.   You mentioned in the list of priorities for EU external action that number three was Russia.   I was wondering in what aspects it is an important factor.   Before, I have heard that Japanese people feel threatened by the rise of China.   Similar to that, I have heard that many European countries kind of fear Russia, so I was wondering if that was true or not.

Also, in first slide you mentioned EU as a model.   I am actually really interested in the actions that the EU is taking concerning climate change.   I was wondering is there anything that Japan can learn from the EU actions against climate change.   Thank you.

(USUI)   Thank you very much.   You may also ask your questions in Japanese or English, but please keep it to either Japanese or English.   There was a question related to climate change and China. Are there any other questions?   Yes, please.

(Question2)   I would like to ask a question in Japanese. I appreciate the presentations and it was a good opportunity for me to listen to the presentations and the comments.   I was really intrigued. Thank you so much for great presentations.

I have two questions.   The first question is on political aspects.   Japan has decided to make it the system such that, when you are 18, you are able to vote now.   I think it is important that young people participate in politics, but that is not taking place so much in Japan.   The younger generation is not that interested in politics, so if you could, give us any advice as to how we can encourage the young people to become more interested in politics.

Secondly, my future dream is to work in an embassy, but I think it is important to learn about the specific host country, whether it is things about politics or security or the economy.   I think that first of all I need to understand the situation of Japan and its systems.   I wish to enter the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and become a member of an embassy's personnel, so please give me some advice as to

what I could study.

(USUI)　Perhaps we could learn from the EU how you can influence the young people to become more interested in politics.　You wish to work probably as a diplomat in the future when you say 'a member of an embassy', so I understand your question regarding suggestions as to what you might study.　Thank you.　Another question?

(Question3) Thank you for the presentations.　We talked about Germany/Europe, Europe/Germany. Germany is important and the president of the Bundesrat, when I talked with him last night, I asked questions about the Euro crisis at moment.　The response was to ask Greece to do what is necessary. I think that Germany is not acting based on norms.　I think it is based on their own interests.　I think that, in terms of monetary and financial issues, the norms probably would not come into the picture so much.　What is your view?

(USUI)　The relationship between Germany and Greece, the suggestion was that Germany was being moved not by norms but rather by interest.　Perhaps a response could be made.

(Question4)　Thank you very much. Having listened to the presentations, I would first say that, looking at the situation from Japan, the EU is multiethnic and it is open.　At least that is the recognition widely held among the Japanese people.　Regarding immigration policies from an institutional aspect, rather than multiethnic, I think the EU probably may have stronger elements of national ethnicity.　In that sense, politically speaking, there may be common aspects between EU countries and Japan when it comes to the very basic fundamental values, but I think that mutual understanding may not be shared by the two sides, so I wanted to raise that point.　If that was not an appropriate question to ask, I am sorry.

(USUI)　Perhaps a cross-cultural understanding may not be so good between the EU and Japan. Perhaps that was one of the points that the questioner was making.　Next question.　Perhaps one more question.

(Question5) I have a question to Dr. Higashino and Professor Usui.　I have recently seen in the European news about the many people in Europe in Sweden and France, for instance, shifting more towards the right in terms of the political spectrum; neo-Nazi types of parties becoming more popular or, in the Ukraine, the prospects about possible enhancement of military actions by the EU countries and the immigration policies.　I think that are the kinds of news that we hear from Europe nowadays. The EU has values based on the rule of law and the value of law.　In Japan, I think it was mentioned our being rather skeptical about the EU norms and values, but if you continue with the current LDP government in Japan, perhaps the EU norms and values will be well appreciated by Japan and the Japanese government.

(USUI) I think that we could speak for about half an hour together with Dr. Higashino, especially about. Therefore, let us talk about the shifting of the political spectrum towards the right both in the EU and in Japan. Perhaps I could also ask Professor Day to respond to that particular question.

I think that we only have about 12 minutes per person to respond to the questions from the commentators and the floor. I will leave it up to you as to where you would like to place the emphasis. May I ask each speaker to respond in about 12 minutes? Then we will have 30 seconds or so left at the very end. Probably Professor Ichikawa will do something about that. May I start with Professor Altmann to respond to the questions?

(ALTMANN) Thank you very much. In particular, thank you for the questions. Maybe I will start with Dr. Takeda who was referring to the history of the common security and defense policy (CSDP). In fact, you are right. For almost 40 years not much happened within the European Community. That is certainly because there have been too many different interests and also one of the strongest countries on the continent, Germany, was in the beginning considered to still be, let us say, the culprit of the Second World War, so that was one of the reason why WEU was founded, this Western European Union in order to somehow block Germany from rearmament, but also the function to enable Germany's smooth entry into NATO. This was one of the very low steps.

The second step was then in 1970 when we had the European Common olicy which did not include defense and security policy because of reluctance from some countries. For example, Denmark and Greece said that this should not be part of political cooperation in the EU. Therefore, the trigger was, as I mentioned before and as you also mentioned, the turn in the early 1990s when we had a development that had two phases. One was the end of the Cold War, which meant that this basic threat that existed before for the last 30 years was not any longer existent, which brought about of a retreat of the USA from Europe.

At the same time, we had these new conflicts in the neighborhood, in particular in the Balkans, where all of a sudden the USA was still requested to act because Europe could not or did not want to. Europe did not have any possibilities, any instruments, any forces, and was also very split as to what was happening in the Balkans. There was on the one side Great Britain and France which were still siding with Serbia as a remnant from the Second World War and on the other side countries like Austria and Germany which were much closer to the Balkans, which felt in particular the huge migration and fleeing people from the Balkans. The latter countries wanted some action. The former countries like France and Britain did not.

I personally met in 1992 at a conference in Rhodes a British specialist on the Balkans, John Zametica, who was the main advisor to the British government on Balkan affairs. I was amazed how anti-American, anti-European, and in particular pro-Serbian he was, and he was the main advisor to Whitehall! Two years later, I read in one of the newspapers that the main advisor to Radovan Karadžić, the leader of the Republika Srpska, the Serbian entity in Bosnia & Herzegowina, was Jovan Zametica - so John and Jovan is the same. Jovan is the Serbian name for John, so this person was born a Bosnian Serb who was advising the British government in a sense that was pro-Serbian, whereas other countries like Germany or Austria, they are not anti-Serbian, but they wanted to interfere. Also

in France for quite a long time there was reluctance to interfere in Bosnian affairs.

Here, again, the USA had to act and the USA really led then this intervention which in the end terminated the Bosnian War. However, this really prompted the feeling in the EU that there is no common defense and security policy and something should happen. Only then the Europeans started to discuss to form a platform for common defense policy, which still did not really function in the 1990s when you think about the Iraq crisis when the United States wanted to interfere and Germany, for example, said, "No, this is not appropriate to interfere in the sovereignty of a state." Still then the EU was split because the British for example backed the US.

I would say that this still exists or is factual today. When we think about the Ukraine crisis, which you mentioned, you very clearly see a difference between countries like, let us say, Italy and Greece on the one side who oppose the sanctions (still they cooperate in the sanction policy, but they officially verbally oppose it), whereas on the other side the Baltic states, Poland, so these former Eastern European states, very much call for even harder sanctions.

The problem, of course, here is again that the EU is not united. The EU will be still led by different interests and the entire European defense and security policy is still an intergovernmentalist approach, although we have the common platform. We have the Petersberg decisions. We have the Treat of Lisbon with the enlargement of the norms, but still when it comes to actions, there is not unanimity in decisions.

Now, we have norms. That is true also in foreign politics. If I speak about foreign politics, I would also include enlargement politics because enlargement is still in between foreign politics and security politics and internal politics. Once these countries are members, it is, of course, internal, but to become members of the EU, norms are very important. You are aware of these Copenhagen criteria, which are three sets: the political, the economic, and then the *acquis communautaire*. This is a set of norms for countries who want to join the EU, countries who are not yet part of EU´s internal, domestic politics but neighboring, thus politically foreign countries in the neighborhood. One of the newer, additional principles is also that these countries who want to join the EU must have friendly relations with their neighbors, so there is a set of norms which clearly exist with regard to foreign and security polices in the EU.

Now, when we spoke about the sanctions and the actions of the EU in the Ukraine crisis, you mentioned the EU civilian mission. This EUAM is an assistance mission (it is not a military, it is really a civilian) which has the purpose, the target to make the state more functional, the Ukrainian state, so they are only assisting Kiev. It is not a mission to end this conflict in Eastern Ukraine or even to talk about the Crimean issue. Therefore, it is clearly an EU civilian mission for Kiev for the state, whereas we still have in addition the OSCE which tries to resolve the conflict in one or the other way or to go in between This is very complicated because you know that the OSCE, this Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has as member also Russia, which always can block if really concrete actions should be decided upon. In addition, at the moment we have as the leading nation, the heading nation in the OSCE, Serbia, which, again, is very pro-Russian and is not willing to join the sanction policy vis-à-vis Russia.

If you then come to the question of sanction policy and whether it really makes sense, I would

pose an opposite question: should the EU just not react to what happened with Crimea, with Eastern Ukraine where very clearly an aggression and a violation of agreed upon international treaties (the Budapest Memorandum) by Russia happened? Putin himself has acknowledged that Russian troops, official troops were entering Crimea, so should the EU just say, "Okay. That is a done deal. Let us proceed as if nothing has happened," or should the EU give a signal? And what signal could the EU send? It is only on a civilian basis, not a military because, as I said before, there is no real common defense policy which could enable the EU to interfere, not speaking about the threat of enlarging the conflict. So the only tool was to think about sanctions trying to show Russia that we do not agree what happened in Crimea, the clear misuse of any international rules. Therefore, I think that this was the only way to react.

Whether there is a plan B now, I would say no. There is just wait and see at the moment. The West, the EU, Brussels is just waiting how and whether Moscow will react hoping also that the sanctions would work in a way that Russia considers to improve its relations again with the West. However, what will not happen is that Russia will give back Crimea to Ukraine, and probably will not be willing to give up its interests in the eastern part of Ukraine.

Now, finally, Greece and Germany You approached the question (I think it was here from the audience) whether German politics is not based on norms but on interests. I mean, politics are always based on interests, but interests must also be based on some norms, and I still think that Germany is so often wrongly addressed as the major actor of anti-Greek politics, which is not the case; which is really not the case. But Germany is the country which is involved financially the most in all of the rescue actions with Greece, and it is not the country which is the one that speaks only negatively against any further opening up or rescue issues. There is a number of other countries like Finland, Spain, Slovakia, the Baltic countries or Portugal whose governments say, "Why should we forgive the indebtedness, the high debt of Greece, if we had to go through very hard measures to overcome the crisis? Why should we pay for Greece´s reluctance concerning necessary reforms?" And these countries are also involved financially in the rescue issues in the ESM and the financial support, so those are the countries which are much more against greater concessions than is Germany.

I think that those were the major question which I could answer. Okay, diplomatic service, maybe just one short remark: to enter the diplomatic service, I just can speak about how it is happening in Germany what young people have to consider. First of all, they must be very interested in international affairs, in history, in general economics. They should have very broad knowledge because, if you want to enter the diplomatic service in Germany, you must pass a first exam with the Ministry of External Relations where these people are asked about very substantial knowledge on history, on economics, and on politics, and they must speak at least two foreign languages. At the moment it is English and French or Spanish, so they must be rather fluent in two foreign languages. If they pass this exam, then they come into a learning process, the attaché training program, where they will learn about essentials concerning diplomatic service.

(USUI) Thank you very much. Next, Professor Mayer, please. Sorry, but time is so tight, so exactly within 12 minutes, please. Thank you.

(MAYER)   There are lots of questions on the table.   Let me make one conceptual remark.   A lot of questions asked what is an interest and what is a norm.   There is a full body of literature on are interests given and eternal and objective and we can find them, or are interests part of a socialization process where identity, culture, ideas play a part.   We cannot distinguish if you take a constructivist line between norms and interests, this is one and that is that, because it is all part of a conceptualization.   What is important in that body of literature is what is so called the power ideas nexus.   Who has the power to determine the norms which then determine the discourse which then determines the action?   Critical theory tries to identify those kinds of relations between power and ideas.   I wanted to do this at the beginning because a lot of questions are related to that.

The one question that came is, is the EU able to impose its values?   Can they do it?   When it is more successful?   When is it less successful?   Membership is a reward which requires internalization of these norms.   If you can offer something powerful, then the power to impose ideas is more obvious than if you cannot.

Coming back to power and nexus, in trade negotiations, the EU always says human rights; conditionality, these conditionality, that.   The cynical scholar in me tells me that the more powerful the partner is, the more powerful the economic interest is, the less powerful is the EU to impose an influence.   If there is any doubt between economic interests and imposing norms, my hunch is, when we talk about China, when we talk about Japan, when we talk about Korea, that those with powerful economic interests behind them are less likely to take norms because the EU imposes them.   They might internalize them regardless of the imposition, but there is a different form of norm diffusion than an imposition of norms.

I will never forget, when I took a taxi in Singapore, the taxi driver asked me, "Where are you from?" I said, "From Germany."   He said, "Oh, Europe.   Euro-Norm III.   I have to change my catalytic converter," for his taxi because the government had taken the norm from the European Union and applied the environmental norm to the taxis in Singapore.   There was not any imposition.   It was just that they were looking for environmental legislation and said to the taxis, "In two years' time, you need to change your car."   That is a diffusion of norms that is not imposed but can happen nevertheless.   It is not part of trade negotiations and there are various forms of norm diffusion which can influence.

On the theme norms, interests, and so on, on the German theme, is Germany following interests in Europe rather than norms?   It is again a combination of the two, and you can frame it through a norms-based you have to follow the rules and the rules are if you borrow money you pay back.   If you say you will reform this, this, and that, then there is an obligation to do so, and if you do not do this, you undermine the whole European project because these norms are holding the project together. And, by the way, there is a lot of solidarity, but it is linked to certain commitments to repay that solidarity.   It can be a very normative way of framing it.   You can also then say, no, it is all about Germany lending, making money, having a reduced euro which helps them to export, having export sort of 7% trade surplus, and so on.   You could frame it through interests.   You can frame it through norms, but what cannot be denied is that Germany is a central player.   I would still consider

it a benevolent player in the European project rather than a hegemon that imposes on the rest of the continent what it perceives to be in the German interest.

There were questions regarding do the Europeans fear Russia as the Japanese fear China. The short answer is yes. The longer answer is the difference is that I cannot see a future for Europe without energy cooperation, trade, and so on with Russia. I cannot see a future of Japan without trade and integration with China in one form or the other. I can see the American security guarantee to be extended further in Asia and this holding. And I can see the American security guarantee holding in Europe as well. The key for the relative success of both Japan in relations to China and Europe in relations with Russia, fortunately or unfortunately, depend to some extent how we develop our relations with America; the transatlantic, the transpacific, the security, and I think the fear is there. The solution is a combination of a powerful resistance and forms of engagement. Having said that, NATO to me – that sounds very conservative, but NATO to me is the instrument to address the Russian threat together with the EU, OSCE, bilateral fora, neighborhood policy, and so on, but the cornerstone remains the NATO.

This leads me to the question about what can the EU do in security in Asia; strategic partnership, interregionalism, and so on? I want to come back to my presentation and say, can they swim? I think that the real issue about European influence in the Asian security arena is limited. What they can do, however, is promote the ideas of civilian power, i.e. constraining the use of force, strengthening the rule of law, promoting non-violent conflict management resolutions, promoting sustainable development, and promoting forms of interdependence.

As far as strategic partnerships are concerned, are they the arrival of interregionalism? To some extent it is because, if you take interregionalism conceptually, it is region to region dialogue, but it should not be bilateral. However, when we talk about the WTO, free trade, but what we have is regional trade and we have bilateral trade agreements, so we have to live with realities that you have the dream of one system and you have the reality of a much differentiated system, this spaghetti bowl in international trade, region to region, WTO, but also economic partnerships. To some extent, the EU is not sovereign to make these decisions.

It is a dialogue and the Chinese, between 2003 and 2006 in their foreign ministry (for those who want to go into foreign ministry) treated Europe as an entity and then they reverted back to bilateral relations. The Europeans also responded, to some extent, by going back to bilateral. As far as the strategic partnerships are concerned, in Japanese, strategic has a strong military connotation and you can ask the question, can you have a strategic partnership with us and with the Chinese and with the Koreans? This somehow does not work. The strategic partnership concept in Europe is not necessarily a military one. It means long-term and important and stable for contributing to global governance. If we look at this comprehensive approach, you can say these countries are important economically, militarily, politically, and we have an interest to have stable long-term relations which is longer than day-to-day business. If you understand strategic partnerships in that context, you can have probably strategic partnerships with these three countries without going into the military conflict narrative.

It is a contested concept in Brussels and elsewhere. When Catherine Ashton came to Tokyo in

2010, I asked her exactly about strategic partnerships, and she said, "Oh, that is such an Oxford question. You want concepts. In reality, it just means important." I was not pleased, but it tells you something how in Brussels these relationships are not, as academics do, defined a, b, c, d and does it make sense because they think differently and they operate.

(HIGASHINO) I was actually there in the audience.

(MAYER) And I asked the question, and she was not happy. She was not happy. Robert Cooper came to me afterwards and said, "Yes, this is how it is," and he explained that she was fresh in the role and so on, so let us not go too much into details.

There were questions about EU as a model in climate change, EU as a model in this and this and that. I think that, as far as Japan and EU and climate change were concerned, there was a lot of cooperation towards the Kyoto protocol and so on. This has become less of a harmonious negotiation, but nevertheless, there is mutual learning and mutual understanding for a common goal. These relations go in phases, but on the whole, I think that Japan and the European Union share similar assumptions.

What has to be said, however, is when we define climate change targets, we always use 1990 and emission targets as the baseline and then said, by 2020, 2025, 2030 we want to have a reduction. For Europe, this is relatively easy because Europe lost, because of globalization, a lot of high energy intensive production, so it is easy to say, "We reduced the target." For a country such as Japan and much more because there is an increase because of aluminum and all that high energy production, car industry, and so on, it is harder to reach these targets which are defined by the Europeans. For China, India, and so on this is very, very different, but it is to understand that the whole framework is framed which favors the Europeans as opposed to others. Questions about real lifestyle sacrifices and how much have you made is a question that the Indians, the Chinese, and so on ask the Europeans all the time. I think that the Europeans feel that they are the role model in climate change, but if you ask, "How much of a real sacrifice in lifestyle have you made?" I do not think there is anything that you feel that you have made a major contribution and other partners have a harder act to follow.

TTIP, TPP, EU-Japan free trade, what happens first and so on – I am sorry, one minute – on the whole I believe TTIP is in trouble. Europe needs a major trade agreement. That is good news for EU-Japan because I think there might be an agreement of EU-Japan before TTIP, but I only have one minute. It is a risky – I throw it out to you without going into too much detail, but on that I think I will leave the right wing parties. I will leave the multiethnic, immigration, identity, and so on questions probably to Stephen, but I am happy to answer if you want to throw it back at me, but because of time constraints, here it is.

(USUI) Thank you very much. Professor Day, please.

(DAY) Do I have 12 minutes?

(USUI)   Maybe, actually it depends on Ichikawa-sensei, but I suppose 12 minutes is probably okay. Okay, thank you.   Please.

(DAY)   Okay, *arigato*.   Just to begin with, I would like to mention something that maybe I did not stress enough in the presentation which begins to address Ken-san's comments: the Europarties are very much ideational/ideological driven organizations. Europarties such as the Greens, the centre-left PES, the liberals, the centre-right EPP, which are often collectively identified as the mainstream, want to promote and uphold their own party political ideological vision as well as uphold general EU norms and values (including support for the development of representative democracy at the EU-level). Of course, this does not mean that they always agree with each other over policy.   These Europarties also want to strengthen themselves in relation to the contextual environment in which they exist because they believe that with greater organizational capacity comes the potential for greater influence.   I think you can find in the literature that deals with norms, many scholars who talk about the need to become rooted in social practice – Theo Farrell for example.   That is what the Europarties are seeking to achieve.

Driving that process are actions, it seems fair to say, influenced by both normative and instrumental reasoning.   This is something that Mayer-sensei highlighted in his presentation and what March and Olsen tell us – along the lines of 'political action generally cannot be explained exclusively via either normative or via instrumental reasons.   It is some combination of the two.'

With that in mind, let us take a look at the contribution that the Europarties made to the process of democracy-building in Central and Eastern Europe post-1989. At that time, it was the EPP, PES, ALDE (under a different name – ELDR) and Greens. It was not always so easy for the Europarties, in conjunction with some of their corresponding national member parties and political foundations, in the early 1990s. They had to go in to what was often a rather chaotic party political situation as the new democracies were emerging. In Poland, for example, 27 political parties were elected to the Parliament in 1991 as a result of a hyper-proportional electoral system. Across the region there was also a myriad of newly emerging small parties. They were often referred to as 'sofa-parties' – the metaphor alluding to the notion that all of the members could fit on a sofa.   There were also lots of historical parties returning from political exile as well as the former ruling communist parties seeking to realign and re-emerge.   The Europarties had to ask themselves would potential partners (i.e. applicant parties) be viable political parties.   Should they invest time and effort assisting them?   The Social Democrats (PES) for example, had to decide, what do we do with a number of former communist parties who were now seeking to portray themselves as social democratic parties?   Should such support come at the expense of, the usually very small, historical social-democrats that were returning from exile (which translated into a rather weak domestic profile once they returned with the partial exception of the Czech Social-democrats). Should the PES reject overtures from former communists, turned self-proclaimed social-democrats, considering that such parties were by far the strongest left-wing current in many countries? Alternatively, should the PES try to promote some form of rapprochement between the former communist parties and historic social-democrats? The EPP faced similar problems. This was connected to the number of centre-right political parties seeking to occupy the same political

space in a country. Sometimes there three, four or five such parties all proclaiming that they were the best natural for the EPP. Under such circumstances, which one should the EPP choose to collaborate with?   Ultimately, there was a lot of time, effort and work that went into the process of forming linkages. Actually the European Commission, about 10 years later, recognized that time and effort by the Europarties in its support for the Party Regulation that I spoke about.   The Commission line was something like, "We will support the Party Regulation initiative because of the work that you have done in Central and Eastern Europe in terms of democracy building."   There were, of course, failures. At the beginning of this process, applicant parties were obviously keen to boast about their organizational and societal strength, as well as their conformity to the norms and values to the Europarty. On occasion, though, such parties would disappear at the next election or would splinter due to personality clashes amongst the leadership. Sometimes financial assistance would be misused etc. etc. Overall, therefore, there appears to be little doubt that the Europarties had an impact on, not only, the democratization process across the region but also the subsequent consolidation of party systems. Underpinning those actions, we can point to examples where the Europarties appear to be taking an action as it was the 'right thing to do' and examples where it appears that such actions were taken for more 'instrumental' reasons – just as one might expect.

Spitzenkandidaten, what did I want to say about *Spitzenkandidaten*?   Representative democracy is built on the foundational idea that those who are affected by decisions should have the opportunity to affect change vis-à-vis those decisions and, if they wish, replace the decision-makers.   That was the underlying normative theme that facilitated the emergence of the *Spitzenkandidaten* process.   *Thus, I think, rather than just look at the outcome in terms of who was finally nominated, look at the overall process.*   I think that the process will prove to be more important, especially as 2013-14 was the first time for this event to be held. *Spitzenkandidaten* 2.0 in 2018-19, is likely to provide, for example, more opportunity for party primaries, perhaps up to one year prior to the European elections, in order for the Europarties to choose their candidates. This has the potential of having a great impact for the party base to get involved and subsequently help generate a higher level of wider media and public interest.   I also think that there will be many lessons learned from this time round.   I partially agree with what you said about the role of norms, in terms of the way that the leading candidates emerged in the PES, EPP and the Liberals. The importance of those norms does not appear to shine so brightly – indeed some of the machinations within and amongst some national member parties appears to be classic displays of power politics.   But in terms of the process - the normative dimension in light of Article 17(7); as an attempt to help develop the representative democracy at the EU-level and begin addressing aspects of the democratic deficit critique – the importance of norms does seem more prevalent.

Higashino-sensei's remarks are a little bit outside my area, but I seem to recall that Prime Minister Aso around 2008 - was he prime minister or foreign minister at that time?   He talked about the arc of freedom and democracy. And that seemed like an interesting idea, but I do not know what happened to it.   Prime Minister Hatoyama then came along. He seemed to be inspired by the EU story – particularly its peace-building dimension, but Hatoyama did not survive very long.

One of the things for me – and it is more of a feeling so I am not sure if it is correct – relates to party-to-party relations at the international level. Japanese governments obviously have strong

government-to-government linkages but when governments change, as they frequently do in Europe for example, that can present difficulties because at the party-to-party level it does not seem that Japanese political parties have such 'active' international linkages around the globe. *Jiminto*, the Liberal Democratic Party, for example, was a founding member of the International Democratic Union in the '80s with Chancellor Kohl from Germany, Margaret Thatcher, and others, but nowadays it does not appear that they are as active in the IDU as they used to be. *Minshuto*, the Democratic Party, was thinking about joining the Liberal International or the Socialist International, in the end it could not make its mind up and did not join either. Although these international organizations, are often accused of merely being 'talking shops', personal relationships and the opportunity to network, I feel, can be very, very valuable. I wonder whether Japanese parties need to boost their party-to-party connections around the world. Even if the ideological colour of the Prime Minister of a country changes, as is often the case across Europe where coalition governments are the norm, so Japanese parties would still have good connections to a government even if their ideological counterparts no longer held the premiership.

Just very briefly, 18 year olds can vote, that is great. I like it. Maybe there is a need for younger politicians to be elected so as to act as a role model for younger people. Also remember that active involvement in politics is not necessarily just about voting. Nowadays there are many opportunities to participate in other forms of participation – so, if you choose, you can have a continuous voice rather than just vote once every 4 or five years.

The foreign ministry question: it sounds like you already learned English. Learn Chinese, and Spanish, and then you can cover the globe in terms of your linguistic ability to make yourself invaluable for the foreign ministry.

The question about Germany: again, I agree with Mayer-sensei that the importance of rules can be also part of the normative dimension. Quite a few commentators have said that that Finance Minister Schäuble is a passionate believer in the European project as a peace project, and he is a passionate believer in the need to follow rules. It sounds like he is being rather harsh towards the Greek Government, but from a normative point of view, he is following what he believes ought to be done – i.e. the need to follow rules, rules which for him appear heavily influenced by the 20th century political history of his country.

Turning to the question about the issue of mutual understanding between Japan and the EU: perhaps we need some kind of Japan-EU Erasmus scheme. If so, it should not only be for students. We need it for young apprentices/young workers right across the society. The opportunity to experience living abroad, to interact, learn a language etcetera, etcetera, are a massive step forward for mutual understanding, I think.

Finally, the rise of the far-right: I guess to start with it is important to put their level of support into perspective. In any kind of representative democracy, especially when the electoral system is a proportional system, it does not seem surprising that such parties are able to gain 10-15% of the seats, particularly during these difficult economic times. Now, the questions for the far-right is, are those voters just *protest voters* who vote far-right once and then return to the mainstream at the next election? Alternatively, is the far-right able to secure those voters, as a bedrock of support, leaving them free to

begin pursuing other potential supportst?　If they can capture those voters, then that obviously begins to be a problem for mainstream parties.　It seems that social-democratic parties are particularly vulnerable, at the present time, to losing some of their traditional voters to the far-right.　At the EU level, there were many headlines after the 2014 elections about the rise and the electoral success of the Eurosceptic parties – both the softer Eurosceptic parties (who want the EU to be just a trading organization) and the hard Eurosceptic far-right parties that want to bring about the EU's abolition. However, please remember that the four mainstream political groupings (EPP, PES, Liberals and Greens) still won 70% of the seats in those European elections.　I do not know if I am too naïve and too optimistic, but 70% in my book is still a pretty impressive figure.　It is not as much as they got in 2009 (80%) or in 1994 (77%) but it is still slightly more than what they scored in 1984 (67%). I definitely think we need to keep our eye on it at both the EU and national-level, especially as with the latter they might have a chance of joining a governing coalition. In addition, we need to be aware that the far-right can sometimes, influence the political agenda from a position of opposition even if they are not in government. On both counts, it will be interesting to see the extent to which governments and parties of the mainstream end up being pulled in a direction, which is seemingly contradictory to classic EU norms and values?

We live in very, very interesting times.

(USUI)　*Arigato gozaimashita.*　I would really like to say my big thanks to the three excellent presenters. Thank you very much.

With this, we have completed both parts, part one and part two.　I hope that the thought on norms and the EU would lead you to think further about global politics.

Now I give the microphone back to Professor Ichikawa.

Closing Remarks

Akira ICHIKAWA

(Associate Professor, Institute for Industrial Research, Kwansei Gakuin University)

Professor Usui, thank you very much.   I would like to thank the commentators and the panelists for their responses.

I would just like to close very briefly with these remarks.   We have focused our attention on the normative politics in the European Union today.   I think, in order to understand the EU, we thought that the normative side of politics in the EU would have to be looked at more closely.   This is why we organized this symposium.   At EUIJ Kansai, and for the students who are studying in the program here as well as for Kobe University, I have noted and was quite moved and touched by the kind of questions that came from the floor and from the students.

I have also written one chapter in the book that has just been published, and I said that the norms may be related to interests, but it cannot be separated from interests and sub-norms, but I think it is impossible to disregard normative politics in understanding the European Union.   Therefore, that is why I have organized this symposium in this way.

I think we have invited three distinguished speakers who were capable of addressing this topic most eloquently and also to invite the Japanese commentators, young and upcoming active commentators, the three of them who were able to give astute comments back to the speakers.   I truly think that it was a good occasion to listen to the views of all of these people.

With this, we have completed the program.

【Lecturers' Profile】

Prof. Stephen Day

Professor, Faculty of Economics, Oita University. Ph.D. (University of Warwick). His fields of specialties are comparative politics and EU politics.

Prof. Hartmut Mayer

Official Fellow and Tutor in Politics at St. Peter's College, University of Oxford and Adjunct Professor in European and Eurasian Studies at SAIS Europe, Johns Hopkins University, in Bologna. Ph.D. (University of Oxford). His fields of specialties are EU external relations and EU-Japan Relations.

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【Commentators' Profile】

Prof. Yoichiro Usui

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
Dr. Ken Takeda

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【Coordinators' Profile】

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